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Abstract
This master thesis analyzes the ethical challenges journalists have in their work, with special regard 
to code of conduct and hate speech. When it comes to the issue of hate speech, this master thesis 
focuses at hate speech directed to minorities in Turkey. 
The media market in Turkey is highly regulated by laws and regulations. As a result of that several 
newspapers have been in trouble with the law. This in turn leads to self-censorship in the business. 
Two media groups own 80 percent of the newspapers. This makes the media very concentrated. 
Media  owners  also  invest  in  other  businesses,  such as  energy,  automotive,  telecommunication. 
Since  media  owners  also  invest  in  other  companies,  journalists  avoid  writing  critical  about 
companies  the  owner  of  their  newspaper  has  made  investments  in.  Hate  speech  directed  in 
newspapers at minorities, are not problematized among the public. After Turkey was founded as a 
republic, there was a homogenization policy in Turkey. Minorities didn't have the same rights in 
Turkey as Turks.  Foreign countries  such as France,  Britain and Russia,  forced Turkey to grant 
minority  rights.  This has caused a  bad memory in  Turkey, when talking  about  minority  rights.  
Minorities are often written about as terrorists, like the Kurdish people. Hate speech can lead to hate  
crime, and there is no legislation of either hate speech or hate crime. 
In order to have some reflections about the issues journalists have in their work with special regard 
to code of conduct and hate speech, I conducted 10 interviews with people who has worked and 
works as journalists, columnists and in organizations which have competence in this field. 
The study shows that it's difficult writing ethical about issues such as corruption, non-unionization, 
Kurdish/Armenian issue, because the media owners invest in other sectors as well. The media is 
regulated with many laws, and these laws can be used against newspapers when they write about 
something which is in disfavor of the government. The media has a clientalist relationship with the 
government,  which  also  makes  it  difficult  writing  critical  news  about  the  government.  Since 
nationalism is deep-rooted in the society in Turkey, hate speech targeted at minorities don't cause 
reactions  at  the  people.  The  only  type  of  hate  speech  that  has  been  problematized  by  the 
government is Islamophobia. What would normally been regarded as freedom of speech, has been 
violated in Turkey, blaming it for insulting Turkishness.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION 
This master thesis addresses challenges journalists working in Turkish newspapers have regarding 
ethical practice and hate speech. The starting point of this master thesis is minorities in Turkey. I  
want to look at how they are perceived and described by journalists in Turkish newspapers since I  
assume that newspapers are instrumental in shaping peoples' attitude towards minorities. It might  
also be the other way around, namely that newspapers reflect the already existing attitude people 
have towards minorities. Since hate speech in newspapers often are directed at  minorities,  hate 
speech is included in the research question.  Further I want to explore to what extent journalists  
follow codes of conduct in their daily work, and if they don't, what are the reasons for not following 
a certain code of conduct. There might be several reasons for not following a code of conduct.  
Perhaps the problem is on the individual level, that most journalists are not well enough educated 
about codes of conduct and ethical guidelines. Or it could be on a structural level, that there is no  
room for following codes of conducts since a code of conduct concerns around ethical principles, 
and media only care about profit maximation. I also want to know whether the issue of codes and 
conducts and hate speech are interconnected. Perhaps lack of prioritizing codes of conduct leads to 
more hate speech.  With these different issues in mind, the research question is formulated the 
following way: 
How do Turkish journalists deal with ethical challenges in their work with special regard to codes
of conduct and hate speech?
In 1997 the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted a Recommendation on hate 
speech that stated the term “shall be understood as covering all forms of expression which spread, 
incite, promote or justify racial hatred, xenophobia, anti-Semitism or other forms of hatred based on 
intolerance,  including:  intolerance  expressed  by  aggressive  nationalism  and  ethnocentrism, 
discrimination and hostility against minorities, migrants and people of immigrant origin” (Council 
of Europe: 2009). In Turkey there is neither hate speech, nor hate crime legislation, and there are no 
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real sanctions if a journalist writes hate speech toward a minority group in Turkish newspapers. The 
only suggestion of hate crime legislation is against Islamophobia. In Turkey more than 90% are 
Muslims, so this suggestion of legislation would not protect the minorities of the country. 
The issue of hate speech in media has been on the agenda in several  bodies in the Council  of 
Europe,  and also in  several  Turkish organizations.  This means  that  this  is  an  issue  also on an 
international level. 
There's a definition of minorities here, since they are a big part of this master thesis. According to 
Store  Norske  Leksikon,  minority  is  used  for  ethnic  groups  which  constitute  a  minority  of  the 
population in a country. The description is also used for subordinated or marginal groups, defined 
from ethnic  “racial”  or  other  characteristics  as  gender,  religions,  language  or  culture.  Another 
important criterion is inequality in power and political influence. In many cases national minorities 
have originated through geopolitical borders between states, as for instance in Europe after the First 
World War (SNL: 2013). The minorities which will be in scope in this master thesis, are Kurdish 
and Armenian minorities defined as ethnic groups, which also distinct themselves from the majority 
in  Turkey  when  it  comes  to  other  characteristics  such  as  religion  and  language.  The  Kurdish 
minority is Muslim, but they have another language, and the Armenian minority has both another 
language and religion, since they traditionally have been regarded as Christians. Other minorities 
are the Romani people, and Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender people (LGBT). 
By raising this research question I want to find out more about two different issues, how journalists 
in Turkish newspapers deal with codes of conduct and how they deal with hate speech. These two 
issues sometimes overlap. If a journalist doesn't care about following a code of conduct because the 
journalist doesn't find the code of conduct that important, the journalist might also not care about 
whether the article he or she writes can perceived as hate speech or not. Not writing hate speech can 
be implemented  in  a  code  of  conduct.  So code of  conduct  is  more general  and often contains 
“recommendations about hate speech” while hate speech is more specific. I think that those two 
issues are connected, and this I will try to show through my data. 
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1.1 Research question
The research question is: 
How do Turkish journalists deal with ethical challenges in their work with special regard to codes  
of conduct and hate speech? 
Those included in the target group are people working in newspapers, television, non-governmental 
organizations and professors working at universities in Turkey. After getting to know about their 
background through the interviews, it turned out that some of the interviewees earlier had worked as 
a journalist.  When writing Turkish journalists,  I  mean a person who writes for a newspaper or 
magazine. In this case not only those who writes a lot of reportages and do a lot of interviews in a 
newspaper, but also those working as columnists, or those who write for a newspaper once or twice 
a week, are included. By ethical challenges I think of challenges that would occur by the news 
production, such as the conflict between doing ethical journalism and writing sensational news. 
By  writing  “in  their  work”,  I  point  at  what  their  working  at,  I'm  not  thinking  about  ethical  
challenges  at  their  working  place,  with  colleagues  and so  on.  According  to  The  new Penguin 
Thesaurus dictionary, a code of conduct, is referred to as both guidelines, principles, and ethics 
(Penguin Books: 2000). Then it's possible to describe a code of conduct as ethical guidelines. In the 
case of journalism, a code of conduct is issued by a press council or a journalist association to help 
the journalists to follow a certain ethical standard. 
1.2 Research objective
The objective of this research is to investigate the experiences and reflections the interviewees, 
which have competence in the field of journalism and hate speech in newspapers, have around the 
topic of the research question in this master thesis.  
1.3 Motivation
The starting point of this master thesis was the minorities in Turkey. The reason behind it is because 
I want to know more about the situation of minorities in Turkey. I had read that Turkey used to be 
much more ethnically mixed before the First World War, and that during the nation building process 
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in Turkey, it became much harder for minorities living in Turkey. This made me wonder how the 
situation is for minorities in Turkey today, and to which extent the history forms peoples’ perception 
of minorities. I had also heard about cases where newspapers portrayed minorities negatively, which  
has  led  to  more  hostility  against  minorities.  This  was  not  cases  particularly  in  Turkey,  but  in 
general. Since newspapers are instrumental in shaping what people think of minorities, I thought it 
would be interesting finding out if it is difficult following a code of conduct, to avoid this sort of 
portraying of minorities, and which challenges journalists have with in the case of hate speech. 
Politically I find Turkey interesting because Turkey is a regional power both in connection to the 
Arab world and in connection to Eurasia. After the Arab spring, Turkey was referred to as a role 
model in the Arab world regarding democracy. A way to look at how democratic a country really is, 
is by looking at how they treat their minorities. Turkey has been an EU candidate since 1995, and I 
also want to explore how this fact affects the media in Turkey and the treatment of minorities.
Hate  speech  in  newspapers  and  in  general  is  a  phenomenon  not  only  in  Turkey,  but  also  at 
international level. This means that the topic of this master thesis is not only in interest for those  
who live in Turkey. In a human right perspective hate speech and freedom of speech can be two 
conflicting rights. What someone will regard as a personal opinion about Christianity, and defend it 
in the name of freedom of speech, other will regard as hate speech towards Christianity. The court  
in a given country is the one with the power of definition of what is hate speech and what freedom 
of speech is, but these decisions are hard to make. This conflict between hate speech and freedom of  
speech, is present in many countries, and is a topic I would assume is of interest also in academia. 
1.4 Research methodology 
I did 10 qualitative interviews in Istanbul with people working in television, newspapers, professors 
at universities and non-governmental organizations. There after I analyzed the interviews by using 
thematic analysis. I'm interested in categories which emerged out of the interviews, and how these 
categories are discussed by the interviewees.  
In the book of Alan Bryman,  Social research methods  (2012), content analysis is defined as an 
approach  to  the  analysis  of  documents  and  texts  that  seek  to  quantify  content  in  terms  of 
predetermined categories and in a systematic and replicable manner. This is a term employed by 
Altheide (1996) to refer to an approach to documents that emphasizes the role of the investigator in 
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the  construction  of the meaning of and in  texts.  It  is  also sometimes referred to  as qualitative 
content analysis. There is an emphasis on allowing categories to emerge out of data (Bryman 2012: 
290-291).
Since the data which will be used in the analysis are not document or texts, but interviews, it's 
arguably more correct to say that it's thematic analysis. But the emphasis of letting the categories 
emerge out of data and the role of the investigator is consistent with the principles of use during my 
analysis. 
I read through all the interviews and tried to figure out which themes were emerging out of the data. 
When several of the interviewees pointed at the same theme, the theme was written as a sub-topic of 
the analysis, and abstracts were placed from the interviews and under the sub-topic. Some of the 
sub-topics were predefined since they were asked a question, and they answered upon that question. 
When doing qualitative content analysis, there is an emphasis at what is being said, not how it is 
said. It allows the researcher to proofread the quotations with the objective of making the quotation 
easier to read.  The data were in the end placed in the context of both the background and the theory 
chapter, and makes the different chapters in the master thesis more interconnected. 
1.5 Related research
There is a Turkish master thesis written in 2006 about press ethics and practice of journalism in 
Turkey: “A case study on Turkish journalists' self-evaluation of their codes of practice”, written by 
Hilal Köylü. There is not so much literature on hate speech in Turkey, but Hrant Dink Foundation 
arranged a three-day conference in Turkey in 2012, which resulted in a book named hate speech 
and hate crime (Nefret suclari ve nefret söylemi). Minority Rights Group International (MRG), a 
non-governmental  organization  working  to  secure  the  rights  of  ethnic,  religious  and  linguistic 
minorities and indigenous peoples worldwide, in 2007 published the report  A Quest for Equality:  
Minorities  in  Turkey.  In  this  particular  project  they  focus  on  issues  like  displacement,  anti-
discrimination  law,  and  educational  rights  of  minorities  in  Turkey.  European  Network  against 
racism published in 2012 the report Turkey: Racism and related discriminatory. In this report they 
write about different issues minority groups are heading in Turkey, such as employment, housing 
and racist violence and crime.There have also been published yearly reports from freedom house 
and reporters without borders about the press freedom in the world. One report that goes more into 
detail about the press freedom 
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in Turkey, is the report of Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV), 2012: Caught 
in the Wheels of Power: The Political, Legal and Economic Constraints on Independent Media and 
Freedom of the Press in Turkey. 
In the case of racism and hate speech in the press Teun A. Van Dijk, in 1991 published the book:  
Racism and the Press.  He has  researched on discourse in  the society,  and how racism spreads 
through text and talk. This book in particular focuses on racism in the press, how the press use 
headlines and topics to promote their opinions, and how the readers use the information they get 
through the press. In the case of ethics in journalism, Jeremy Iggers in 1998 published the book:  
Good news, bad news: Journalism Ethics and the Public Interest, where he writes about journalism 
in general, and issues of following a code of conduct in journalism. 
1.6 Outline
In chapter one you find the background for the topic, the reason for having this angle to the master 
thesis,  methodology research object,  and different  motivations  for  writing  this  master  thesis.  It  
finishes with a presentation of the theory which will be used. 
In chapter two you find the historical background of how minorities were treated under the nation 
building process of the Turkish republic. Politics, media and the society at large in Turkey can be 
understood through the lenses of polarization, which was also the main reason for the three coups in 
1960, 1971 and 1980. Thereafter the chapter shifts to politics in Turkey today, and continue with the 
governmental regulations of the media. It finishes with the Turkish media landscape, which include 
the sub-chapter of polarization in media market, working conditions for journalists, self-regulation, 
hate  speech and social  monitoring  of  newspapers,  which  is  done mainly  by  non-governmental 
organizations. 
In chapter three you find the theory I  will  use for  the analysis  of  my data.  I  will  use social 
dominance theory in my analysis. Social dominance theory is about group-based social hierarchies, 
and why someone in one group tries to dominate other groups.  In order to keep the inequality in a 
society,  people and institutions hold on to different  forms of legitimizing myths.  In this  theory 
legitimizing  myths  are  separated  into  Hierarchy-enhancing  legitimizing  myths  (HE-LM)  and 
Hierarchy-attenuating legitimizing myths (HA-LM). Within the first category (myths) as sexism, 
racism and nationalism fits in. Within the last category (myths) such as human rights and socialism 
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fits in. The concept of hierarchy-enhancing and hierarchy-attenuating also fits to institutions. 
In  chapter  four you  find  the  methodology  of  the  master  thesis.  The  chapter  starts  with  the 
presentation of the research design. The research design contains information about the number and 
age of the interviewees. Thereafter the research question is presented once again, and there is an 
explanation of why Social Dominance Theory has been used in this master thesis. In the end of this  
chapter there is a practical description of how money and time constraints affect the project, and of 
ethical issues around the project. 
In  chapter  five  you  find  the  analysis.  The  sub-chapters  in  the  analysis-chapter  consist  of 
categories/themes that emerged out of the data and themes that the interviewees were asked about 
during  the  interview.  These  categories/themes  are  as  follows:  Polarization,  minorities,  media 
group/ownership,  auto-censorship/self-censorship,  government/freedom  of  speech,  codes  of 
conducts  in  practice/implementation,  nationalism  in  Turkey,  hate  crime  legislation  and 
Islamophobia  and  social  media.  I  start  each  sub-chapter  with  an  introduction,  thereby  change 
between excerpt of interviews and an analysis of this excerpt, and a conclusive analysis of all the 
excerpts in the end of each sub-chapter. 
In  chapter  six you  find  a  conclusion  based  on  the  findings  in  the  data  in  connection  to  the 
background and theory-chapter. 
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CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND
In order to understand the society in a given country, it is essential to take a look at the historical  
events in this country. Since minorities are a big part of this master thesis, the focus at the historical  
background will be about how minorities have been regarded by the state in the transformation from 
the  Ottoman  Empire  till  the  founding  of  the  Republic  of  Turkey  and  the  decades  thereafter. 
Thereafter the focus will be at politics in Turkey earlier in history and today. Since 1999 Turkey has 
been an EU candidate, which has led to a democratization process in Turkey. This democratization 
process has had both progress and set-backs. Media is closely connected to both politics and other 
financial sectors, which in turn affect what the journalists can write about in terms of politics and 
business.  The government  regulates  the media by passing different media laws onto the media. 
These laws affect both freedom of speech and self-censorship and self-regulation in journalism. 
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2.1 Historical background of the Republic of Turkey
The Ottoman Empire lasted from the fourteenth to the twentieth century, and stretched almost from 
Vienna in the west to Iran in the east. This resulted in diverse ethnic and religious minorities being 
included in the empire, most of them being Jews and Christians. Christianity, Judaism and Islam 
have  Abraham as  their  stamfather,  therefore  Christian  and Jewish  minorities  were  accepted  as 
'people of the book' (Pulton 1997: 43).  The empire allowed religious groups limited autonomy in 
governing themselves through the millet system.  
Towards the end of the Ottoman Empire there was a rise in nationalism, as well as demands for 
rights and equality, among both minority and majority groups. Different groups belonging to the 
empire, wanted to have their own nation state, this was especially the case at the Balkans. This was 
at the time when nationalism was on its rise in Europe. Turkey was also affected by the nationalistic  
sentiments. The government failed to meet the society’s demands for democratization and equal 
treatment. This situation led the outside powers such as Russia, France and Britain to interfere in the  
internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire, by claiming to be protectors of the Christian minorities. The 
war with Russia in 1915 almost led to a complete destruction of Christian communities in Anatolia. 
This event has afterwards been called the Armenian genocide, even though it’s not recognized as the 
Armenian genocide by Turkey. 
The peace treaties were established in 1919–20, following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire and its 
allies.  The victorious  states  required  defeated and new states  to  guarantee  the rights  of  ethnic, 
linguistic and religious minorities.  Minority protection was imposed on Turkey in the Treaty of 
Sevres.  Meanwhile,  much of  the former Ottoman territory  was occupied  by the Allied powers. 
Turkey reacted to this intervention by foreign powers with the War of Independence. The result of  
this  War  of  Independence  was the  creation  of  the  Republic  of  Turkey under  the  leadership  of 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in 1923 (MRG 2007: 6). 
The Republic was geographically much smaller than the Ottoman Empire.  They looked to Europe, 
and particularly to France, to find a nation state model which they could use while forming the 
Republic of Turkey. They imported ideologies used in the nation state building process in France, 
namely  secularism and nationalism.  The core  elements  of  this  ideology have  later  been called 
"Kemalism" after Mustafa  Kemal Atatürk.  Nationalism is  often seen as  a  modern phenomenon 
which originated in Europe at the end of the eighteenth or beginning of the nineteenth century. 
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While economic success can decrease the risk of nationalisms, economic troubles can have reverse 
effect  (Pulton  1997:  2,  6).  Since  Turkey  had  experienced  losing  a  lot  of  their  territory  in  the 
transition from the Ottoman Empire till the republic of Turkey, and felt they were behind Europe in 
sense  of  modernization,  nationalism arguably  had good conditions  for  growing in  Turkey.  The 
project of modernization was connected to nationalism. This project was conducted mostly by the 
elites in Turkey, and not done by the grass movement (Kavli 2009: 104). 
After Turkeys' War of Independence, they negotiated a new Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. They were 
again compelled by the European powers to grant minority rights to ‘non-Muslims’. These recurrent 
events of foreign powers forcing Turkey to grant minority rights, has created a memory in Turkey 
where ‘minority rights’ are being associated with an unjustified interference in their internal affairs. 
While a separate legal regime was created for some non-Muslims which in practice meant only 
Armenians, Greeks and Jews, all Muslims categorized as ‘Turks’ became subject to homogenization 
policies. These homogenization policies can be regarded as one step in the nationalization project of 
Turkey. Non-Muslims had to pay the high price of ‘second-class citizenship’ in return for minority 
rights, and various ethnic groups, as well as individuals belonging to non-Sunni denominations of 
Islam, had to suppress their differences in order to get ‘full citizenship’. The process of eradicating  
non-Muslims  from  Anatolia  continued  after  Lausanne  with  the  1923  population  exchange 
agreement,  whereby  Turkey  and  Greece  ‘exchanged’ large  parts  of  their  respective  Roma  and 
Turkish minorities (MRG 2007: 7).
The nationalization process in 1930s formed the official policy of ‘Turkey exclusively for the Turks' 
(Pulton 1997: 115). Many professions were closed to those who weren't ethnic Turks. Various ethnic 
groups who shared  a  common Muslim identity  were  labeled as  ‘Turks’ and became subject  to 
homogenization policies through various laws and policies adopted in the 1920s and 1930s. Some 
of  the  concrete  homogenization  policies  were  as  followed:  nationalist  theories  advocating  the 
supremacy of the Turkish history and language, forcing resettlement of minorities in predominantly 
Turkish areas in order to assimilate them into the ‘Turkish culture’, prohibition of the use of non-
Turkish  names,  the  ban  on  the  use  of  minority  languages  in  schools  and  in  courts,  and  the 
requirement  of  ‘belonging  to  the  Turkish  race’  for  recruitment  to  military  academies  and 
employment in the public sector (MRG 2007: 7). In 1934, Law 2510, regulating the distribution and 
settlement of Turkey's population, saw Eastern Thrace restricted to inhabitants of purely Turkish 
upbringing and education, and the forced removal of the historic Jewish communities of Edirne and 
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the Straits zone. This anti-Jewish campaign led to the flight of 8-10,000 Thracian Jews to Istanbul 
in the space of a couple of weeks. Some of these policies and policies later in the Turkish history, 
have almost led to eradication of different minority groups. 
The situation worsened with Ismet Inönü, the successor of Atatürk. The severe economic crisis of 
1939-42  was  blamed  on  Jewish  and  Christian  businessmen,  and  the  Turkish  press  launched  a 
vicious campaign against them. Religion and ethnicity were the criteria used to define how much 
tax a person should pay. There were two lists: one for Muslims and one for non-Muslims. Non-
Muslims paid up to ten times as much as Muslims. The published list of defaulters revealed that 
they were almost all Greeks, Jews and Armenians. Another aim of the tax was that it would destroy 
many of Istanbul's non-Turkish businesses which had survived the economic nationalism of the 
1920s and 1930s. The situation regarding non-Turkish Muslims was also problematic. A serious 
revolt of Zaza-speaking Sunni Kurds led by Sheikh Said was ruthlessly put down, and hundreds of 
his supporters including himself were hanged (Pulton 1997: 116-119). 
In order to make the people loyal to the nation state, a nation state needs an ideology that people can 
believe in. Building a national sentiment within a given country makes the people think that they 
have something in common. 
2.2 Politics in Turkey 
Turkey has secularism as state principle, and defines their selves as a secular state. The ideal of  
secularism as state principle comes from the party of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, which was the leader 
of the Republican people party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi-CHP). 
The fact that the ideologies of secularism and nationalism was forced from top-down, make the 
ownership to these two ideologies harder. Even though people in Turkey were happy that changes 
were made in the country, they didn't necessary agree to all the methods and the ideologies behind 
these changes. Some people supported the ideology of secularism, while other people were more 
skeptical  to  secularism.  Turkey  has  been  divided  in  two  when  it  comes  to  the  ideology  of  
secularism,  and  has  led  to  a  polarization  both  at  society  at  large  and  within  politics.  This 
polarization in politics was more visible when the one party system ended after the Second World 
War. This polarization further led to political instability in the country. The military took the role of 
protecting the heritage of Atatürk, and when the military feared that this heritage of Atatürk and 
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CHP was in danger, they conducted a coup. This happened both in 1960, 1971 and 1980. A way of  
trying to create more stable Governments, was by introducing the law that a party needed at least 10 
percent to be part of the Government. In 1982 a new constitution was made. Arguably this was a 
constitution made in order to protect the values of Kemalism. This constitution is the one they have 
in Turkey today. Islamistic parties have several times in history been banned, since they have been 
accused of threatening the secularistic values in Turkey  (Kavli 2009: 105).  
2.2.1 Government
Today it is the party called justice and development party (Adalet ve kalkinma Partisi-AKP) which 
is in government. They are the only party in government, which means that they have a one party-
rule. AKP won the Turkish parliament election in November 2002 under the leadership of Recep 
Tayyip Erdogan, which became prime minister in 2003. AKP was founded as one of two successors 
after the Islamistic inspired virtue party, Fazilet Partisi (FP) (Kavli 2009: 106). As earlier in Turkish 
history, the secularist side feared autumn 2002 that the secular nature of the republic and basic 
freedoms was in danger.  Many people voted for AKP in the election because they thought that this 
party perhaps would be better able to govern the country in a more responsible way than the earlier 
governments  had managed to  do.  The project  of  Erdogan  has  been trying to  combine  western 
modernity and traditional Turkish and Islamic values. By doing that, he tries both to please the  
secularist  side,  and the  Islamic  side  of  the  population  in  Turkey.  AKP regard  themselves  as  a  
“centrist-conservative, democratic political party” (Kavli 2009: 108). 
In Turkey the prime minister has a lot more power than the president, and you could arguably say 
that Erdogan has the same power in Turkey as president Obama has in USA. Erdogan is thinking of 
running for precedency in 2014, and also to move the executive power from the prime minister to 
the president. This means that he would practically have the same role in Turkey in the future that 
he has today (Nytimes: 2012).
Turkey still has the same constitution which was made in 1982, two years after the coup initiated by 
the military. Having a constitution which was made two years after a coup is not an ideal situation, 
and is not suitable for the situation Turkey is in today. The government is now working on a new 
constitution.  The  work  started  with  the  setting  up  of  a  Constitution  Conciliation  Committee, 
following  an  agreement  between  different  parties  on  equal  representation.  The  committee  is 
composed of three members from each of the four political groups in parliament. The Conciliation
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Committee held public consultations with a broad range of stakeholders between November 2011 
and April  2012 to  receive  the  views of  political  parties  not  represented in  parliament,  of  state 
bodies, professional associations,  trade unions and non-governmental organizations. For the first 
time ever, representatives of non-Muslim minorities were officially received by parliament. This is  
a democratic move by the Government. 
The  key  challenges  to  consensus  on  the  substance  of  the  constitution  include  views  on  the 
separation of powers, state-society-religion relations and the Kurdish issue. A meeting was held 
between  the  Prime  Minister  and  the  leader  of  the  main  opposition  party  CHP,  looking  for 
opportunities  to  make  progress  on  the  Kurdish  issue,  but  there  was  no  follow-up  (European 
Commission 2012: 7-8). Judicial reform and the normalization of civilian-military relations remain 
priorities of the government. The government has again started to work with its commitment to EU 
accession. Some of the legislation was adopted without enough consultation, which caused strong 
criticism. Members of the government reacted negatively to the criticism from the media and civil  
society,  and  brought  court  cases  on  a  number  of  occasions,  for  instance  when  criticized  for 
supposed nationalist tendencies (European Commission 2012: 10-11).
2.2.2 Parliament
The new parliament convened on 1 October 2011 with all parties represented, following a crisis 
over the courts’ refusal to release eight MPs-elect from pre-trial detention (what is MP?) Work on 
political  reforms  and  the  parliament’s  ability  to  perform its  key  functions  of  law  making  and 
oversight of the executive, continues to be prevented by a lack of spirit  of compromise among 
political  parties.  The 10% minimum limit  for acquiring seats in parliament  remains the highest 
among Council of Europe member states. The 10% limit was made in order not to have stable  
parties in the parliament, but it's also a democratic problem if a party has 9% and thereby cannot 
obtain seats in the parliament. Consultation of civil society remains the exception rather than the 
rule (European Commission 2012: 8-10). Civil society often represents voices in the society which 
are not so often heard, and civil society often has a watch dog function towards the politics in a  
country.  Often  civil  society  organizations  are  experts  in  a  certain  field,  and  that's  why  it's 
problematic if they aren't taken seriously. 
When it comes to the policy making of the media, the parliament in general has a limited role. In 
accordance with strict party discipline which dominates the political culture in Turkey, 
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parliamentarians often vote in line with the party politics. Little discussion on substantive issues 
takes place in the parliament,  and in those cases where it  does, it  is quite partisan.  Opposition 
parties often express their opinions through accusations rather than constructive criticism whereas 
the government rarely takes into account their feedback. The political culture of lawmaking and the 
legislative workload caused by the need to harmonize the national legal framework with different 
EU criteria, prevent the parliament from responding in time to the unforeseen needs arising from a 
fast changing media sector. The regulatory agencies’ role in policy making is also quite limited. 
They have to prepare drafts in accordance with the political priorities of the government, which then 
finishes these before submission to the parliament (Kurban and Sözeri 2012: 18). 
2.2.3 EU
The democratization process in Turkey and the work with writing a new constitution is linked to the 
EU accession process. In order to become a member of EU a country has to fulfill the Copenhagen 
criteria. The key criteria were defined at the European Council in Copenhagen in 1993. Countries 
that want to join EU need to have stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human  
rights and respect for and protection of minorities. Further they need to have a functioning market 
economy and the capacity to cope with competition and market forces in the EU, and the ability to 
implement effectively the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, 
economic and monetary union (European Commission: 2013). Turkey signed the Customs Union 
Agreement with the EU in 1995, and in 1999 Turkey was officially recognized as an EU candidate 
country.  The accession  negotiations  started  in  2005.  Some of  the  European  institutions  Turkey 
already is a member of, is the European Council, OSCE and NATO. 
Turkey’s  acceptance  as  an  official  candidate  for  membership  to  the  European  Union (EU)  has 
generated a huge political reform process, which further accelerated after 2002, when the ruling 
Justice and Development Party came to power (European Commission 2012: 4). There has been a 
progress towards granting limited and conditional language rights to ethnic and linguistic minorities 
and remedying some of the property rights violations against non-Muslims in the 60s, but there is 
still a lot more things to do. 
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AKP have reversed many human rights reforms the latest years, especially after 2005. Turkey still  
has  a  restrictive  Anti-Terror  law,  and  their  Penal  Code  maintains  authoritarian  provisions  in 
violation of fundamental rights and freedoms (Kurban and Sözeri 2012: 64). When it comes to the 
protection  of  minority  rights,  they  have  been  reversed.  Examples  of  these  are:  the  criminal 
proceedings  against  intellectuals,  advocates  and writers for  criticizing  Turkey’s  minority  policy 
and/or advocating minority rights, rising nationalism and racism, the strengthening of ultra-right-
wing groups, increasing attacks against minorities, and normalization of discriminatory discourse. 
This discourse is not just from the media and civil society, but also from state officials at the highest 
level. The assassination on 19 January 2007 of Hrant Dink, an Armenian journalist and intellectual  
which voiced the Armenian question, indicates that minorities and their advocates in Turkey still are 
struggling.  
The election in August 2007 of Abdullah Gul, the former foreign minister who has been working 
with fulfilling the EU human rights conditionality as the new president, is a development in terms 
of  minority  protection.  Much  will  depend  on  the  new  government’s  political  will  to  conduct 
reforms, and its ability to stand up to the military establishment. The government’s initiation of the 
process to draft a new constitution is a promising start.  
The concept of ‘minority’ still  triggers discriminatory reactions. Public officials at highest levels 
make offensive statements about minority identity, portraying it as an undesirable and unworthy 
status. Zeki Sezer, the leader of Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol Parti, DSP) ‘blamed’ the 
government  for  portraying  Kurds  and  Alevis  as  minorities  for  the  sake  of  entering  the  EU. 
Advocacy  on  minority  rights  is  considered  as  conspiracy  against  or  betrayal  of  the  state  by 
nationalists and some public officials. During a press conference, Chief of Staff Yasar Buyukant 
blamed  the  EU  for  creating  new  minorities  in  the  Republic  by  calling  ethnic  and  religious 
communities, such as the Alevis and Kurds, minorities in its reports on Turkey (MRG 2007: 6-7).
2.3 Governmental regulations of the Turkish press
In order to understand the working situation for journalists and their ethical dilemmas, you need to 
know what kind of regulations they have to relate to. This sub-chapter starts with the structural level  
of the media in Turkey, and then on the individual level.
Turkey did not have a regulatory framework governing media content until the mid-1990s, because 
21
of the domination of the state in all sectors of the economy, including the media. Until mid-1980s,  
the state had direct  control  over the media.  In 1983 the neoliberal Motherland Party (Anavatan 
Partisi-ANAP) came to power. This was the end of the military rule, and also a turning point in 
Turkey’s economy. ANAP’s leader Turgut Özal initiated a process of economic liberalization and 
adopted  free-market  reforms.  The  new  government’s  support  for  private  entrepreneurship 
encouraged big corporations to enter the media sector. This changed the profile of investors of the 
media. In the 1990s, with the termination of state monopoly over broadcasting, the Turkish media 
market started to be dominated by a few conglomerates, which increased their economic power 
through mergers, and made competition strategies by setting up cartels and engaging in promotion 
wars. This situation changed with the 2001 economic crisis and the following state regulation of the  
banking sector. Those media groups which had investments in the financial and banking sectors 
were particularly affected by the crisis. The rapid deregulation of the media and the emergence of 
cartels,  led to  the  need for  a  regulatory  framework to  govern  the  market.  This  resulted  in  the 
adoption of the first broadcasting law, and the establishment of the Radio and Television Supreme 
Council (Radyo ve Televizyon Üst Kurulu-RTÜK). The main reason for policymaking in the media 
has been to harmonize better the laws with the EU criteria.  
Policy making in the media in Turkey is a bureaucratic process where priorities are set  by the 
executive.  The ministries,  agencies and institutions  responsible  for media regulation, follow the 
conservative values in the constitutional and legal framework. When there's a tension between the 
values of freedom of expression, freedom of the press and the right to privacy versus the protection 
of the family, nation and the state over the individual, they tend to prioritize the latter goal (Kurban 
and Sözeri 2012: 17-18). The tension between these two values is reflected in the Press Law. The  
Press  Law  protects  freedom  of  the  press,  the  right  to  information,  and  the  right  of  reply  to 
defamatory  or  untruthful  news.  At  the  same  time  the  law  restricts  these  freedoms  on  the 
argumentation  of  protecting  national  security,  territorial  integrity  and  state  secrets.  A  new 
amendment  to  the  media  law  was  passed  in  2011,  allowing  for  television  broadcasts  to  be 
suspended and stations to be fined or closed by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan or other 
designated ministers in cases of emergency or threats to national security (Freedom house: 2012). 
Also here the argument of national security is used. 
In the new Broadcasting Law in Turkey (no. 6112) there are diverse types of restrictions going 
beyond the EU Directive which the law claims to be in compliance with. While the EU directive 
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cites  the  protection  of  children  and prevention  of  hate  speech as  the  only  grounds for  content 
restriction,  the law restricts content on grounds of, inter alia, ‘the national and moral values of 
society, general morality and the protection of the family.’ The state has been criticized for violating 
the freedom of expression and freedom of the press by defining broadcasting principles in  punitive 
laws  rather  than  enabling  the  media  to  develop  its  own  values.  A  further  criticism  is  the 
conservative nature of the values endorsed in the Broadcasting Law by the exclusion of sexual 
orientation as a ground of discrimination (Kurban and Sözeri 2012: 36).  
2.3.1 Penal laws
As I have mentioned in previous chapter, Constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and 
expression are only partially upheld in practice. They are also generally undermined by provisions 
in the Penal Code and a strict Anti-Terror Law. Turkish law does not meet press freedom standards 
as laid out in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). All countries that are party to 
the  European  Council,  have  automatically  agreed to  follow ECHR.  The restrictive  Penal  Code 
overshadows positive reforms that have been implemented since Turkey became an EU candidate 
(Freedom house: 2012). 
Here are some articles from the penal code which overshadow the new reforms in Turkey. These 
articles provide the legal basis for cases against the media organs,  journalists and human rights 
defenders: 
Defamation (Article 125)
Setting  up  criminal  organizations  for  the  overthrow  of  the  constitutional  order  (Article  314) 
encouraging military personnel to disobey the law (Article 319)
Discouraging individuals from military service (Article 318)
Insulting the Turkish nation, state, parliament, government or the courts (Article 301)
Incitement to crime (Article 214)
Praising a crime or criminals (Article 215) 
Incitement to hatred or animosity (Article 216)
Publishing or broadcasting obscene material (Article 226) 
(Kurban and Sözeri 2012: 39). 
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Article 216 of the Penal Code, which bans “inflaming hatred and hostility among peoples”, is used 
against journalists and other commentators who write about the Kurdish population or allegedly 
denigrate the armed forces. You can get six-months to three-year in prison if you are sentenced with 
this article. The academic Ismail Besikci was in 2011 sentenced to 15 months in prison for an article  
entitled “The Rights of the Nations to Self-Determination and the Kurds.” Besikci has spent a total  
of  17 years  in  prison for  similar  publications  on the Kurdish minority.  The cartoonist  Bahadir 
Baruter  faced  a  one-year  prison  sentence  for  a  cartoon  that  appeared  in  the  weekly  magazine 
Penguen, depicting the words “There is no God, religion is a lie” on the wall of a mosque. The 2004 
press law that replaced prison sentences with fines for media violations is here being overshadowed 
by article 216 of the Penal Code (Freedom house: 2012). 
Defamation cases against journalists who criticize the government have been brought by high level 
officials, including the Prime Minister. In 2011, 24 journalists were sentenced to a total of 21 years 
and nine months of imprisonment and 48,000 TL in fines in defamation cases. Two newspapers 
were  fined  to  a  total  of  50,000  TL.  The  European  Court  of  Human  Rights  (ECtHR)  found a 
violation of freedom of expression in their judgment of this issue in February 2012. Prosecutors are 
using the Penal Code to censor the media by penalizing them for covering cases where the military 
officers are accused of having committed crimes against the state.  Recently,  criminal cases are 
brought against journalists for breaching the confidentiality of investigations (Article 285) and for 
attempting to unduly influence the courts (Article 288). These two articles have been used more 
regularly since 2007 because of the Ergenokon case which many journalists  have been writing 
about (Kurban and Sözeri  2012: 40).  Ergenekon is a network called “the state behind the state” 
which  consists  of  high  ranked  military  people,  politicians,  academicians  and  journalists.  The 
network is accused for being behind both terror, murder and disappearances, and makes sure the 
cases remain unsolved. The motivation behind all this is to maintain the secular Turkish state. 
In 2011, three journalists from the website OdaTV were arrested in relation to the Ergenekon case. 
Later the same year the police raided a number of homes of journalists and professors in search of  
notes and computers.  The government and the chief prosecutor in the Ergenekon case says that 
journalists arrested during the investigation were detained not because of their writing, but because 
of evidence tying them to an illegal organization, though this evidence has not been released. The 
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OdaTV staff  was  allegedly targeted  for  their  critical  reporting  on the Ergenekon case.  Mustafa 
Balbay, a bureau chief of the daily Cumhuriyet who was arrested in connection with Ergenekon, had 
been held in prison without charge for nearly three years as of the end of December 2011 (Freedom 
house: 2012). 
Another provision that the prosecutors refer to for censoring the press, is Article 318, which makes 
the  non-violent  expression  of  views  on  conscientious  objection  a  criminal  offence,  and  the 
publication  of  these  views  in  the  media  an  aggravating  factor.  The  provision  has  caused  the 
conviction of journalists for simply reporting on conscientious objectors who refuse to serve in the 
army (Kurban and Sözeri 2012: 40). 
The most widely debated and criticized provision of the Penal Code has been Article 301, mainly 
because of the high profile cases brought against intellectuals such as Hrant Dink and the Nobel 
laureate  Orhan Pamuk.  Five  columnists  of  the  national  media  were  also prosecuted  under  this 
provision for having criticized the banning of an academic conference on the Armenian genocide of 
1915.  Article 301 originated from a diplomatic row Turkey had with France in 2001 after French 
National Assembly recognized the killings of Armenians under the Ottoman Empire as genocide. As 
a result of this diplomatic row, Turkey made constitutional amendments (MRG 2007: 5). 
Article  301 of  the  Penal  Code,  which  prescribes  prison terms  of  six  months  to  two years  for  
“denigration of the Turkish nation,” has been used to punish journalists who state that the genocide 
was committed against the Armenians in 1915, discusses the division of Cyprus, or criticizes the 
security forces. Because of growing international pressure, the government amended, but did not 
abolish,  the  provision  such  that  prosecution  in  each  individual  case  is  now  subject  to  prior  
authorization of the Minister of Justice. This amendment has decreased the number of proceedings 
launched under this provision, but it has still been found inadequate by the human rights community  
(Kurban and Sözeri 2012: 40).  The amendments made in 2008 to this article were mostly cosmetic 
changes, substituting “Turkish nation” for “Turkishness” and “State of the Turkish Republic” for 
“Turkish Republic,” and reducing the maximum prison sentence from three years to two (Freedom 
house: 2012). 
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2.3.2 National courts
The track record of Turkish high courts in cases involving freedom of expression and freedom of 
media is poor. In civil cases high courts tend to go against the established ECtHR case law, by 
ruling  in  favor  of  plaintiffs  who  bring  defamation  cases  against  intellectuals  and  public 
personalities. These plaintiffs have in several cases been high officials, including the prime minister 
(see 2.3.1). In March 2011, the High Court of Appeals sentenced Nobel laureate Orhan Pamuk to 
pay around a 2,500 Euro fine for having ‘violated the personalities’ of plaintiffs for having stated in 
an interview that the Turks ‘killed 30,000 Kurds and one million Armenians’. 
The courts use the Anti-Terror Law and the Penal Code for convicting individuals who express non-
violent opinions on the situation of the Kurdish minority or the armed conflict between the army 
and  the  Kurdistan  Workers  Party  (Partiya  Karkeren  Kurdistan-PKK),  which  is  a  militant  and 
political  organization  among  Kurds  in  Turkey.  Often  they  don't  make  a  distinction  between 
reporting on terrorism and terrorist propaganda, and instead regard ‘media outlets reporting about 
sensitive issues as the publishing organs of illegal organizations’. A result of this is that journalists  
often are prosecuted on charges of terrorism and treated as ‘terrorists’ just for having performed 
their duties to provide the public with information (Kurban and Sözeri 2012: 40-41). Amendments 
to the anti-terror law, officially called the Law on the Fight against Terrorism, which were passed in 
2006,  says  that  journalists  can  be  imprisoned  for  up  to  three  years  for  the  dissemination  of  
statements and propaganda by terrorist organizations, and five years for creating propaganda on 
behalf of a terrorist organization. The legislation has raised concerns about arbitrary prosecutions, 
since members of the pro-Kurdish press are sometimes accused of collaborating with the separatist 
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) militant group. The Ergenekon and PKK cases have further led 
editors  and journalists  to  practice  self-censorship  to  avoid violating  legal  restrictions  (Freedom 
house: 2012). 
The  Turkish  Constitutional  Court’s  case  law  on  freedom  of  the  press  and  expression  is  also 
problematic. The Court has decided not to review the restrictive criminal laws, even when the head 
of the executive branch has recommended it.  In a case brought by the former President Ahmet 
Necdet Sezer, on the grounds that the suspension of the future publications and distribution of a  
periodical violate the freedom of the press, the Constitutional Court found Article 6(5) of the Anti-
Terror Law to be compatible with the constitution and rejected the request for annulment. Legal 
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reforms have also been overshadowed by the Constitutional Court. Where the parliament adopted 
progressive legal reforms in accordance with the ECHR standards, the Constitutional Court ran over 
the changes. In May 2011 the Constitutional Court invalidated Article 26 of the Press Law, which 
imposes time limits on prosecutors for launching criminal cases. Once this decision enters into force  
in July 2012, prosecutors will no longer be bound to certain time restraints if they want to file a case  
about a publication in a periodical. For time being, the maximum period for filing a case is two 
months after publication for dailies and four months for weeklies (Kurban and Sözeri  2012: 41). 
Various  international  organizations  such  as  the  Organization  for  Security  and  Co-operation  in 
Europe  (OSCE),  the  European Federation  of  Journalists  and the  Council  of  Europe (CoE)  has 
pointed out the gravity of the situation in Turkey, and has called on the government to take the 
necessary measures to ensure press freedom in the country. The European Parliament published a 
critical report in March 2011, naming cases against journalists as ‘police or judicial harassment’ and 
expressing concern about ‘the deterioration in freedom of the press, about certain acts of censorship 
and about growing self-censorship within the Turkish media, including on the Internet’. The Turkish  
Prime  Minister  blames  the  report  for  being  biased  and  subjective,  stating  that  the  imprisoned 
journalists were behind the bars not because of their journalistic activities but ‘because of their 
relations with terrorist organizations, and their attempts to topple the government.’ Prime Minister 
Erdogan also protested RSF’s World Press Freedom Index, which in their 2013 report rated Turkey 
as 154 out of 179 countries, which also means that Turkey dropped six places from 2012. In “The 
Press Freedom Index” published by Reporters Without Borders (2013) it's written that they do not 
take direct account of the kind of political system which exists in each country, but they claim that 
democracies provide better protection for the freedom to produce and circulate accurate news and 
information than countries where human rights are more often violated, for instance in terms of 
strong regulations on freedom of the press. In their report they have found that in almost all parts of 
the world, influential countries that are regarded as “regional models” have fallen in the index. In 
the name of the fight against terrorism, Turkey is the country which has the most journalists in 
prison (WPFI 2013: 2, 5). 
In addition to prosecuting journalists, courts routinely issue criminal sanctions against newspapers, 
despite ECtHR rulings. In 2010 alone, the Kurdish language daily Azadiya Welat was suspended 
thrice for one month periods each time. In March 2012, a high penal court issued a one-month 
suspension order against the pro-Kurdish daily Özgür Gündem for having made the propaganda of 
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the  terrorist  organization.  The  judgment  provoked  such  a  strong public  reaction  that  the  court 
reversed its decision just a few days later (Kurban and Sözeri 2012: 42-43). 
2.3.3 The ECTHR on media freedom in Turkey
Turkey has been a member of the Council of Europe since 9 August 1949. All 47 Council of Europe 
member states are party to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Since all member 
states of Council of Europe is a party of ECHR, the European Court of Human Rights follow up all 
their members, including Turkey, and their violations of ECHR. 
The vast majority of cases on media freedom and freedom of expression brought to the ECtHR are 
decisions based on the Penal Code and the Anti-Terror Law. In the case of  Ürper and Others v.  
Turkey, the Court scrutinized Article 6(5) of the Anti-Terror Law, concluding that the banning of the 
future  publication  of  entire  newspapers  had a  chilling effect  on applicants,  warning them from 
publishing  similar  news  in  the  future,  and  thus  constituted  censorship.  This  illustrate  that 
newspapers  constitute  self-censorship  in  order  to  avoid  trouble  with  the  law.  The  ECtHR also 
noticed that the Constitutional Court of Turkey had not taken into account the Ürper and Others 
judgment  in  its  jurisprudence  on  media  freedom.  Concerning paragraph  2  of  Article  6  (in  the 
ECHR?), the ECtHR held that the applicants’ criminal conviction for having published statements 
of illegal organizations and their members, violated Article 10 of the Convention. 
One case which is particularly noteworthy is when the Turkish government had argued that the 
amended version of Article 301 would prevent arbitrary prosecutions for non-violent opinions. In 
the case of Dink v. Turkey, the Court found a violation of Article 10 in ECHR on account of Hrant 
Dink’s  conviction  for  ‘insulting  Turkishness’ in  his  article  published  in  the  Armenian-Turkish 
weekly Agos. Dink was portrayed as an enemy of the Turks and turned into an object of hatred by 
the national media on account of his conviction. He was assassinated 19th January 2007 (Kurban 
and Sözeri  2012: 43-44). ECHR ruled in September 2010 that the Turkish government had failed to 
respond to the ultra-nationalistic hostility toward Hrant Dink. Prior to his murder, Dink had twice 
been prosecuted under Article 301 for insulting Turkishness (Freedom house: 2012). 
In the case of Akcam v. Turkey (2011), the ECtHR held that ‘the safeguards put in place by the 
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legislator to prevent the abusive application of Article 301 by the judiciary do not provide a reliable 
and continuous guarantee or remove the risk of being directly affected by the provision because any 
political change in time might affect the interpretative attitudes of the Ministry of Justice and open 
the  way for  arbitrary prosecutions’ (rewrite  phrase?).  The Court  found not  only the  applicant’s 
prosecution under Article 301, but also the article itself to have violated Article 10 of the European 
Convention.  The ECtHR also addressed the defamation cases  brought against  journalists.  In its 
judgment dated 21 February 2012 in the case of  Tusalp v. Turkey, the Court concluded that the 
sentencing of a journalist  to pay 5,000 TL in compensation for having attacked Prime Minister 
Tayyip Erdogan’s personal rights violated Article 10 of the Convention. Finding that the criticisms 
did not constitute a personal attack against the Prime Minister, the Court repeats that “the press 
fulfills an essential function in a democratic society” and that politicians should tolerate criticism 
because of the fact that they are politicians. According to the ECtHR, journalistic freedom also 
includes being provocative overstating, which the Prime minister should tolerate.  The Court also 
pointed out the significant amount of compensation that the applicant was ordered to pay, which 
was given in order to scare people from criticizing public officials in the future. 
 
Judge Isil Karakas of the ECtHR has pointed out that the ECtHR found violations in more than 200 
cases against  Turkey, as opposed to 10 in the case of France.  He particularly drew attention to 
Article 6(2) and (5) of the Anti-Terror Law and Article 301 of the Penal Code as in violation of the 
European Convention, and recommended abolishment of Article 301. The persistence of the Turkish 
judiciary to disregard the ECHR standards and the ECtHR’s case law shows that the violation of 
press and expression in Turkey do not only origin from anti-democratic laws, but also from the 
understandings  of  judges  and  prosecutors.   He  also  emphasized  that  long  periods  of  pre-trial 
detention was not just a problem stemming from the laws, but also from judges who decide on the 
continuation  of  detentions  ‘on  the  basis  of  cliché’ remarks  which  do  not  provide  sufficient 
reasoning. A CoE Commissioner for Human Rights stated that in ‘the absence of a drastic shift in 
the  adjudicative  approach  of  the  judiciary,’ legal  reforms  will  not  be  sufficient  to  ensure  the 
protection of freedom of press (Kurban and Sözeri 2012: 44-45). 
2.4 The Turkish media landscape
The topic of this chapter is the Turkish media landscape, and it will focus both at polarization and 
competition in the media market, self-regulating mechanisms in general and in Turkey, the issue of 
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hate speech and in Turkey, and of the engagement by different organizations to monitor newspapers 
in Turkey.   
Istanbul and Ankara are the main media centers of Turkey. That's the cities where the headquarters  
of all the national newspapers and broadcasting companies are situated.  Zaman, Posta,  Hürriyet, 
Sabah, Milliyet and Haber Türk are the major ones among the national dailies. 
Turkey’s  media  landscape  is  dominated  by  large  multi-sectorial  groups  such  as  Dogan Group, 
Turkuvaz, Ciner Group, Çukurova Group, Doguş Group, and Feza Group. All the major commercial 
channels and newspapers belong to these media holdings. The distribution of the print media is in 
the hands of Dogan Group’s Yay-Sat and Turkuvaz Group’s Turkuvaz Dagitim Pazarlama. These 
large conglomerates are also active in many other sectors.
Dogan Group, the largest and the most prominent of the media giants, owns a substantial part of the  
media in Turkey, namely the mainstream and nationalist leaning major dailies Hürriyet, Milliyet and 
Vatan,  the  boulevard  daily  Posta,  the  liberal  paper  Radikal (40,000),  the  sports  daily  Fanatik 
(190,000),  the business daily  Referans (11,000),  and the English-language daily  Hürriyet  Daily  
News (5,500). Turkuvaz Group is owned by Çalik Holding which has connections with the ruling 
party AKP. The mainstream Sabah, the boulevard daily Takvim (120,000), the sports daily Fotomaç 
(200,000), and the regional newspaper  Yeni Asir (40,000) belong to the Turkuvaz Group. Gazete 
Habertürk (220,000) was launched in 2009 by Ciner Group. The biggest selling, liberal/Islamic 
daily  Zaman  is owned by Feza Group, which has close connections with the Islamic sect leader 
Fethullah Gülen. Zaman also has a sister newspaper Today’s Zaman (5,000) in English. Çukurova 
Group owns the nationalist dailies  Akşam  (150,000), H.O Tercüman (15,000), and the boulevard 
paper Güneş (110,000). The conservative Islamic daily Yeni Şafak (100,000) is owned by Albayrak 
business group. The Islamic A.Vakit (50,000) is more radical and sensationalist in content and has 
been prosecuted several times. Milli Gazete (50,000) is another Islamic daily known to be the voice 
of “Milli Görüş” which has been the ideology of a certain Islamic political tradition in Turkey. 
Cumhuriyet  (55,000) is not exclusively owned by any multi-sectorial group. The newspaper has 
traditionally been representing the left-wing in Turkey, and is now representing the Kemalists. Star 
daily (100,000) is owned by the businessman Ethem Sancak. Star has a mixture of columnists with 
diverse political orientations. In November 2007, several journalists and intellectuals together with 
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a small publishing house launched a new national daily,  Taraf, which challenged the nationalist 
discourse of the media, and uncovered sensitive issues such as the role of the military in politics, the  
politicization  of  the  Turkish  judiciary  system,  and  governments’ legislation  on  state  contracts. 
Taraf has achieved a respectable position in Turkish media landscape. 
Anadolu Ajansi (AA), Dogan Haber Ajansi (DHA), Ihlas Haber Ajansi (IHA), Cihan Haber Ajansi 
(CIHA) and ANKA are the most prominent news agencies in Turkey. Anadolu Ajansi is the oldest 
news agency and it is the prime source for the press in Turkey. It was founded by Kemal Atatürk in 
1920 to promote the independence war of the Turkish Republic. It is the ‘official’ news agency 
subsidized  by  the  state.  AA has  28  offices  in  Turkey  and  22  offices  abroad,  and  provides 
approximately 800 news and 200 photos to its subscribers each day.
The  independent  news  agency  ANKA founded  in  1972  also  has  daily  news  and  photographic 
services. It provides a daily economic bulletin in Turkish and a weekly one in English. DHA is 
owned  by  Dogan  Group  and  primarily  provides  news  services  for  newspapers,  TV and  radio 
stations belonging to the Dogan Group. Ihlas Group’s news agency IHA has 145 offices in Turkey 
and abroad. It also covers Europe, Middle East, Arabian Peninsula and Central Asia and provides 
news services to European, American and Arabic TV channels. IHA provide service in English and 
Arabic too. Ajans HaberTürk belongs to Ciner Group and CIHA belongs to the Samanyolu Group. 
CIHA has offices in 31 countries including Gaza, Baghdad, Erbil and Kabul and gives service to 22 
foreign media organizations in Arabic language. Another independent agency, Dicle Haber Ajansi 
(DIHA), which was established in 2002, provides services in Turkish,  English and Kurdish. Of 
foreign  news agencies  operating  in  Turkey, you have  Reuters  among others (Media  landscape: 
2010). 
2.4.1 Polarization in media market
The media market  is  an attractive sector for  investors.  One of  the reasons is  because  they get 
revenues  from  advertising  and  because  of  the  media’s  power  to  influence  public  opinion. 
Advertising both provide the main source of income for media owners, and gives the commercial 
media its characteristic look.  
According to TURKSTAT’s Print Media Statistics, there were 163 national, 73 regional and 2368 
local newspapers published in Turkey. National newspaper consumption is over 80%, followed by 
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local papers with 15.3% and regional newspapers with a share of 2.4%. At the national level, the 
competition in this sector takes place over advertising revenues rather than sales. Since the market  
is highly concentrated, most newspapers cannot generate optimal advertising revenues and therefore 
make business while losing money. Dogan and Turkuvaz dominate the market by over 80 per cent, 
which indicates that there is almost a duopoly in the media ownership. This duopoly is not only 
limited to the advertising revenues, they also control the entire newspaper and magazine distribution 
sector (Kurban and Sözeri 2012: 26, 28). 
The political polarization in general and in the media in particular is reflected in the advertising 
revenues. An example of this phenomenon is daily Taraf. During its first two years, the newspaper  
operated under great financial difficulty due to its inability to get advertising from the private sector.  
They didn't want to be associated with a newspaper perceived as too radical by the establishment.  
Some companies avoid giving advertising to the newspaper because they feared it would damage 
their commercial reputation. The former chief editor of Star pointed out that the pro-government 
newspapers are getting ads through exerting political pressure on companies. The big media groups 
that don't manage to balance between the strong power centers in Turkey, namely the army, the 
government, the opposition and the business world, are also too weak vis-a-vis the political power 
of AKP government. Calik Holding, which is closely connected to the government, bought in 2007 
the largest media group. The chairman of the board of this group is the son-in-law of the Prime 
Minister (Kurban and Sözeri 2012: 28, 29, 50). This is one way the government gets influence in 
the media market. The major private holding companies pressure editors and journalists to avoid 
coverage  that  could  harm  the  parent  company’s  business  interests.  This  can  include  avoiding 
criticism of the government or potential advertisers  (Freedom house: 2012). It is difficult finding 
critical  coverage about  the  biggest  companies  in  Turkey.  The advertising  pressure prevents  the 
media from reporting on corruptions, dismissals, strikes or non-unionization in the financial sector 
(Kurban and Sözeri 2012: 52). 
When AKP came to power in 2002, the media owners initially supported the new government. This 
positive atmosphere largely decreased after AKPs' second electoral victory in the local elections of 
2004. The collaborative attempts of a group of political elites and media owners to bring an end to 
AKP’s power turned in to huge conflicts between the government and the media. The fall out was 
particularly visible in the largest media group’s Dogan Group opposition to the government reform 
packages. On 10 February 2008, the constitutional amendment adopted by the parliament to legalize 
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the headscarf at universities was covered by Hürriyet, the biggest Turkish daily, with the headline 
‘411 hands rose to chaos,’ referring to the number of parliamentarians who voted in favor. Hürriyet 
was also a part of the generating of public opinion in favor of mass demonstrations in the name of 
protecting  secularism.  This  mass  demonstration  has  later  found  to  be  co-organized  by  groups 
involving retired military leaders. After this event the AKP government figured out a strategy to 
eliminate media opposition. They forced the Dogan Group to downsize its media investments by 
introducing disproportionately heavy fines for tax fraud (Kurban and Sözeri  2012: 49- 50). The 
alleged  tax  evasion  was  worth  some  $3  billion.  In  February  2011,  the  courts  overturned 
approximately  $1.1  billion  in  fines  and  interest  allegedly  owed  by  Dogan.  The  Dogan  Group 
announced in April that it was selling two of its major papers,  Milliyet and Vatan, to the Karacan 
family in partnership with the Demirören Group for $74 million, in order to raise funds to pay the  
remaining taxes and fines. Demirören and the Karacan family had a dispute over the control of 
these two papers, forcing a third party to step in to administer them. As a result of this ongoing 
disagreement,  journalists  working  in  these  papers  were  having  trouble  getting  paid.  Dogan 
employees have after this bad experience reported practicing self-censorship to avoid more trouble 
with the law (Freedom house: 2012). The side various media organs chose to align with in the 
conflict between the military and the government is not just a question of political reference, but is 
also a reflection of the deep social, economic and political transition taking place in the country 
since the early 1980s (Kurban and Sözeri 2012: 13). 
As a result of the economic consequences it might have if a newspaper covers a case which the 
government doesn’t approve,  newspaper are reluctant to address sensitive issues. Many of those 
issues  are  minority  issues,  such as  the  Kurdish  and Armenian  issues.  Other  issues  can be  the 
position of the Army and the Cyprus question. An example of this phenomenon occurred after the  
death of 34 Kurdish civilians who were bombed by military fighter jets in the Uludere/Roboski 
village of the Hakkari province at the end of 2011. The victims were villagers engaged in cross-
border smuggling who were reportedly mistaken as PKK militants. The mainstream media did not 
cover the massacre in the first 18 hours and waited till the government issued a press statement 
before they released their first coverage. When they had released their first coverage, the public 
opinion was already informed about the incident through the Kurdish news sources and the social 
media.  This  incident  damaged  the  reliability  of  the  mass  media  in  the  dissemination  of  news 
(Kurban and Sözeri 2012: 51). 
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2.4.2 Working conditions for journalists
The new ownership structure at the beginning of the 1980s resulted in a shift in the journalistic 
profession. Traditional family-owned media ownership was replaced by new investors who already 
operated in other industries of the economy such as energy, telecommunications,  finance or the 
construction sector. The new owners of the Turkish press gradually carried the corporate mentality 
to their media operations. The commercialization of the media led to an increase in the sensational  
news and tabloidization of the press (Kurban and Sözeri 2012: 23, 49).
In  the  1990s  the  market  was  deregulated.  This  resulted  in  the  development  of  ‘clientalist’ 
relationships between media patrons and the state. The media patrons began to put pressure on 
politicians to maximize their profits in their other activity areas, using their media outlets. While 
media owners competed with each other financially, they shared a common mindset of protecting 
the ‘state interest’ (Kurban and Sözeri 2012: 49). The media owners shared this common mindset of 
protecting the 'state interest' because they are dependent on the state to maximize their profits in  
other areas. That is why they want to maintain this clientalist relationship. 
This  relationship  between  the  media  owners  and  the  state,  also  have  consequences  for  the 
journalists. The new media owners often force journalists to make a choice between their labor 
union memberships and their jobs. Most of the media employees are forced to work outside the 
legislation  regulating  the  rights  of  journalists  (known as  the  law 212)  and  without  permanent 
contracts. Media workers who are not provided a contract under the law 212 cannot obtain a press 
card and cannot become a member of the Turkish Journalists Union (Türkiye Gazeteciler Sendikas- 
TGS) which is the only trade union that has the authority to negotiate collective agreements for 
journalists.  Due  to  the  pressure  of  the  media  owners,  the  influence  of  TGS  has  diminished 
considerably (Media landscape: 2010). A labor union representative stated that as soon as employers 
find out about their unionized employees, they pressure them to quit the union. He added that their  
members who were dismissed due to their union activities have great difficulties finding a job in the 
sector (Kurban and Sözeri 2012: 54). 
In Turkey there was a financial crisis in 2001. This crisis was caused by the patronage relationship 
of  media  conglomerates,  politicians  and  businessmen  through  widespread  corruptions  in  the 
banking sector. This crisis resulted in the dismissal of about 5,000 journalists working in media 
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groups that had investments in the banking sector. Few dare to bring a lawsuit against their former 
employers  because they fear that they will  not find a  job in the sector  afterwards.  There is  an 
unwritten rule that media companies don't hire journalists another media company has fired. This is 
another reason why people are reluctant to being a member of a union, since it has happened that 
members have been dismissed due to their union activities. Research conducted for the TESEV 
report  (2012) shows that a very high number of media employees lack social  security benefits. 
Journalists are forced to frequently change jobs, resulting in high and media companies are reluctant  
to have a transparent policy when it comes to labor relations (Kurban and Sözeri 2012: 50, 54). This 
media ownership structure raises concerns about the objectivity and independence of the journalists, 
and hinders diversity and pluralism in media (Media landscape: 2010). 
Media  enterprises  that  make  no  profit  and  work  under  conditions  that  are  not  economically 
profitable, survive just on the resistance of their owners. Labor exploitation is a significant source 
of media subsidy in Turkey. A media executive stated that this situation creates an extraordinary 
pressure for cost-cutting on the owners. These conditions make issues such as increasing the quality 
of journalists and improving their working conditions secondary, and result in informal employment 
practices which are harmful for journalists. An editor working for a broadcasting company said that 
the lack of skilled journalists  in the sector was a fact because nobody wanted to invest in high 
quality media in Turkey, and that they rather try to employ young and inexperienced journalists who 
don’t pay attention to the ethical aspect of the media’ (Kurban and Sözeri 2012: 56). 
2.4.3 Self-regulation 
Self-regulation is  done by the press for the reason of maintaining professional  respect,  provide 
reliable  news,  and  comment  what  should  and  should  not  be  done  in  order  to  be  regarded  as 
trustworthy by the reader.  There are  three  mechanisms established in journalism to make these 
values more likely to be implemented, namely ethical codes, press councils and ombudsman. 
The ethical codes of the press are composed of the entirety of the principles ensuring objectivity in 
news, the primacy of the public rights to information, the confidentiality of private life and news 
sources, the avoidance of the provocation of violence and conflict as well as of discrimination.
The effort to establish written ethical codes in journalism began with the creation of professional 
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associations. These associations as well as the societies and trade unions that were formed at the 
beginning of the century referred to basic ethical principles in their declarations. Later, the press-
media organs began to determine their own ethical codes (Höylü 2006: 30-31). A code of conduct 
comprises a set of principles and rules determined by members of the profession to let the media 
perform the best service possible  to  the public.   The basic responsibility  of the journalist  is  to 
provide public opinion with correct, unbiased and principled news (Höylu 2006: 7, 12). 
Associations such as the press council, include the representatives of the public as well as of the 
press, and have the power to issue adjudications which must be published in the paper. It also has 
the  power  to  impose  small  fines.  An ombudsman is  someone  who receives  and  evaluates  the 
complaints of readers relating to the press and finds solutions to remove tensions between the press 
and the reader. He is responsible for investigating readers’ complaints about the accuracy, balance, 
and  quality  of  published  news  stories.  The  ombudsman  produces  appropriate  suggestions  and 
responses  to  clarify  stories  or  to  correct  errors.  The  characteristics  which  establishes  the 
independence  of the  ombudsman is  his  special  status which  separates  him from the journalists 
(Höylu 2006: 32, 34). 
The problem with journalism is that journalistic decisions often are being made not on the basis of 
journalists’ professional expertise about what it is important for the public to know, but on the basis  
of market research about what kinds of things potential customers would want to know (Iggers 
1998:  78).  This  is  one  obstacle  of  the  implementation  of  a  code  of  conduct.  What  potential 
customers would want to know may not be regulated by ethical values. 
One thing to bear in mind, is that the sort of ethical discourse that takes place on a daily basis  
among journalists is different from the more abstract and theoretical discourse that can be found in 
codes of conducts. The way journalists report and edit, are shaped by the relations of power and by 
the  institutional  priorities  within  the  organizations  that  employ them (Iggers  1998:  15-16)  (see 
2.4.1). 
In the book of Iggers (Good news, bad news: Journalism Ethics and the Public Interest, 1998) there 
are several theories of why journalists can have difficulties articulating their responsibilities. James 
Carey of Columbia University offers a set of explanations. His essay, “Journalists Just Leave”, takes 
its title from a remark made by Arthur Caplan, former associate director of the Hastings Center. He 
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observed that nearly all other professional groups that attend conferences at the center start ethics 
study groups, organizations, journals, or engage in other forms of ethical discourse, except for the 
journalists.  Carey’s  explanations  are  that  neither  journalists  nor  philosophers know how to talk 
about  journalism ethics,  and  that  journalists  fear  that  to  have  a  public  discussion  about  their 
professional ethics is the first step down the road to increased regulation. Since journalism is a far  
more public activity than medicine for instance, journalists feel more exposed and more defensive 
about  their  practices.  Unlike  the  doctors,  lawyers,  and  ministers  who  provide  the  model  for 
discussion of professional ethics, journalists  are not independent practitioners serving individual 
clients, but rather hired working for large organizations (Iggers 1998: 28). 
2.4.4 Self-regulation in Turkey
With these issues in mind regarding the difficulties with self-regulation and ethical codes in general, 
the focus shift form self-regulation in general to self-regulation and ethical codes in the case of 
Turkey. 
Self-regulation came on the agenda after the coup in 1960. The search for self-regulation to prevent  
journalists from being subjected to governmental restrictions, resulted in the founding of the Press 
Ethics  Legislation  and  the  Press  Honor  Board  (Höylu  2006:  35).  Journalists  had  also  earlier 
addressed the issue of self-regulation, but because of the worsening of the relationship between the 
press and the government, it had been problematic to get through their wish of self-regulation of the 
press. The press felt more free when the restrictions on the freedom of the press, by the National 
Unity Committee, turned out not to be implemented. Since certain newspapers were challenging 
this  new  freedom,  some  journalists  were  concerned  they  would  face  restrictions  again.  The 
Journalists Organization and the Istanbul Journalists Union convened a meeting with the newspaper 
owners and reached an agreement on the establishment of a self-regulatory mechanism. 
The journalists  and newspaper  owners  who gathered to  celebrate  Press  Day on July  24,  1960, 
proceeded to  conclude  the  Press  Ethics  Code.  They also  adopted  a  document  establishing  the 
foundations of the Press Honor Council. The goal of the Press Honor Council was to bring into 
operation the Press Ethics Code and to start with a self-regulatory mechanism. By adopting the 
Press  Ethics  Code,  journalists  were  for  the  first  time  acknowledging  the  framework  of  their 
Profession. The regulations both described the journalists’ duties and defined what is regarded as 
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unacceptable (Höylu 2006: 38).  The Press Honor Board was a voluntary professional institution 
and membership in it required a written covenant. The board was in the end unsuccessful because of  
its shortcomings that emerged over time. 
A shortcoming originating from the structure of the board was that they had no power to impose  
sanctions on those who were guilty of violating the Press Ethics Code. During the first year the 
Board had become powerless in preventing irresponsible  publications because of its inability to 
obtain the necessary respect. The self-regulatory efforts of the press continued after the failure of 
the Press Honor Board, and on 14 February 1972, the Turkish Journalists Union endorsed the Press 
Ethics Codes of Journalism adopted by the International Press Institute. The codes constitute the 
second basic document in the field of press ethics after the Press Ethics Code (Höylu 2006: 39, 42). 
The Turkish Press Council was formed by a group of journalists in 1986, and is supported by media  
owners as well. The Press Council, which had the aim of 'a freer and more respected press', declared  
‘the Professional Ethics of the Press’ to create a media environment where ethical principles were 
implemented.  It  developed  its  own  charter,  which  was  most  recently  amended  in  2003.  The 
independence  of  this  body  from the  state  and  official  ideology  has  been  highly  contested  by 
members of the profession. Currently, the Press Council ‘accounts to very few newspapers and does 
not enjoy significant respect among the media community’. A group of journalists, who parted their 
way with the Press Council, recently established the Media Association (Medya Dernegi) to support 
and raise the standards of the media. In 2011, the association announced a new code of ethics for 
journalists, which was developed during a three-day Media Ethics Workshop held in January of the 
same year.  
The Turkish Journalists Association (Türkiye Gazeteciler Cemiyeti), which was formed in 1946, 
made  sure  that  the  Council  did  not  represent  all  journalists  through  its  own  ‘Rights  and 
Responsibilities of Turkish Journalists Declaration’ in 1998. This declaration is the most referred 
source on ethical codes for journalism. Some media groups and newspapers have in recent years 
declared  their  own  professional  codes  and  established  self-regulatory  institutions.  The  most 
noteworthy is the Publication Council of the Dogan Group with its publication codes (Höylu 2006: 
55-56)  (Kurban  and  Sözeri  2012:  53).  To  sum up  the  efforts  of  establishing  a  self-regulatory 
mechanism,  one  can argue  that  the  ideological  polarizations  and political  divisions  within  and 
among various media and journalists’ associations prevent them from engaging in collaborative 
efforts to develop rules of self-regulation.     
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The last  form of  self-regulatory mechanism is  ombudsman.  The institution of ombudsman was 
initiated in Turkey with the appointment of Yavuz Baydar by Milliyet, which is part of the Dogan 
Media Group, at the beginning of 1999. Baydar used his weekly ‘Readers’ Representative’ column 
in Milliyet  to respond to complaints from readers and to criticize editors and journalists in the 
context of professional principles. Baydar also published the views of the journalists responsible for 
the  stories  (Höylu  2006:  60).  Newspapers  like  Sabah,  Hürriyet,  Vatan,  Yeni  Safak,  Aksam and 
Zaman have ombudsman too (Media landscape: 2010). 
2.4.5 Hate speech 
Hate speech is often directed at minorities, and is a certain form of discrimination of other people. 
In a code of conduct, discrimination is often included. In order to say anything about hate speech, I  
need to define what hate speech is. I have chosen to use the definition of hate speech made by the  
Council of Europe. The fact that they have made a definition of hate speech, insinuates that hate 
speech is a topic of international interests. 
The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted in 1997 a Recommendation on hate 
speech that stated the term:
“shall be understood as covering all forms of expression which spread, incite, promote or justify  
racial hatred, xenophobia, anti-Semitism or other forms of hatred based on intolerance, including:  
intolerance expressed by aggressive nationalism and ethnocentrism, discrimination and hostility  
against minorities, migrants and people of immigrant origin” (Council of Europe: 2009). 
As I  have written earlier  in this  master thesis,  the media has a clientalist  relationship with the 
government/state. The media owners have the power to influence the government in the way that 
they can take a pro-government stance through the news they print in their newspapers, and thereby 
the government can give them some advantages with giving them more state contracts (see 2.4.1).  
This means that both the media and the government/state are institutions with power. 
There is one scholar in particular which looks at the relationship between the press and the state,  
namely Teun Van Dijk. He has been a professor of discourse studies at the University of Amsterdam 
until 2004, and is at present professor at the Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona. In his book 
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(Racism and the Press, 1991) he describes these two institutions as  power elites. He thinks that 
despite  its  dependence  on  other  power  elites,  the  press  does  not  passively  participate  in  the 
reproduction of power. The press also produces its own dimension of the power structure through its 
strategies of selection, emphasis, focusing, exaggeration, relevance assignment, description, style or 
rhetoric. They press also have the power to set the agenda and to define the reality. 
The term elite racism implies that these elites have a special set of racist ideologies and practices, 
and also that their position allows them to preformulate those of the population at large, and to  
produce and reproduce the majority ethnic consensus. Anti-racist ideologies can be marginalized 
and excluded from popular opinion formation. Groups that work for the weakening of majority 
group control, and especially of political and corporate control, risk being attacked with the media's 
own strategies.  These  strategies  can  be  everything from verbal  abuse  to  more  subtle  forms  of 
marginalization, such as limiting access, biased reporting and quotation, or discrediting (Dijk 1991: 
41-44). 
The press has different strategies of how to reach their potential readers. They define the message 
they want to communicate by how they phrase the headline. They summarize what they perceive to 
be the most important aspect with the news. The journalists’ definition of the situation influences 
the  interpretation  made  by  the  readers.  Headlines  are  usually  read  first,  and  the  information 
expressed in the headline is used by the reader during the process of understanding the meaning of 
the rest of the text. They are also used to activate the relevant knowledge the reader needs in order  
to understand the news report. 
Headlines also have an important role in the everyday routines of news production. Just like the 
readers, journalists use summarizing headlines to understand and memorize the information they get  
from their many sources. They are not only written in order to do the best summary for a news 
report,  but also in order to draw attention from the readers. That's because readers often decide 
whether to read a news report or not on the basis of the information in the title (Dijk 1991: 51). 
Headlines about minority affairs are essential in the definition of minority events. In the right-wing 
press,  this  definition  tends to  be negative.  If  minorities,  immigrants,  anti-racists  or the left  are 
generally  defined  as  a  problem  in  the  conservative  press,  these  headlines  may  even  further 
emphasize this evaluation by defining them as criminals, deviants, irrational mobs or lunatics. 
Topics represent what news-makers consider to be the most important information about a news 
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event.  The  selection  of  topics  results  from routines  of  news-making,  and  embodies  criteria  of 
journalistic decisions about the newsworthiness of different events (Dijk 1991: 69-71). The way the 
press presents and represents social actors, is part of a broader ideological structure of value. It is 
this ideology that explains why specific groups are dealt with positively or negatively and why such 
value judgments constitute a coherent system of social representation. This system features norms 
and values that define fundamental  goals of groups and their  members.  In the editorials of the 
conservative press, and especially of the tabloids, this ideological framework is more visible and 
straight forward (Dijk 1991: 147).
Dijk thinks that the special role of the press needs to be evaluated in terms of its uses by the readers 
and the ways readers process the news (Dijk 1991: 23). In order to understand how readers process 
the news, you need to ask the readers themselves. This is often done by conducting interviews. 
Teun A. Van Dijk carried out in-depth interviews with around 150 people in the Netherlands and 
asked them about a number of 'minority' issues they had learned about from newspapers. Through 
discourse analysis of these interviews he got insight into the minority attitudes and ideologies of 
different kinds of readers, and of how their perception of the news are shaped by the contents of the 
press stories about these issues (Dijk 1991: 224). He asked people to talk informally about the  
minority issues they have read about in the newspaper and to analyze such interviews. This will  
raise  suggestions  about  the  detailed  contents  and  structures  of  more  general  attitudes  about 
minorities, as well as about some of the relations between these social representations and the social 
representations  of  journalists  expressed  and  conveyed  by  news  reports  in  the  press.  (Find  an 
explanation for social representation)
A first assumption is that the formation or change of the minority beliefs of the readers as a function 
of news reports in the press, presupposes that the readers actually understand such news reports. 
Research shows that many people sometimes understand very little of news reports. The process of 
influence must be based on that 'little' that readers do understand. What the people do understand of 
new  reports,  they  can  only  use  their  relevant  information  later  when  they  remember  this 
information. Any influence of the press must be based on the little people memorize of what they 
read (Dijk 1991: 227-228). The processes of generalization and abstraction often involve discourse 
and communication. People hear or read how other people understand and evaluate events and often 
adapt their models to those of others, if only in order to be able to communicate, or to feel like a  
competent member of a group. Few of the interviewees have direct personal experiences with the 
minority events they learned about through public or personal communication (Dijk 1991: 230, 233, 
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236). One conclusion from the analysis of their recall protocols is that time delays are not always a 
main factor in such recalls. When an event is massively reported, the readers may effectively have 
integrated this story in their models and their more general knowledge and attitudes towards this 
group (Dijk 1991: 243). Another conclusion is that the media plays a key role in determining how 
the public thinks about social and political reality. Even though the media may have different short-
range effects on media users, they influence the formation of ideological frameworks which the 
readers shape after reading the news (Dijk 1991: 225).
Editorials offer practical, common-sense frameworks for making sense of the social situation in the 
society.  Many  readers  accept  these  editorials,  just  because  they  have  no  occasion  to  form 
alternative, anti-racist attitudes and ideologies (Dijk 1991: 150). Newspapers are easy accessible, 
and no “class-phenomenon”. You don't need to be educated to read the newspapers. This is one of 
the problems with news in the newspapers, if you don't have any other sources of information, you 
can base your knowledge upon distorted news without knowing it. 
Peoples' opinion-making process is slightly different. Once people have acquired some information 
about specific minority events, people may accept or disregard the more neutral or negative bias 
associated with these stories in their newspapers. Right-wing readers of a right-wing newspaper 
have an ideological framework that facilitates the development of right-wing opinions whatever the 
opinion of their newspaper. The same could be said to be true for left-wing readers of left-wing 
papers. They will tend to form biased models of situations reported in the press if these situations 
can  be  interpreted  in  line  with  their  dominant  prejudiced  attitudes.  Press  opinions  and  reader 
opinions will tend to be similar and reinforce each other, which is also obvious from the very choice 
of newspapers in the first place (Dijk 1991: 237-238). 
By comprehensive reporting the media are able to define a public debate and to communicate the 
essential contents of minority situations that have lasting effect on people's knowledge about the 
society at  large.  Analysis  of  the opinions expressed in  the interviews,  showed that  the opinion 
structures adopted by the readers closely followed those made available by the newspapers. Even 
though  there  are  variations  in  the  attitude  structures  disclosed  by  the  newspapers,  there  is  a 
remarkable consensus about the main points of the debate. People may differ about specific points 
of policy, and have the imagination that there is a 'free debate' in the newspapers. In practice very 
few readers provoke the ideologies about the minority situation as it is defined by politicians and 
newspapers. The media provide the facts and opinions that people use partly in what to think, and 
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which they also use in devising how to think about minority affairs (Dijk 1991: 244). 
2.4.6 Hate speech in Turkey
I've talked about the press in general and how they define what the readers think of for instance 
minority  events in the newspapers.  Now I want to explore this  topic in  more specific  terms. I  
assume that even though Dijk wrote about the European press, you find similarities on the structural 
level between the European press and the Turkish press. I claim that my findings in this section, 
strengthens  Dijks'  claims that  the  press  influence  the  interpretation  the  readers  have  of  certain 
events they read about in the newspapers. I take this one step further, and shows that when people 
read about racism and hate speech in  the newspapers,  it  can also lead them to do hate  crimes 
towards those people which they read about in the newspapers. 
Hrant Dink foundation, which was founded after the assassination of Hrant Dink, conducted a one-
year study on hate speech in Turkish newspapers. They categorized their hate speech findings, and 
the  most  frequently  seen  hate  speech  they  analyzed,  were  hostility/  war  speech,  followed  by 
invectives  /defamations/denigrations,  followed  by  exaggeration  /ascription  /  distortion  and 
symbolization. In many examples, more than one of these categories was present. When this was 
the case, the dominant speech was taken into consideration for analysis purposes (Dalkiram 2012: 
5).  Earlier  in  my master  thesis  I've written about  journalists  that  have  been  charged for  being 
connected to terrorist organizations, or doing terrorist propaganda when they write critically about 
the Kurdish issue. When you find hate speech in newspapers, it's the other way around. Hate speech 
in newspapers is a result  of uncritical journalism, and this kind of journalism has arguably less 
problem of passing self-censorship. 
The Turkish nationalism is regarded as the fundamental value in Turkish newspapers even though 
there are some ideological  differences between different  newspapers in Turkey. This value  also 
forms  the  discourse  about  Kurds,  Alevis  and  Gypsies  and  Armenians  (Göktas  2012:  95). 
Nationalism can be linked with hate speech, and strengthens the in-group or the majority group in 
the society. When it is defined as a positive value, hate speech actually becomes less controversial 
than  critical  reporting  of  news  event.  Earlier  in  Turkish  history  nationalism  has  had  extreme 
consequences, for instance when Turkey exchanged populations with Greece, mobs attacks were 
tolerated, non-Muslims had to pay heavier fines and so on. The murder of the Armenian Hrant Dink 
43
has been regarded as a result of massive writing about him as a traitor of Turkey in the newspapers.  
The assassinator only knew about Hrant Dink through what he had read in the newspapers. 
In the shadow report  published by European Network Against Racism (2012), they write about 
different cases where minorities have been victims of hate crime. In the report it looks like these 
hate crimes have been a result of writings done in the newspapers. It also seems like hate speech has  
come from public officials themselves. In 2010 there were several attacks reported in the media 
against  different  minority  groups  and people  of  Kurdish  origin  in  particular.  Racist  nationalist 
discourse and hate speech by politicians in the run up to the general election, which was held on 12 
June 2011, is thought to be linked to the rise in racist violence (Bilgen and Kizilkaya 2012: 4). 
When racist hate speech is performed by politicians, it can have a crucial effect. They can reach out 
to many people  because they are profiled people with power.  The language used after security 
forces are killed in armed conflict, is often harsh and can lead to social hostility and hate crimes. In  
an IHD’s Report they tell this: 
As a result of the examination we carried out in the county, we determined that about 40 
workplaces were ruined. We also determined that the Building of BDP was ruined together 
with  the  furniture  in  it  and  its  doors  were  broken  down with  sledge  hammers.  It  was 
determined that the ruined workplaces remained as they were and their owners did not lay 
claim to them because they were afraid of being lynched. It was determined that Turkish 
flags were hung from the windows of almost all of the houses as well as two very large ones 
at the entrance of Dörtyol county. We also came across those who hung Turkish flags from 
their  workplaces,  even  though  they  were  Kurdish,  because  of  their  fear'  (Bilgen  and 
Kizilkaya 2012: 28). 
There have been rare occasions where RTÜK resorted to its powers  to  sanction discrimination 
against minorities. The agency suspended a women’s show on ATV, a national television station, on 
grounds of ‘inciting people to revenge and hatred.’ The sanction was imposed after the host of the 
program criticized the Kurdish population of Van, a province badly hit by an earthquake in October 
2011,  for  seeking  rescue  from  the  same  police  that  they  ‘had  thrown  stones  at’ during  mass 
demonstrations (Kurban and Sözeri 2012: 37). 
These  links  between  hate  speech  and  hate  crime  is  also  strengthened  by  the  three  phases  of  
persecution, made by the former president of the World Evangelical Alliance, Johan Candelin. This 
model divides the phases into active and passive stages. The phase is active if the state is directly 
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involved and passive if the persecution is performed by private people/civil society and the state 
fails to take action to stop the persecution and protect the victims. The three phases can overlap or  
occur  at  the  same time.  Disinformation  lies  and stereotyped images  in  e.g.  media,  educational  
material  and in  the  way politicians  and officials  describe  religious  minorities.  Acts  that  justify 
discriminative acts can be rumors, prejudice and hostilities among the population. It can also be 
discrimination in relation to legislation,  implementation of legal provisions and public services, 
employment, education and family matters. Violent persecution threats of or acts of violence against 
a person or a person's belongings due to his/her religious affiliation, e.g. imprisonment, torture, 
physical harassment, displacement and violent attacks (Stefanus alliance international 2013: 14). 
There are also other groups than minority groups which can be a target of hate speech. If you  
challenge the discourse in the mainstream media, you can yourself be a target of hate speech. In  
other words, hate speech can be used as a weapon to silence the opposition. Since the media has a 
clientalist relationship with the state, it's also possible that it's in the interest of the state that hate 
speech is conducted at certain groups. In a report published by Freedom House in 2012, which is an 
independent watchdog organization that supports the expansion of freedom around the world, they 
write about the impact of blasphemy laws on human rights. In this report they write about how 
blasphemy laws can be used in order to silence opposition. This can also say to be true with hate 
speech. 
It may be predicted that for the right-wing Press especially, the main opponents politically will be 
the  radical  left,  ethnically  the  most  militant  minority  groups,  socially  the  pro-minority  welfare 
organizations, and culturally those who are symbolic competitors for the definition of the minority 
situation. That could be anti-racist educators, scholars, writers, as well as some politicians (Dijk 
1991: 44). Cultural autonomy, and especially anti-racism in education, is explicitly condemned as 
examples of lack of patriotism (Dijk 1991: 149). 
2.4.7 Social monitoring of newspapers 
Lately there has been a growing awareness on the need for social monitoring of the media. The 
problems of self-regulation of the Turkish media, as well as the strict nature of the governmental 
regulation,  have  encouraged  civil  society  to  monitor  the  media’s  compliance  with  universal 
principles and professional codes of ethics. Various non-governmental organizations and activist 
groups started media watch initiatives in order to expand the culture of diversity and to reduce 
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discrimination,  racism  and  hate  speech.  MEDIZ  (Woman’s  Media  Watch  Group)  has  been 
monitoring sexism in the media since 2006. The group had a public discussion of the issue at a 
conference titled ‘For a non- sexist Media’ and published a book named End to Sexism in Media. 
KAOS GL regularly watches sexism and discrimination in the media against LGBT individuals. 
After the assassination of Hrant Dink in 2007, hate crimes and hate speech in the media became a  
pressing  issue  for  civil  society.  The  Association  for  Social  Change  (Sosyal  Degisim  Dernegi) 
published a report entitled Hate Crimes in National Press: 10 years, 10 examples. Recently they 
launched a campaign for the adoption of Turkey’s first anti-hate speech law. The International Hrant 
Dink Foundation combats racism and discrimination based on ethnic and religious grounds through 
media monitoring. During a two years project funded by the European Commission, the Foundation 
analyzed 24 newspapers, published four monthly reports and organized workshops for journalists. 
The Human Rights Joint Platform (Insan Haklari Ortak Platformu- IHOP) published a report titled I  
am  not  Racist  but...:  Racist  and  Discriminatory  Speech  in  the  Press,  which  points  out  that 
‘discrimination denial strategy’ is one of the most typical examples for discrimination in the media 
(Kurban and Sözeri 2012: 60). 
BIA is a non-for-profit organization that monitors and reports violations of freedom of expression, 
monitors the newspapers’ coverage about human rights, woman and children rights issues, and the 
functioning  of  the  media  in  terms  of  media  ethics.  Its  news  and  information  network  Bianet 
provides daily coverage of the issues that are ignored in the mainstream media, especially about 
human rights, gender rights, minority rights and children rights issues (Media landscape: 2010).
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CHAPTER 3
THEORY 
The background chapter is about politics in Turkey, governmental regulations of the Turkish press, 
and the Turkish media landscape. This chapter focuses at the chosen theory in this master thesis,  
which is Social Dominance Theory (SDT). The theory places the empiri in a theoretical framework. 
It helps you to interpret the findings in both the analysis chapter, and the background chapter. 
Social Dominance Theory claims that in all societies some groups dominate other groups. They call 
this  phenomenon  group-based  hierarchy.  Social  Dominance  Theory  claims  that  group-based 
hierarchy is sustained by using legitimizing myths. Legitimizing myths are myths that defend this 
inequality  in  the  society  between  different  groups.  If  the  legitimizing  myths  are  increasing  or 
sustaining the inequality between groups, they are called Hierarchy-enhancing myths (HE-LM). If 
the legitimizing myths are decreasing the inequality between groups, they are called Hierarchy-
attenuating myths (HA-LM). The concept of something being Hierarchy-enhancing and Hierarchy-
attenuating can also be transferred to institutions. The Hierarchy-enhancing institutions are often 
more  powerful  than  Hierarchy-attenuating  institutions,  which  is  one  way  why  the  inequality 
between  groups  sustain  the  society.  Social  Dominance  Theory  also  focuses  at  people  on  the 
individual level. Even though there are people in the same group, with the same social status, some 
people are more discriminative than others. They measure this by Social Dominance Orientation. 
People are described with high or low SDO. 
 
47
3.1 Social dominance theory
No matter the society’s form of government, the contents of its fundamental belief system, or the 
complexity  of  its  economic  structures,  human societies  tend to  organize  as  group-based social 
hierarchies,  where at  least  one group enjoys greater social  status and power than other groups. 
Members of dominant social groups tend to enjoy a disproportionate share of positive social value 
or material and symbolic resources such as political power, wealth, and protection by force, health 
care,  leisure,  and  education.  Negative  social  value  is  disproportionately  left  to  members  of 
subordinate  groups  in  the  form  of  underemployment,  dangerous  and  unpopular  work, 
disproportionate  punishment  and stigmatization.  Although the definitional  bases  of  group-based 
hierarchical organization vary across societies and within the same society over time, group-based 
hierarchical  organization  appears  to  be  a  human  universal.  Social  dominance  theory  has  been 
developed in order to have a better understanding of how group-based social hierarchy is formed 
and maintained. Social dominance theory assumes that we must understand the processes producing 
and  maintaining  prejudice  and  discrimination  at  different  levels  of  analysis,  including  cultural 
ideologies and policies, institutional practices, relations of individuals to others inside and outside 
their groups and the psychological predispositions of individuals.
Social  dominance  theory  argues  that  societies  have  three  different  systems  of  group-based 
hierarchy. The first system is an age system, in which adults have disproportionate social power 
over children. The second system is a gender system, in which men have disproportionate social, 
political, and military power compared to women, and the third system is an arbitrary-set system, in 
which groups constructed on “arbitrary” bases not linked to the human life-cycle, have differential 
access to things of positive and negative social value. Arbitrary-set groups may be defined by social 
distinctions  often related to  power,  such as  nationality,  ‘‘race’’,  ethnicity,  class,  estate,  descent, 
religion, or clan (Levin, Pratto, Sidanius 2006: 271- 273). 
3.2 Legitimizing myths
According to social dominance theory, group-based social hierarchy is produced by the effects of 
discrimination  across  different  levels,  namely  institutions,  individuals,  and  through  intergroup 
processes.  Discrimination  across  these  levels  is  structured  to  favor  dominant  groups  over 
subordinate groups by legitimizing myths, or consensually shared social ideologies in the society. 
Social dominance theory assumes that group-based inequality is not just a result of intimidation and 
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discrimination by dominants against subordinates. Social dominance theory rather states that the 
decisions and behaviors of individuals, the formation of new social practices, and the operations of 
institutions are shaped by legitimizing myths.  Legitimizing myths are consensually held values, 
attitudes, beliefs, stereotypes, and cultural ideologies. 
Social  dominance  theory  distinguishes  between  two  functional  types  of  legitimizing  myths. 
Hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing myths (HE-LMs) contribute to moral and intellectual justification 
for group-based oppression and inequality. Some illustrating examples can be different forms of 
racism, sexism, heterosexism, stereotypes, nationalism, Confucianism, and internal attributions for 
poverty. These diverse myths have been used to argue that inequality is fair, legitimate, natural, or 
moral. Hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing myths tend to organize individual, group, and institutional 
behavior in ways that sustain dominance.
Ideologies that counter group-based dominance are called hierarchy-attenuating legitimizing myths 
(HA-LMs). Examples of hierarchy-attenuating legitimizing myths are political doctrines such as 
social  democracy,  socialism,  religious  doctrines  such as  the  preferential  option  for  the  poor  or 
inclusive and egalitarian themes in religious scriptures, and humanist doctrines such as feminism 
and human rights. One factor determining the potency a legitimizing myth has to either enhance or  
attenuate group-based social hierarchy, is the degree to which it is consensual across members of 
both subordinate and dominant groups. While social dominance theory assumes that, everything 
else  being  equal,  dominants  will  generally  show greater  endorsement  of  hierarchy-  enhancing 
legitimizing myths than will  subordinates,  and subordinates will  display greater endorsement of 
hierarchy-attenuating  legitimizing  myths  than  will  dominants,  within  stable  social  systems, 
dominants and subordinates will agree with respect to these legitimizing myths more than they will 
disagree (Levin, Pratto, Sidanius 2006: 275-276).  
3.3 Institutional discrimination 
In the  same way as  legitimizing myths,  many institutions  can be classified  as  either  hierarchy 
enhancing  or  hierarchy  attenuating.  Hierarchy-enhancing (HE)  institutions  promote  and  sustain 
inequality by assigning disproportionately more positive social value or less negative social value to 
dominant  groups  than  to  subordinate  groups.  Powerful  hierarchy-enhancing  institutions  include 
profit-maximizing financial institutions, transnational corporations, internal security organizations 
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such  as  KGB and  FBI,  and  criminal  justice  systems.  Criminal  justice  systems  are  viewed  as 
important mechanisms of group dominance and control because subordinates are over-represented 
in prison cells, torture chambers, and execution chambers across many different societies. 
Hierarchy-attenuating  (HA)  institutions  reduce  the  consequences  of  hierarchy-enhancing 
institutions,  but  seldom balance their  influence.  They try to aid members  of subordinate  social 
groups such as the poor, ethnic and religious minorities, and attempt to help them getting access to 
resources otherwise limited to dominants, such as public services. Hierarchy-attenuating institutions 
include  human  rights,  civil  rights,  civil  liberties  groups,  welfare  organizations  and  religious 
organizations.  Such  institutions  often  lack  substantial  and  permanent  funding,  force,  legal 
precedent,  or other bases of power.  In contrast  to the criminal  justice and employment sectors, 
which regularly assign negative social value such as prison terms and dangerous work situations to 
subordinates, hierarchy- attenuating institutions rarely assign negative social value to dominants. 
The  discrimination  committed  by  hierarchy-enhancing  institutions  is  a  potent  cause  of  group 
hierarchy  for  several  reasons.  First,  institutions  can  mobilize  and  allocate  larger  amounts  of 
resources  than  individuals  can.  Second,  large  institutions,  such  as  national  governments  and 
multinational corporations, have a great systematic influence. Third, because institutions eternalize 
themselves, the discrimination they engage in operates over generations, and when individuals or 
groups try to fight those practices, institutions often defend their discriminatory practices as part of 
defending  the  institution  itself.  Fourth,  institutions  establish  their  own  internal  norms,  which 
coordinate the people who work in them and homogenize individual differences. Fifth, individuals 
in many institutions, including the military and corporations, are frequently exempted from being 
condemned for their  institutional  actions because the institution has special  legal  status (Levin, 
Pratto, Sidanius 2006: 276-277). 
One of the most robust causes of group-based dominance is the use of the criminal justice system to 
enforce  social  hierarchy.  Three  conditions  must  be  met  for  the  state  to  use  its  system  of  
military/police and courts to enforce social hierarchy. First,  the criminal justice system must be 
filled by people with prejudicial  and punitive attitudes that are consistent with their roles.  The 
second condition  that  must  be  met  is  that  the  public  must  tolerate  the  group prejudice  of  the 
criminal justice system. Third, if the criminal justice system is effective in enforcing group 
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dominance, then there should be more inequality where it is applied more forcefully (Levin, Pratto, 
Sidanius 2006: 307-308).
3.4 Individual discrimination 
Discrimination made by individuals happens when an employer decides not to hire a person who 
has applied for a job, a real-estate agent decides not to sell to a potential buyer, or a prosecutor  
decides to charge a defendant with a less serious offence, and the reasoning behind these decisions 
are  made  on  the  ground  of  the  ethnicity  of  the  individual,  nationality,  social  class,  sexual 
orientation,  or  gender.  Which  groups  are  generally  favored  and  which  are  disfavored  in  such 
decisions, depends partly on the contents of the legitimizing myths. The social structure of society 
more often lead to hierarchy-maintaining than hierarchy-attenuating behavior. People in high-power 
groups usually have more things of positive social value they can assign to others, and more power 
to ensure that things of negative social value are assigned to people in other groups. A hierarchical 
structure implies it's easier to do actions that maintain or enhance inequality than doing actions that 
attenuate the hierarchy (Levin, Pratto, Sidanius 2006: 278-279). 
People and institutions select each other’s so that the legitimizing myths and values are compatible 
with their own standing. This implies that people’s co-workers are likely to reflect back and affirm 
their own prejudices, beliefs, and values. People in hierarchy-enhancing institutions are not likely to 
be challenged by people who hold hierarchy-attenuating beliefs and attitudes because such people 
work  in  different  institutions  and  jobs.  Institutions  ingrain  functionally  compatible  ideologies 
through  their  own institutional  culture  and  norms,  and  give  employees  practice  at  using  such 
ideologies in their work. The tendencies to enhance hierarchy or to attenuate it are all coordinated 
through legitimizing myths among individuals, their local work-groups, institutions, and how the 
institution assign resources (Levin, Pratto, Sidanius 2006: 306-308).
3.5 Intergroup processes in discrimination 
Group-based  social  inequality  is  also  partly  produced and maintained  by intergroup  processes, 
specifically  the  collaborative  activities  of  dominants  and  subordinates.  This  collaboration  is 
achieved  by  behavioral  asymmetry,  or  coordinated  differences  in  the  behavioral  repertoires  of 
dominants and subordinates that produce better outcomes for dominants than for subordinates. Two 
major types of behavioral asymmetry are asymmetrical in-group bias and ideological asymmetry.
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Asymmetrical  in-group bias. Social  dominance predicts  that the degree of  in-group bias differs 
systematically across levels of status and power. Within stable group-based dominance systems, 
dominants will often display more in-group favoritism vis-a-vis subordinates than will members of 
subordinate  groups  vis-a-vis  dominants,  especially  with  respect  to  dimensions  of  power  and 
privilege. Asymmetrical in-group bias favoring dominants is also shown by people’s endorsement 
of legitimizing myths.  The more legitimate the social system is perceived to be, the greater the 
degree to which dominants will display in-group favoritism compared to subordinates.
Ideological asymmetry. Many of the psychological and ideological forces that help sustain group 
dominance, work better for people in dominant than in subordinate groups. Although hierarchy-
enhancing legitimizing myths influence the behaviors of both dominants and subordinates, they are 
often easier for people in dominant groups to endorse. 
3.6 Social dominance orientation
Social  dominance  orientation  (SDO)  captures  to  which  extent  individuals  desire  group-based 
dominance and inequality. These desires for social dominance are expressed in individual acts of 
discrimination  and  participation  in  intergroup  and  institutional  processes  that  produce  better 
outcomes  for  dominants  than  for  subordinates.  The  more  an  individual  wants  group-based 
dominance  and  inequality,  the  higher  level  of  SDO  the  person  has  acording  to  this  way  of 
measuring.  One way  individuals  with  high  SDO can justify  their  discriminatory actions,  is  by 
supporting a wide variety of legitimizing myths that have in common the notion that dominant and 
subordinate  groups  deserve  their  relative  positions  of  superiority  and  inferiority  in  the  social 
hierarchy. 
According to social dominance theory, hierarchical relationships among groups are both partly a 
cause and partly a result of these processes. Societies that are structured more hierarchically are 
likely  to  have  larger  mean differences  in  SDO between dominant  and subordinate  groups,  and 
hierarchy- enhancing legitimizing myths and social policies that are more powerful than hierarchy-
attenuating alternatives (Levin, Pratto, Sidanius 2006: 281-282). 
Social  dominance theory assume that members of dominant arbitrary-set groups are expected to 
have higher levels of SDO than members of subordinate groups, because they want to sustain the 
privileged access to social and economic resources that they have access to through their dominant 
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position  (Levin, Pratto, Sidanius 2006: 287-288).
SDO has been shown to correlate with prejudice against a wide range of subordinate arbitrary-set 
groups defined by religion, race, and ethnicity. People with high SDO believe the world is a zero-
sum  game  and  because  they  desire  power,  they  will  use  others  to  get  ahead.  This  belief  is 
compatible  with the  relative  meanness  of  those  with  high SDO. Their  mentality  leads  them to 
support economic competition over  social  welfare programs.  People with high SDO tend to be 
unfeeling and confident (Levin, Pratto, Sidanius 2006: 303-304).
SDO posites that all factors such as being a function of group position and situational contingent 
social  identities,  stable  individual  differences,  and  socialization  experiences  are  involved  in 
determining people’s orientation towards group-based social inequality. SDO should be seen both 
partly  as  a  result  of  hierarchical  relationships  among  groups,  and  partly  as  a  cause  of  those 
relationships (Levin, Pratto, Sidanius 2006: 294). 
This research shows how group dominance works as a system, infecting the attitudes of individuals,  
social roles, and institutional behavior in an interdependent and self-perpetuating manner. Social 
dominance theory is a broad theory that generates hypotheses about how different aspects of group 
dominance systems work together with one another (Levin, Pratto, Sidanius 2006: 308). 
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CHAPTER 4
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
In the methodology chapter there is an explanation of the research design, how I approached the 
interviewees,  research  process,  reliability  and  validity,  and  type  of  research.  The  methodology 
chapter shows how the interviews have been conducted and why this type of interviewees and 
research design has been chosen. 
4.1 Research design
This study of journalists' ethical challenges, is based on 10 interviews of  people in the age between 
25 and 65, who has worked and works as journalists and columnists, in TV, or in organizations 
familiar  with  the  issue  of  hate  speech  in  media  in  Istanbul.  They  work  primarily  in 
leftist/mainstream newspapers, and organizations considered as being liberal. I have conducted a 
semi-structured interview with all the interviewees. 
The research question is: 
How do Turkish journalists deal with ethical challenges in their work with special regard to codes
of conduct and hate speech? 
As mentioned in the introduction chapter, I look at the issue of minorities in Turkey, and how they 
are perceived and described by journalists in Turkish newspapers. When it comes to the issue of  
hate speech in newspapers, hate speech is often targeted at minorities. I want to use a theory which 
could highlight the relationship of group-based hierarchy between the majority and the minority, 
and understand the reason for stereotyping minorities through hate speech. A theory which I find 
useful in this regard is Social Dominance Theory. This theory states that in all societies at all times 
there is a tendency of group-based hierarchy. Discrimination between dominant and subdominat 
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groups, or majority and minority groups in this context, happens both at individual and institutional 
level. This means that people can be met with discrimination both from individuals and institutions. 
This  theory  is  also  useful  when  understanding  the  relationship  between  journalists  and  the 
government, which one of these two groups are the dominant, and what resources a dominant group 
has versus a subdominant group. Social Dominance Theory is useful when doing the analysis. It  
creates a theoretical framework for understanding the data. 
In order to get some good reflections and thoughts around the research question, it's very useful to 
interview Turkish journalists themselves, and people who work in organizations, or in TV, where 
they have competence in the field of hate speech in newspapers and codes of conduct in Turkish 
media. People who are in the business, knows what kind of ethical challenges journalists have, are 
well-suited for answering the question about codes of conduct, and they would also have some 
thoughts  regarding  hate  speech  in  newspapers.  When  interviewing  a  person  who  works  in 
organizations you get some reflections around the outcome of what journalists write in newspapers, 
since they would know a lot about the use of hate speech in newspapers. 
The type of data used in this master thesis is qualitative data from interviews. Since a tape recorder  
was used during the interview, I didn't have to make notes, and could focus fully on the interview 
and be able to think which question to ask next. 
Money and time constraints are often issues when doing investigations for a master thesis.  The 
field work in Istanbul was covered by the Priscilla scholarship, which means that there was no 
financial problems of conducting the interviews. The stay in Istanbul resulted in 10 interviews, and 
a  lot  of  data.  Doing  more  than  10  interviews  would  create  a  lot  of  work  afterwards,  with 
transcribing and coding all the material, figure out what to use in the master thesis and then finally 
write the master thesis. Due to the constraints you have by writing a master thesis in only a year, 
conducting 10 interviews between mid-october till mid-november is perfect both in term of doing 
the interviews early in the master thesis process, and in term of the data material resulting from the 
interviews. 
4.2 Approaching the interviewees
An introduction letter was sent to all the people I contacted, called “enquiry regarding participating 
in interviews in connection to a master thesis”.  The introduction letter inform  about what I study,  
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what is the topic of my master thesis, how many people I want to interview and who I want to 
interview. It finishes with how I want to conduct the interview, duration of the interview and that 
the researcher and the interviewees will figure out together with the researcher how to conduct the  
interview.  The  introduction  letter  underlines  that  it  is  voluntarily  to  participate  and  that  the 
interviewee has the right to withdraw from the project at  any time. All the information will  be 
treated confidentially, the recordings will be deleted when the thesis is finished, and no individual 
will be recognized in the master thesis. 
Since  most  of  the  appointments  were  arranged  in  Istanbul  through  the  snowball  method,  the 
introduction letter was not sent to all the interviewees. In some cases I just had a telephone number, 
and got the appointment straight away, and had no time to send the introduction letter. In such cases 
I tried to inform the interviewee orally as best as possible. Anyway it seemed that the interviewees 
didn’t pay much attention to this sort of formalities. 
4.3 Research process 
First of all the research question was approved by my supervisor. I had decided to do qualitative 
interviews  with  8-10  persons  in  Istanbul  working  as  journalists,  columnists,  in  TV,  or  in 
organizations familiar with the issue of hate speech in media. Conducting interviews involves issues 
such  as  confidentiality,  so  the  project  had  to  be  approved  by  Norwegian  Social  Science  Data 
Services (NSD). After  they approved the project,  the process of recruiting interviewees started. 
Being  in  Norway  and  trying  to  reach  journalists  by  writing  them  e-mails,  turned  out  to  be 
challenging. Before going to Istanbul conducting those interviews, I had only 3 appointments, and 
all these appointments were made with people working in organizations. The conclusion was that it  
would probably be easier to  recruit  interviewees after  arriving Istanbul.  The strategy to  recruit 
interviewees was to use the snowball method, which means that you recruit interviewees by asking 
those you have an appointment with if there is someone they could recommend as interviewees, and 
then you get the contact information to these new potential interviewees.  The snowball  method 
worked out very well, and resulted in 10 interviews from mid-October till mid-November 2012. 
After conducting the interviews, the job of transcribing the data from the interviews has to be done.
I started to code the data after transcribing the data. The method in use for analyzing the data is 
thematic  analysis,  which  is  related  to  content  analysis,  which  has  been  mentioned  in  the 
introduction chapter. In this form of analysis the data is organized into different themes and 
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categories. There is no focus at how people frame their words and sentences during the interview,  
but what people say. Since the focus where at the latter, I allowed myself to proofread the data in 
order to make the quotations in the analysis chapter easier to read. I claim that the meaning of what 
has  been  said  in  the  interviews  has  been kept.  When analyzing  the  data  thoroughly,  different 
categories emerged out of the data. Some categories were already mentioned in the interview guide, 
other  categories  emerged  out  of  what  the  interviewees  said  in  the  interviews.  The  different 
categories became sub-chapters in the analysis chapter. After the sub-chapters was lined up, the data 
was organized into these different sub-chapters. The different categories were written with another 
color into the interviews in order to easier find the relevant material when the different quotations 
from the interviews were incorporated in the master thesis.
When  analyzing  the  data,  I  have  tried  to  build  bridges  between  the  data  and  the  theory.  The 
background chapter is also included in the analysis.  When using the background chapter in the 
analysis, the data are better contextualized, and makes the different chapters in the master thesis 
more interconnected.
4.4 Reliability and validity
Except for one interviewee, I could speak English without a translator. This means that there are 
fewer chances for being misunderstood than if there was a translator. It is also easier to establish a 
contact  with  the  interviewees  when  there's  not  a  translator  there.  The  interviewees  had  good 
analysis  of  the  situation  in  Turkey with regard  to  codes  of  conduct  and hate  speech.  All  were 
familiar  with the terms codes of conduct and hate speech, so there was no need to explain the  
research question in depth. The interviewees in this project were quite homogenous in the sense that 
they  were  primarily  working in  leftist/mainstream newspapers,  and organizations  considered as 
being liberal. I think this is a result of using the snowball method, since people often know better 
other people which work in the same type of environment as yourself. 
My aim of this master thesis is not to find the “truth about ethical challenges for journalists  in 
Turkey”. Rather it is to have some reflections around this issue from people who has been working 
as journalists or working with hate speech in relation to newspapers. One way of showing that this 
are their reflections, is by using words like “they claim that...” “This interviewee means...” One the 
other hand, what the interviewees say does in large part match with the background chapter.  This 
strengthens the reliability of my interviewees. When someone mentions issues regarding different 
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articles  in  the  Turkish  constitution  for  instance,  those  articles  have  also  written  about  in  the 
background chapter as troublesome. 
 
4.5 Type of research 
Since I did a semi-structured interview, the questions were not asked in the same order to all the 
interviewees. The questions were asked in the order which was most natural according to how each 
interview developed. The questions were formulated around different themes, which mean that the 
interviewees could speak quite freely within each question. 
Before going to Istanbul, I was uncertain about the reception of the master thesis project, but I  
received only good feedback. The interviewees were open minded and just curious about why I had 
chosen this topic for my master thesis. I got the impression that the interviewees were quite aware 
of the issues raised in the research question, and they also had many reflections around the topic.  
No one had problems with being recorded while the interviews were conducted.
The  interview  guide  was  build  up  gradually,  starting  with  general  questions  most  people  are 
comfortable talking about, such as what is their profession and which working experiences they 
have,  followed  by  questions  about  their  perception  of  the  role  of  the  media,  principles,  and 
challenges with implementation, cooperation and campaigns developed by organizations. In the end 
the interviewees were asked if they had anything to add. 
Out of the eleven interviewees I spoke with, three of them worked in an organization, in which one 
of them had earlier worked as a journalist. Two of the interviewees’ works as professors, in which  
of them had earlier  worked as a journalist,  and the other writes columns besides working as a 
professor. Three of them work just as journalists, and the last three work in television, as Editor-in-
chief for a newspaper, and as Ombudsman for a newspaper. They were somewhere between 25 and 
65, and seven of them were women. The interviewees were a homogenous group in the sense that 
they  work  primarily  in  leftist/mainstream  newspapers,  and  organizations  considered  as  being 
liberal. On the other hand they had different types of jobs, which mean that they brought different 
perspectives into the interviews.
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CHAPTER 5
ANALYSIS 
I have structured this analysis by starting with two topics describing the background of Turkey, and 
also the framework for understanding the context of the other issues discussed in this analysis. 
That's why the topics Polarization and Nationalism in Turkey are in the beginning of the analysis. I 
continue with the topic of minorities, because you can understand the topic of minorities better 
when it comes in the light of nationalism in Turkey. Media ownership is not particularly connected 
to the topic of minorities, but is a framework for understanding better the topics of Freedom of 
speech/Government, Hate crime legislation and Islamophobia, and Self-censorship. After analyzing 
the topics of Media ownership and Freedom of speech/Government, you can put Self-censorship in 
the context of these two topics. Codes of Conducts and implementation come after all the other 
issues as a topic of how the media themselves try to implement Codes of Conducts. Social media is 
not a topic I focus on in this master thesis, but since social media is a media which are just being 
more and more used, and also influence the other media, I have chosen to have it as a part of my 
analysis. 
5.1 Polarization
Polarization is a term that recurred among several of my interviewees, and also in the background 
chapter. Polarization in this setting means that the society is divided into two ideologies and this  
causes a polarization, or two opposing poles. The issue of polarization creates a framework for 
understanding both the politics, the media and the society in Turkey, and that's why it’s important to 
have the issue of polarization at the beginning of the analysis. Several interviewees mention the 
issue of polarization, which is one historical framework important to take into consideration. 
I asked about how the interviewee perceived the media in Turkey 
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I must say that Turkish mainstream media have two heads now. In the past it  was one.  
Only  the  big  capital  connected  to  the  state  or  government,  have  the  ability  to  change  
everything, and to discuss whatever they want to. Now we have two mainstream media, one 
of them is the continuation of the old mainstream media, which is western modern-secular 
media, and the second one, which is new, is connected to today’s AKP government. They 
are more conservative and more Islamist, but they are connected to today’s government, and 
they have power now. They have money and they have power. These two mainstream media 
are in competition. They are defending different positions, so every issue in Turkey, every 
debate, every problem is seen in glasses of these two mainstream media. The people have 
their own positions, one belong to one, or the other (Interviewee 4). 
The interviewee says there is a connection between the new media and the government.  The old 
mainstream media represents the western-modern secular media, and the new mainstream media 
represents the more conservative islamist media. There is a competition between these two media. 
It seems like the polarization in politics is also reflected in the media (see 2.2). The people position 
themselves to one of these two sides, so the polarization in politics and media is also reflected in the 
society. The polarization in politics has existed for decades. The coups in 1960, 1971 and 1980 were 
orchestrated by the military when they thought  the  heritage of Atatürk,  namely secularism and 
laicism, was in danger. The government is now more Islamic oriented, and represent a political shift 
in Turkey. Even though there is a political shift in Turkey, it seems like both political sides have 
power and resources in the media since they can promote their views through the newspapers.  
I  asked  whether  the  interviewee  find  newspapers  in  Turkey  good  at  avoiding  negative  speech 
towards minorities. 
No, there is a huge polarization in Turkey. There’s a hegemonic class in every period. It used 
to be the militarist police and the republican elites at the beginning. Now it’s political Islam. 
We have Islamists and we have laicists in this country, so there is a huge conflict between 
them. You can see all the discourses in the media against each other. They blame each other, 
they write wrong stories, they distort reality against each other (Interviewee 9). 
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This  interviewee  uses  the  terms  hegemonic  class  when  talking  about  the  polarization.  The 
interviewee says that political Islam is the hegemonic class at the moment, which insinuates that the 
government  is  the hegemonic class now, when connected to  what  interviewee 4 said about  the 
government being more Islamist. The previous interviewee says that the two mainstream media are 
in competition. This interviewee uses a stronger expression, and says that there is a huge conflict 
between these two sides. The result is the same, they use the media to write stories about the other 
political side. These stories are often wrong stories about the other political orientation, according to  
interviewee 9. 
Since they can use the media to express their opinions about the other political side, they need to 
have a lot  of power and a resource to do so,  as interviewee 4 says they have. One illustrating 
example  is  when  the  parliament  adopted  a  constitutional  amendment  on  10  February  2008  to 
legalize the headscarf at universities. This event was covered by Hürriyet, the biggest Turkish daily,  
with the headline ‘411 hands rose to chaos,’ referring to the number of parliamentarians who voted 
in favor. Hürriyet was also involved in generating public opinion in favor of mass demonstrations in 
the name of protecting secularism against the government. This has later found to be co-organized 
by groups involving retired military leaders (see 2.4.1). Media owners and other political elites got 
together against the government. In this case the secularist side, which is often represented by the 
military, used Hürriyet to promote their views about this constitutional amendment.  
 I asked if the interviewees had anything to add before we finished the interview. 
As long as the society remains as polarized and as long as the audience remains this static, 
then I see almost no way for the media organizations to change their behavior. (Interviewee 
10  B):  There  is  so  much  internalized  hatred  in  the  people  too,  regular  people  who  buy 
newspapers. It’s in their culture to hate the other. It’s just so normal in their daily talk-to-talk 
that they ought to single people out. (Interviewee 10 A): But this is not to say that business 
should be as usual. The hope is that there is at least more awareness than in the past regards to 
that issue… (Interviewee 10 A & B). 
These interviewees add another perspective at the issue of polarization. They also mention the 
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audience,  which  I  think  can  be  regarded  as  the  Turkish  society  in  general.  They say  that  the 
audience doesn’t  demand other news then what they have in the newspapers.  They just  remain 
static.  Interviewee  10  B  says  that  it's  in  the  culture  to  hate  each  other,  and  confirms  what 
interviewee 4 said about people choosing sides. Maybe this is a product of the polarization in the 
society. The fact that this polarization in Turkey has been present for several decades through coups 
in Turkish history, would arguably affect the society at large as well. They are used to the polarized 
news in the newspapers, and newspapers can also offer you a framework for making sense of the 
social and political situation in the society (see 2.4.5). 
As shown above, several of the interviewees that I spoke to, mentioned the polarization in Turkey. 
They mentioned it in different contexts in the interviews, and I didn't have polarization as a subject  
to discuss in my interview guide. I interpret this to be something the interviewees are concerned 
about. The polarization in the country affects the media landscape.  It seems like the polarization in 
the country can provoke distorted and wrong news. Since people don't react to this type of news, 
they're arguably used to this kind of discourse in the media. Often they even position themselves 
against one or the other side of this polarization in media and politics. It also seems like political 
Islam at the moment is the 'dominant hegemonic class', as interviewee 9 put it. 
5.2 Nationalism in Turkey
When talking about polarization in a country, you talk about two strong powers in a country that 
competes for power. Nationalism has another character. Even though the society can be polarized, 
they can in a way be united when it comes to nationalism. Both secular and islamist parties can be 
nationalistic for instance.  Just as with the issue of polarization, several interviewees also talked 
about  nationalism  in  Turkey,  which  is  another  historical  framework  important  to  take  into 
consideration. 
I told the interviewee about the research question, and then I just let the interviewee talk. 
The historical background of this country is too heavy. Like in any artificial nation building 
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process, the history of this nation building is so heavy in terms of human loss and mutual  
atrocities, that of course minorities are subject to permanent hate speech in this country.  In 
the media unfortunately there is no consciousness about it, quite to the contrary. Minorities, 
especially the non-Muslim minorities, Christian and Jewish minorities, are subjected to this 
hate speech on a daily basis. There are some ombudsmen in some new newspapers who try 
to raise attention of the journalist to this sort of language, but with no avail. There is still a 
long way to go, and there are some nationalist newspapers where the entire newspaper is full 
of hate speech. But the main problem is the matter of mentality (Interviewee 5). 
This interviewee mentions that the cost of the nation building is heavy in terms of human loss and 
mutual atrocities. In this nation building process many Armenians were killed which has later been 
termed the Armenian genocide. The homogenization policies in the nation building process were at 
the expense of minorities. Some of the policies were about advocating the supremacy of the Turkish 
history and language, the forced resettlement of minorities in predominantly Turkish areas in order 
to assimilate them into the ‘Turkish culture’, the prohibition of the use of non-Turkish names, the 
ban on the use of minority languages in schools and in courts, and the requirement of ‘belonging to 
the Turkish race’ for recruitment to military academies and employment in the public sector (see 
2.1).  According to the interviewee, minorities are still subjected to this hate speech on a daily basis.  
When taking a look at the Turkish history in terms of how the minorities have been treated, it might 
not be so strange that they are subjected to hate speech. The interviewee draws a line between the 
nation  building  process,  the  treatment  of  minorities  during  this  nation building process,  to  the 
treatment of minorities in Turkey today. 
I ask the interviewee whether there are few or many nationalistic newspapers in Turkey. 
Nationalism is a problematic phenomenon in Turkey as well. Whoever you ask “are you a 
nationalist?”  they  would  say:  “yes”.  The  problem  is  that  nationalism  is  referred  to  as 
something positive in this society, so even the mainstream media, some newspapers, I gave 
you the example of Akit, they are standing in a popular point in the middle, as they know 
that nationalism sells. There will be a certain amount of nationalism in any kind of 
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newspapers apart from the newspapers of Kurds. There are some nationalistic newspapers 
which define themselves with this nationalism. These kinds of ideas should be marginalized 
in a democratic modern society, but if they’re standing in the middle, if they’re popular and 
they become normal, then it´s a problem. They would say: “yeah, what is the problem?” 
(Interviewee 3). 
This interviewee says that nationalism is referred to as something positive in the society. This also 
makes it harder to marginalize hate speech from newspapers, since hate speech and nationalism is 
interconnected. The Turkish nationalism also forms the discourse about Kurds, Alevis, Gypsies and 
Armenians (see 2.4.6). Nationalism is a consensually shared value in the society (see 3.2)
I ask if the interviewee see hate speech as a problem in Turkish media, and where you find such  
speech. 
Today  it’s  better,  but  mainstream  media  is  nationalist,  and  you  can  see  that,  being  an 
Armenian and a Kurd can sometimes be a problem. But it’s not reaching the point of hate 
speech today.  I  don’t  see a  lot  of  examples  in  the  mainstream media,  but  some radical 
Islamist or nationalist newspaper are creating that kind of stuff every day. But mainstream 
media; I don’t think so (Interviewee 4). 
Both these interviewees claim that mainstream media is nationalist. There might be a difference in 
how  problematic  they  find  the  writing  in  the  mainstream  newspapers.  Interviewee  3  found 
mainstream newspapers more problematic than interviewee 4. Maybe they have different definitions  
of what they find problematic, or what they regard as hate speech. 
The interviewee talked about that if you are seen as insulting Turkishness you are subjected to legal 
inquiries, but if you are disseminating hate speech about Jews, you wouldn't end up in trouble. I  
then asked the interviewee if the reason was because the latter was not about insulting Turkishness. 
It’s  about  improper  legislation,  and  about  the  internalized  nationalism  and  the  foreign 
xenophobia, racism. It’s a problem in this part of the Europe,  and I thinks it’s the same  
everywhere now, in Europe as well, Scandinavia, or the Netherlands, or wherever. There’s 
Islamophobia, there’s all sorts of hate speech that’s spreading, but here it’s also widespread, 
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it’s in Greece, it’s in Spain, it’s everywhere. Hate speech is a problem, and we are now 
asking for the government, the parliament to pass criminalization of the hate speech law, so 
that it is properly covered by law (Interviewee 6). 
Since they don’t have a proper law against hate speech, you can’t get prosecuted for writing hate  
speech. The interviewee says that this is not a problem particularly for Turkey, but it's a problem 
everywhere. This set hate speech in an international perspective, and illustrates that hate speech is 
not just a problem in Turkey.  
Interviewee 5  talks  about  the  consequences  the  nation  building  process  in  Turkey had for  the 
minorities in the country, and that the hate speech the minorities in Turkey face today, is partly a 
result  of  the  treatment  of  the minorities  earlier  in  history.  Interviewee 3 says  that  everyone in 
Turkey is a nationalist, and that this attitude cause problems for marginalizing nationalistic ideas. 
Interviewee 4 also says that mainstream newspapers are nationalist, but says that even though they 
are nationalist, the interviewee wouldn't classify their writings as hate speech. Interviewee 6 says 
that the issue of nationalism, racism and hate speech is not an issue particularly for Turkey, but it's 
everywhere, and thereby issues also at an international level. 
All these interviewees think that nationalism is a problem in the country, and several of them link 
nationalism to negative speech about minorities in Turkey. Several of them also link nationalism 
with hate speech directed at minorities. 
5.3 Minorities
The topic of minorities is connected to nationalism in Turkey. In the chapter of Nationalism in 
Turkey, minorities were mentioned as facing hate speech as a result of the nation building process.
Since the topics nationalism in Turkey and Minorities are closely connected, I find it natural to 
place these two topics after each other in the analysis.  
This  interviewee  has  worked  as  a  journalist  before,  and  now  works  in  a  non-governmental 
organization. I asked whether the interviewee works towards journalists and cooperate with them 
regarding issues like hate speech. This is a part of the answer the interviewee gave me.  
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It’s so common that you read something in the newspaper and you begin hating specific 
groups of people, for example LGBT people. Most of the media outlets cover those news, 
and write “they are not even human” or something like that. That’s a huge problem. Most of 
the media outlets who does this, are the conservative type. You can never change their view. 
You may try. There's an LGBT organization, KAOS GL. They have met the nationalist party.  
You never know how it went, but at least they met. There are some LGBT people who has  
been attacked right now, in Istanbul. The news are horrible. They have plackards saying: 
“You are doing prostitution here, I don’t want my child to grow like this” and stuff like that. 
There’s a specific newspaper who writes about refugees on the Syrian border, and they have 
a hate campaign against the refugees on the border. “They are robbing us, they take our 
money, they do bad things to our people” and stuff like that. Most of them are not true as far 
as we know, but they keep doing it. This is against humanity and solidarity, this is against 
Truth Telling, this is against being Fair. On the other hand, a newspaper always wants a 
fancy title. There’s a saying, everyone knows that “sex sells”. If someones' right has been 
violated, they always look to his ethnics or something like that. Instead of saying that John’s 
right  has  been violated,  they write:  a  croupled  Kurdish right  has  been violated.  This is 
always about selling and how they can make people read the news. It’s not about informing 
people (Interviewee 2).   
The interviewee mentions that there has been an attack against LGBT people. According to this 
statement, it looks like hate speech against sexual minorities comes both from the society and the 
media. The interviewee also talks about how the reporting about Syrian refugees violates different 
principles in a code of conduct, such as Being Fair and Truth Telling. It means that in practice, at 
least in some newspapers, they don’t have respect for such codes. They arguably have more focus at 
having headlines that sells, or a fancy title, as the interviewee says. In the interviews which Teun A.  
Van Dijk conducted with some 150 people in the Netherlands, it showed that they would remember 
news if they were written repeatedly. If news about minority events is always communicated in a 
negative way, this  will  eventually  form the perception  the audience  have about  minorities (See 
2.4.5).
Council of Europe  has stated that the term hate speech “shall be understood as covering all forms 
of expression which spread, incite, promote or justify racial hatred, xenophobia, anti-Semitism or 
other forms of hatred based on intolerance, including: intolerance expressed by aggressive 
67
nationalism and ethnocentrism, discrimination and hostility against minorities, migrants and people 
of immigrant origin”. Looking at this definition of hate speech, it suits the interviewees' description 
of what is going on in the media against both refugees and LGBT people. They have been met with 
both discrimination and hostility.  The newspaper which wrote about the refugees on the Syrian 
border uses stereotypes of the refugees in order to legitimize their hate speech. They stereotype a 
whole group. Stereotyping people is a way of legitimizing their myths. Stereotypes can be called 
Hierarchy-enhancing  legitimizing  myths  (HE-LMs)  (see  3.2).  This  way  of  legitimizing  their 
attitudes against subordinate groups, such as minorities, is a way of sustaining inequality between 
the majority and the minority in the society. 
In this interview I mention that the newspaper the interviewee works for might not be the worse 
newspaper  regarding  containing  a  lot  of  hate  speech,  both  since  it's  not  a  typical  mainstream 
newspaper,  and since it's  a leftist newspaper. I ask whether the interviewee finds a tendency of 
writing about minorities in a negative way in mainstream newspapers. 
It depends on the political and moral line of the newspaper. If that line is very clear, they’re  
going to be very clear on their ideas about minorities as well. Some newspapers almost do 
their job for targeting them. There is one newspaper called Akit.  It’s a very conservative 
newspaper. It almost gives names and encourages people to react for them. They work as 
campaigns to humiliate some people. It’s their line (Interviewee 3). 
Conservative newspapers use hate speech on purpose since they have a certain nationalistic agenda. 
This ideology explains why specific groups are dealt with positively or negatively. In conservative 
newspapers  this  ideological  framework  is  more  visible  and  straight  forward  (see  2.4.5).  The 
interviewee says that this newspaper almost gives names and encourages people to react for them. 
In the example of the Hrant Dink murder in 2007, Hrant Dink was regarded as an enemy of the state  
and a traitor of the country in the newspapers. The assassinator of Hrant Dink didn't know him 
personally, but had made an opinion about him through what he read about him in newspapers. 
The former president of the World Evangelical Alliance, Johan Candelin, has developed the three 
phases  of  persecution. Those  three  phases  are:  disinformation,  discrimination  and  violent 
persecution. In the case of Hrant Dink it seemed like he was in a way a victim of all these phases. 
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He was a victim of disinformation through the media. He had to suffer under the article 301 about 
insulting Turkishness. And he was a victim of violent persecution, which caused him his life. I don't 
know which newspapers where involved in this case, but it shows that newspapers can be the first  
phase of the three phases of persecution. In the example of Hrant Dink, the newspapers were 
instrumental in these three phases of persecution. 
This interviewee has been working with a code of conduct for a media group, and I ask whether 
hate speech is a part of the code of conduct in this media group.  
I conducted a research on the way the Turkish media dealt with the Armenian question. That 
was done for a think-thank a couple of years ago. The Armenian question is one of the  
questions where a lot of hate speech is generated in the media in Turkey. At least there is an 
assumption that the Armenian question is one issue of the hate speech. It’s true that in the 
media you will find examples of hate speech centering the Armenian identity. People will  
call, say, the PKK terrorists for Armenians. The term Armenian might be used as a negative 
thing. What I found was that this exists, but it exists mostly in marginal media outlets. The 
mainstream media is quite clear of all this. It’s very very difficult to find something like that  
in  the mainstream media.  I  don’t  want  to  say that  the  mainstream media  is  completely 
innocent, obviously there are cases there as well, but it’s very very rare (Interviewee 8). 
This interviewee says that you find hate speech very rarely in mainstream media, but you find it 
more  often  in  marginal  newspapers.  Some  marginal  newspapers  tend  to  be  conservative 
newspapers,  and  I  assume  that  interviewee  3  and  interviewee  8  talk  about  the  same  type  of 
newspapers. So in the case of conservative and marginal newspapers, they both agree that you will 
find hate speech towards minorities. 
I ask what kind of format the newspaper the interviewee works for has, and what the newspaper 
mostly writes about. 
We’re giving news, some untold stories of Turkey. We are trying to follow up the issues 
about  minority  rights,  human rights  and democratization  process.  We are trying to  be a 
platform of different suppressed groups in Turkey. Because Turkish republican history was 
full of that kind of suppression. Different groups, non-Muslims, Kurds, homosexuals, etc., 
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are suppressed, and have problems with the state, and even the society. They cannot express 
themselves, they cannot excess their rights as citizens. Turkish history is very monolithic.  
The  official  history  is:  everything  is  good,  there  aren’t  any  problems  in  Turkish 
modernization process. Discrimination is not mentioned. Nothing is mentioned about bad 
consequences of the nationalism being so deep-rooted in the society. But after 1990s, thanks 
to the EU-process, democratization process started, and the untold stories are coming out 
from different groups, and this newspaper is a part of this process. We are speaking of this  
kind of identity problems, we are speaking of the Armenian genocide, which is also a part of 
the history of this society (Interviewee 4). 
The interviewee says that minority groups in Turkey such as non-Muslims, Kurds, homosexuals, 
have problems both with the state and with the society.  The interviewee blames the Turkish history  
for this suppression that still  exists in Turkey today. As mentioned in the Nationalism in Turkey 
chapter,  the policy of the state  during the formation of the republic of Turkey has been at  the 
expense of the minorities in Turkey. It seems like the interviewee thinks it's a little bit better today 
because of the EU process. In the Copenhagen criteria it says among other things that every country 
that wants to join EU, must have respect for and protection of minorities. Even though it's probably 
a little bit better after the EU process started, the concept of minority still trigger discriminatory 
reactions. Public  officials  have made offensive statements about minority identity.  Advocacy on 
minority rights are by some public officials considered as betrayal of the state (see 2.2.1).  Another  
aspect is that ‘minority rights’ have been associated with an unjustified interference in Turkeys' 
internal affairs. During the founding of the Turkish republic, Turkey had to grant minority rights, 
and especially to ´non-Muslims´. They were forced by the allied powers to grant these minority 
rights (see 2.1). This was probably very humiliating for Turkey, and by fulfilling the EU process, it  
arguably reminds them of the treaties of Lausanne and Sevres where they also was obliged to grant  
minority rights for minorities.  
This is just in the beginning of an interview. Here I also start by saying the research question of my 
master thesis. I thereby ask what the interviewee works with and other background questions. 
This country is full of issues. How I see the hate speech and the hate crime, which is very 
much related to media, is that there is no such a consciousness in Turkey. This politically 
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correctness is not something people pay attention to. In our daily language there are tons of  
expressions which may relate to hate speech, and on the other hand it doesn’t mean that it’s 
going further than that. But the historical background of this country is too heavy. Like in 
any artificial nation building process, the history of this nation building is so heavy in terms 
of human loss and mutual atrocities, that of course minorities are subject to permanent hate 
speech in this country.  In the media unfortunately there is no consciousness about it, quite to  
the  contrary.  Minorities,  especially  the  non-Muslim  minorities,  Christian  and  Jewish 
minorities, are subjected to this hate speech on a daily basis. There are some ombudsmen in 
some new newspapers who try to raise attention of the journalist to this sort of language, but 
with no avail. There is still a long way to go, and there are some nationalist newspapers  
where the entire newspaper is full of hate speech. But the main problem is the matter of 
mentality (Interviewee 5). 
Like the former interviewee, this interviewee thinks that the Turkish history is one reason for the 
difficult situation for minorities in Turkey today. The previous interviewee talked about minorities 
being suppressed, and this interviewee says they are victims of hate speech, both in newspapers and 
among people in general. The interviewee also says that it’s no awareness of hate speech in the 
media. The interviewee thinks a part of the problem is the mindset of people. In the polarization 
chapter Interviewee 10 a and b said that there was much internalized hatred in people. Perhaps parts 
of this culture of hatred were created already from the nation building process. In any case it seems 
like hate speech is a matter of peoples mindset and attitude according to interviewee 5 and 10 a & b.
In an interview I did with another interviewee, the interviewee told me that they published a list 
every now and then with names of newspapers which had been using hate speech lately, in order to 
put  hate  speech  on the  agenda and confront  those  newspapers.  I  asked whether  interviewee  3 
thought it would mean something to someone working for a newspaper to see their name/newspaper 
in that list,  and if  the interviewee believed it  would depend on which newspaper the journalist 
works for. 
Some of the journalists might not be aware of what's regarded as hate speech. There are 
historical  old words,  let’s say about gypsies. There is  this tradition,  and because you´ve 
heard it since you were a kid, you think it’s normal. But when you think and check it with a 
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journalistic mind, or a resourcable mind let’s say, you should see that there is a hate speech 
there against gypsies, so we should be careful about it (Interviewee 3). 
The interviewee talks about a tradition of how gypsies are being perceived in the society. Traditions 
are normally something that has existed for some time. When the interviewee says that there are 
some historical words about gypsies that people have heard since they were kids, and people start to 
think that it's normal, it seems like this stereotyping of gypsies have become a legitimizing myth. 
The reason for calling it a legitimizing myth, is that when people start to think it's normal, they have 
already accepted this stereotyping. This means that it has become a consensually held value in the 
society  (see 3.2).  Hate  speech becomes incorporated  in  the  daily  language.  This  connects  hate 
speech with what is being said by interviewee 10 a & b in the polarization chapter and interviewee 5 
in this chapter. People remain static and don't react two what is being written. Hate speech has 
become normal both in the context of polarization in the society and towards minorities. Several 
interviewees have said that even though they didn't find hate speech in mainstream newspapers, 
there  could  be  nationalistic  writings,  and  writings  around  the  minority  identity  which  is  not 
positively angled. So it might be that mainstream newspapers would for instance write a stereotyped  
story of gypsies without reflecting around whether the story would be regarded as hate speech or 
not. 
This interviewee works as an ombudsman in a Turkish newspaper. I ask whether the interviewee 
finds a lot of hate speech in the newspaper. 
It has increased. It has always to do with the Kurdish and the Armenian issue, but also about 
illegal  immigrants,  female  immigrants  say  from  Ukraine,  Russia.  Sometimes  they  are 
coming into the picture as objects of hate speech or humiliation or something like that. Anti-
Semitism is also pretty much in the newspapers, not in this paper so much, but the other 
issues particularly. Hate speech is a problem, because Turkey is one of the few countries that 
have not properly criminalized hate speech. It’s almost like the States, but in a sense that if 
you are seen as insulting Turkishness, you are in problems, subjected to indictments, legal 
inquiries,  but  as  long  as  you  are  disseminating  hate  speech  about  Jews,  it’s  okay 
(Interviewee 6). 
This interviewee says that lack of legislation about hate speech in Turkey is one reason why hate 
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speech is a problem in the country.  You can see an issue of group based hierarchy here. When 
you’re using hate speech towards minorities, it’s not a problem, but if you say something that can 
be regarded as a critique of the majority, or  insulting Turkishness,  you're in problems. There is a 
discrimination of different groups through the laws. The resource of having legislation about hate 
speech in the case of minorities, are not there yet. On the other hand there are articles in the Penal 
Code, such as article 301  insulting Turkishness, which are in the favor of the dominant group in 
society.  Hrant Dink, which was an Armenian, and representing the Armenian minority in Turkey, 
was  convicted  for  insulting  Turkishness  because  of  an  article  he  had  published in  the  weekly 
newspaper Agos. Prior to his murder he had been convicted for insulting Turkishness twice (see 
2.3.3). Social dominance theory assumes that there are three conditions that must be met for the 
state  to use the courts to enforce social hierarchy. One of these criteria is that the public  must  
tolerate the group prejudice of the criminal justice system. According to Social Dominance Theory, 
it would mean that there is an acceptance in the society of the court system in that regard, but in the  
case of article 301 there has been a lot of both national and international pressure in order to abolish 
the article. 
This  interviewee  has  been  working  as  a  journalist  before.  I  ask  whether  the  newspapers  the 
interviewee has worked for write in a negative way about minorities or not. 
We have  minorities  in  this  country,  religious  minorities,  ethnic  minorities.  They are  in 
trouble in terms of hate speech. Especially Kurds, Armenians, Greeks and Jews. They are 
being targeted as the victim of hate speech very often. Specially because there is a huge 
conflict  in  the  South-East  Turkey.  The  Kurdish  population  is  being  targeted  by  the 
mainstream news media. Being a Kurd is equal with being a terrorist in Turkey, so all the 
Kurdish people is being targeted, is being framed as PKK guerrilla, as PKK terrorists in the 
news media. Me myself was targeted as “the other”, as the public enemy because I’m saying 
the truth. If you are targeting somebody, if you are using hate speech, there is no problem 
with that if you are being perceived as the enemy by the most of the population. People have 
no problem with that. They give consent to your situation. Most of the people are giving 
consent to this kind of discourses in the media. So, most of the people are nationalist, most  
of the people are anti-Kurdish, most of the people hate Armenians. They don’t believe in 
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what we did in 1915 to Armenians (Interviewee 9). 
This interviewee connects hate speech against Kurds with the conflict in the South-East Turkey. 
Kurds are being targeted as terrorists. This is also a form of stereotyping a group of people, just like 
with the gypsies. According to the Hrant Dink Foundations' study of different newspaper in Turkey 
during a year, the most frequently seen hate speech they analyzed was hostility/war speech. So hate 
speech connected to the conflict in South-East Turkey can be a part of the reason why hostility/war 
speech was the most frequently seen form of hate speech. It looks like there’s not a problem to use  
hate speech towards someone if it’s perceived as an enemy by the government or the population. If 
you’re criticizing the way the government handle the Kurdish issue, you can end up having trouble 
with the government. This interviewee talks about being perceived as a “public enemy” for telling 
the  truth.  Dijk  also  writes  about  how groups  that  works  for  weakening of  the  majority  group 
control, risk being attacked with the media's own strategies. They can respond by marginalization 
and biased reporting in the newspapers (see 2.4.5) One reason for the readers to not respond to 
what's written in the newspapers, might be that they're afraid of the reactions of their criticism. The 
interviewee also says that most people give consent to the situation,  which reflects the view of 
interviewee 5, which says that it's all a question about mindset. People accept this kind of discourse 
in the media. One reason why most people don't react to hate speech in the media, according to 
interviewee 9 (and 5), is because most people are nationalists and anti-Kurdish. In the chapter of 
polarization, the focus was at how the society was divided between secularists and political Islam. 
In the case of nationalism which is mentioned here, it is arguably an agreement between these two 
sides. The minorities become a “threat from the outside”. It seems like the legitimizing myth of  
stereotyping and nationalism is interconnected. 
Interviewee 2 talks about hate speech in the context of LGBT people and refugees on the Syrian 
border,  and  that  in  conservative  newspapers  you  could  find  statements  like  “they’re  not  even 
human” about LGBT people. One reason why newspapers would write in this way, is because they 
want their newspapers to sell. Interviewee 3 talked about the differences between newspapers in 
terms of hate speech, and that it was normal to find hate speech in conservative newspapers. In the 
second quotation, this interviewee talked about some historical words about gypsies, and that these 
historical words people have heard since they were kids, and as a result of that they wouldn't react if 
they  found  this  sort  of  stereotyping  of  gypsies  in  the  newspapers.  Interviewee  4  talks  about 
minorities  being  suppressed,  and  that  this  is  partly  a  result  of  the  Turkish  history  and  the 
nationalism deep-rooted in the society. Interviewee 5 says that hate speech is related to media, and, 
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connects hate speech with the nation building process in Turkey. Interviewee 6 says that the Kurdish 
& Armenian issue is and illegal immigrants face hate speech in the media. The interviewee says that 
lack  of  legislation  is  the  reason  why  hate  speech  can  pass  without  problems  in  the  media. 
Interviewee 9 says that Kurds often face hate speech because of the conflict in South-East Turkey. 
In  this  context  Kurds  are  often being targeted  as  terrorists.  The interviewee also talks  about  a 
consent in society around this type of discourse in media, and that people don't react to it. Turkey 
was hostile towards minorities during the nation building process. This hostility persists in society 
today,  which you can see both in the way newspapers write about minorities,  and the fact that  
people accept this kind of discourse in the media. Since there is no legislation about hate speeh in 
Turkey, newspapers won’t face reactions from the court system either. Several interviewees say that 
you don't find hate speech in mainstream newspapers, but even though you don't find hate speech in 
newspapers, you can find writings about minorities in mainstream newspapers which don’t have to 
be positively angled. 
5.4 Media ownership
Media  ownership  is  more  related  to  the  topics  Freedom  of  speech/government,  Hate  crime 
legislation  and Islamophobia,  Self-censorship and Codes of  Conducts  and implementation.  The 
topics of media ownership are connected to the media structure in Turkey, and how the media sector 
is connected to other sectors. It also has to do with the connection between the media and the 
government. 
This interviewee has earlier worked as a journalist, and is now working in an organization. I ask the  
interviewee about the role of the media, and whether it has a consumer role or take the role of 
informing the public. 
Unfortunately now the media outlets are also working in other sectors. In the place I used to 
work they were also doing automotives, constructions, and they also had a bank, so they 
have the same interests as the government. You may say the same thing for the most of the 
media outlets. This is where it gets complicated. In the old days maybe we could talk about 
the  media as  conservative,  left-wing,  right-wing or  something like that,  now it’s  totally 
different. I mean, you may still be right- or left-wing, but if you have the same interests as 
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the government, it also affects the pieces you cover (Interviewee 2).  
The interviewee says that it's  not just about being left-wing or right-wing newspaper in Turkey, 
because the media is connected to politics through investments. It can be difficult to be a hard core 
left-wing newspaper if it is conflicting with what the governments' view. Another problem with the 
issue  of  investments  in  other  sectors  than  media,  is  that  major  private  holding companies  can 
pressure editors and journalists  to  refrain from coverage that  could harm the parent  company’s 
business interests (see 2.4.1). 
I ask the same interviewee about the effect of principles and ethical guidelines for journalists, and 
whether it's difficult to follow such principles when working as a journalist. 
If there is corruption in the construction sector and the media outlet has a share of the same 
company, they wouldn’t write about it. It would not be good (Interviewee 2). 
Even though you as a journalist would like to do critical journalism, you cannot do it if it's about a 
company that the owner of the newspaper you work for has investments in. That's why it's difficult  
to find critical coverage about the biggest companies in Turkey. Since the media earn a lot of money 
by offering advertisement space for companies in their newspapers, it's not smart to write critical  
about those companies they have in their advertisements. The advertising pressure from companies 
prevents the media from reporting on corruptions, dismissals, strikes or non-unionization in these 
companies (see 2.4.1). 
This is in the end of the interview and I just asked the interviewee if there was anything more the 
interviewee would like to say before we finished the interview. 
Say, you have media owner X, who is in cell-phone business, or energy. It’s very difficult for 
that newspaper to cover critically something about the company that is owned by the owner 
of the newspaper (Interviewee 6).  
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This interviewee says quite similar things as interviewee 2. 
I ask the interviewee what kind of role the interviewee thinks the mainstream media has, and what 
kind of interests the interviewee thinks the mainstream media has. 
Media  company  owners  have  other  interests  in  other  companies,  like  oil  companies, 
construction companies,  automotive companies etc. They’re not making money from the 
media business, but from other businesses. They are using media or media companies to get 
public funds or state contracts from the government. The media have a newspaper or a TV 
channel, and they are serving as the apparatus of the government, so that the government 
gives them a state contract from electric business for example. They are not making money 
with the newspaper,  because  the  newspapers have very low circulation in  Turkey.  Only 
Hurriyet  makes  money from the  news business,  but  the others make money from other 
businesses, so they are quite imbedded with the government (Interviewee 9).  
This investment culture started with the deregulation of the media market in the 1990s. It resulted 
in the development of ‘clientalist’ relationships between media patrons and the state. The media has 
begun to push pressure on politicians to maximize their profits in their other activity areas using 
their media outlets. Even though the media owners compete with each other, they share a common 
mindset which is to protect the ‘state interest’. Since the media ownerships are dependent on the  
state to maximize their profits in other areas, they have to protect the state interests in order to 
maintain this clientalist relationship. If a media company is interested in a state contract for electric 
business for instance, it wouldn't be very clever to print critical articles about the government in the 
newspapers the company owns. The Prime minister pushes the media owners to keep journalists 
under  control  or else  they would have to  dismiss  them for their  critical  press  coverage of the 
government’s policies, on the grounds that their portrayals would risk destabilizing the economy 
(see 2.4.2). 
This interviewee is part of a Turkish media platform for journalists who want to raise awareness 
about ethics in Turkish newspapers with focus at improving journalism in Turkish newspapers. This 
is a voluntarily media platform where journalists can join. I ask about what format the interviewee 
wants the media to have. The interviewee touched upon some aspects which have been mentioned 
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by other interviewees as well. 
The  individual  journalist  is  sometimes  not  very  powerful.  We  are  aware  of  structural 
problems in the media. Many media organizations are owned by companies, and when you 
have that kind of a structure, it’s hard to get away from all the influence for journalists from 
other factors (Interviewee 10 a). 
This  interviewee underlines  that  it's  difficult  for  the  journalists  to  be  powerful  because  of  the 
structure in media. This structure has been illustrated by interviewee 9. 
What all these interviewees are mentioning here, is that the structure of the media in Turkey can 
make it difficult for you to perform your job as a journalist the way you want to, because you  
always have to be careful of what to write and what not to write about. You have to be in line with 
the interests of the owners of the newspaper you're working for. It’s quite obvious that it’s not a 
smart thing to criticize a construction company, if it turns out that those who own your newspaper  
also owns this construction company. The former associate director of the Hastings Center, Arthur 
Caplan  has made a set of explanations why journalists' have difficulties with ethical codes, one 
explanation is that journalists are not independent practitioners serving individual clients, but rather 
hired hands working for large organizations (Iggers 1998: 28). This explanation is strengthened by 
what  my  interviewees  told  me.  One thing  which  is  only  mentioned  by  interviewee  9,  is  that 
newspapers don’t really sell much in Turkey, except for Hurriyet. The interviewee further says that 
they use the newspapers to get public funds, and in order to do that, you shouldn’t write anything 
that the government doesn’t approve. 
 
5.5 Freedom of speech/Government 
Freedom of speech is sometimes conflicting different laws in Turkey. A problem is when what 
someone regards as freedom of speech someone else regard as hate speech, or blasphemy. To regard 
some  speeches  as  blasphemy  or,  for  insulting  Turkishness,  can  also  be  regarded  as  a  way  of 
eliminating opposition. 
I mention to the interviewee that I have read a master thesis which also focuses on media ethics in 
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Turkish  newspapers,  and  that  the  interviewees  told  the  author  of  the  master  thesis  that 
monopolization, absence of editorial freedom, and lack of job security where things they took into 
consideration when they were writing for their newspapers. This interviewee talks about articles in 
the Turkish constitution which can constrain freedom of expression. 
We have  article  216  which  is  concerning  incitement  to  hatred  and  hostility,  or  making 
comments. The pianist and composer Fazil Say wrote something on twitter and now he’s 
being on trial. Freedom of speech is always violated in Turkey. This article is not actually 
aimed to put those people on trial, they're meant for protecting some people, but mostly it’s 
not used the way it should be used. This is one example why most of the journalists do auto-
censorship (Interviewee 2). 
The interviewee says that article 216 is meant for protecting people, but generally most of those 
articles are not used the way it should be used. Instead of protecting people, these articles can be 
used to put people on trial. Such articles can cause journalists to do self-censorship. If you look at  
the consequences such articles have for journalism in a human rights perspective, they actually 
prevent journalists from their right to freedom of speech. Article 216 in the Penal Code, which bans 
“inflaming hatred and hostility among peoples” has been used against journalists and others who 
write about the Kurdish population or allegedly denigrate the armed forces. An academic named 
Ismail  Besikci  was sentenced to 15 months  in prison for an article  entitled “The Rights of the 
Nations to Self-Determination and the Kurds.” Besikci has spent a total of 17 years in prison for 
similar publications on the Kurdish minority. The cartoonist Bahadir Baruter got a one-year prison 
sentence for a cartoon that appeared in the weekly magazine Penguen, depicting the words “There 
is  no God, religion is  a  lie” on the wall  of  a  mosque (see 2.3.1).  The worse consequence for 
violating such articles by performing you right to freedom of speech, is that you can end up in 
prison. 
I  tell  the  interviewee  the  topic  of  my master  thesis,  and  thereby  let  the  interviewee  talk.  The  
interviewee touches upon different topics, and this is one of the topics. 
A very famous columnist of Radikal was sent away just because of what he wrote, actually it  
was about the prime minister. He was always standing in the leftist and oppositional line. He 
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was writing for Radikal since the beginning, for sixteen years, but a couple of months ago, 
he was sent away. There are many journalists who have been taken to trial for humiliating or 
criticizing the prime minister. And as this power means politic and economic power as well, 
the owners of the newspapers can’t dare to be in a bad position with the AKP. They know 
that they can lose many things, because most of them have other kinds of investments as 
well, in energy sector or in any other sector. If your relation is once getting worse with the 
leading party, it means that your capital is in danger somehow (Interviewee 3).  
This interviewee mentions that people have been put on trial for criticizing the prime minister. 
ECtHR has addressed such defamation cases brought against journalists in Turkey. In the case of 
Erbil Tusalp, which was ordered to pay 5,000 TL, ECtHR in its judgment dated 21 February 2012 
concluded that the sentencing of a journalist to pay 5,000 TL in compensation for having attacked 
Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan’s personal rights violated Article 10 of the European Convention of 
Human Rights. They claim that the criticisms did not constitute a personal attack against the Prime 
Minister, and state that “the press fulfills an essential function in a democratic society” and that 
politicians should tolerate criticism because of the fact that they are politicians. According to the 
ECtHR,  journalistic  freedom also  includes  being provocative  and overstating,  which the  Prime 
minister should tolerate (2.3.3) So according to ECtHR Turkey violate article 10 of the European 
Convention for Human Rights, which Turkey adhere to due to their membership of the European 
Council. 
I mention article 301 about insulting Turkishness, and that this article has been debated. 
There are so many! This is in the Penal Code, you also have the anti-terror law, and many 
others. Let’s say you write a piece about the PKK. If you cover news about them, you may 
also be prosecuted. The government would say that it’s propaganda for the rebel group, and 
that’s  impossible!  You’re  a  journalist,  you  are  doing  your  job.  Most  of  the  people  are 
prosecuted just because they are doing their job. It´s the same for the lawyers in Turkey. If 
you are defending such people, you also get prosecuted. Most of the people who are in jail 
are lawyers and journalists (Interviewee 2). 
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In the quotation of interviewee 9 in the sub-chapter of minorities, the interviewee says that Kurdish 
people are portrayed as PKK terrorists in the media, and that this interviewee personally had been 
framed as a public enemy for telling “the truth”. I understand “the truth” to be a way of writing  
about  Kurdish  people  without  saying  that  they're  terrorist,  and  writing  about  them in  a  more 
nuanced way. When looking at that quotation in the light of this quotation, it seems like it can be 
difficult  to have an alternative way of reporting about the minority events such as the Kurdish 
people and the conflict in south-east Turkey. To say this very simple: if you as a journalist try to  
write more nuanced, and say that the Kurdish people not are PKK terrorists, you can end up being 
accused for being a terrorist yourself.  The government could say that it's propaganda for the rebel 
group, as interviewee 2 says here. This means that journalists are often prosecuted on charges of 
terrorism and treated as ‘terrorists’ just for having performed their duties to provide the public with 
information. 
A majority of the media freedom and freedom of expression cases in Turkey brought to ECtHR, are 
decisions based on the Penal Code and the Anti-Terror Law (see 2.3.2). The fact that a lot of the  
decisions brought to ECtHR are decisions based on the Anti-Terror Law, shows how difficult it is to 
report about the Kurdish issue in Turkey. It seems like it's easier to get away with it if you write  
hate  speech about the Kurdish people and claim that they're terrorists, than if  you have a non-
violent opinion about the Kurdish people, and try to report in a more nuanced way. 
I  asked  if  the  interviewee  had  anything  to  add  before  we  finished  the  interview.  Here  the 
interviewee talks about laws and freedom of expression. 
In Turkey you have problems with the press freedom and freedom of expression, because we 
have potentially forty articles in six or seven laws, that limit the freedom of expression; anti-
terror law, Internet law, radio-television law, press law, and Penal Code, which is five, and 
that’s enough. And those forty are there, either functional or dormant, in shelf, so they can 
take it up one day and use it against you. That’s why we have this problem, particularly with 
Kurdish colleagues, most of the jailed ones are Kurds, and also Turkish colleagues who have 
been subjected to legal proceedings because they are covering critical  court proceedings, 
political court proceedings (Interviewee 6).  
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What this interviewee says shows that the media is highly regulated by different laws and that these 
laws can be used against you if you want to cover critical court proceedings for instance. This just  
underlines what the previous interviewees have mentioned about articles that can be used against 
you. Another aspect this interviewee brings up, is that a lot of the journalists who are prisoned, are 
Kurdish. The government is probably more likely to think that Kurdish journalists writing about the 
Kurdish issue are terrorists, than Turkish journalists. 
I ask the interviewee if you can be accused for insulting Turkishness (article 301), or for supporting 
Kurds if you through an article criticize how news have been covered in South-East Turkey about 
Kurds. 
They [government] are trying to prevent religion, mostly Islam, against criticism from other 
people,  from left-wing politicians,  from atheists,  agnostics,  or  from other  people.  Many 
people are being trialed because of this. One example is the Turkish pianist Fazil Say. He 
was  in  a  court  house,  being  sued  because  he  was  saying  that  religion  is  bull  shit  or  
something.  There  is  a  caricaturist,  my  friend,  Bahadir  Baruter,  who  is  a  very  famous 
caricaturist.  He wrote something in one of his  caricatures,  saying that:  there is  no God, 
religion is bull shit, or something like that. He’s in trouble because of this. They perceive 
this as Islamophobia. It’s not Islamophobia, this is his personal opinion about religion and 
God (Interviewee 9). 
Islam is the majority religion in Turkey. If you criticize Islam you can end up in trouble, or being  
accused for Islamophobia. Peoples’ personal opinions are mixed up with hate speech. Islamohobia 
is one type of legitimizing myth. It is a type of ideology, and when someone is critical of religion 
for instance, they call it Islamophobia in order to defend their actions of putting these people on 
trial (see 3.2). 
I start by saying that this is a threat to freedom of speech. 
Exactly! There is no freedom of speech though in Turkey these days. There has never been 
freedom of speech, real freedom of speech, but it is getting worse day by day. Unfortunately, 
because the one-party rule is quite dangerous. They are becoming fascist dictators in Turkey, 
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and  people  like  dictators  in  this  country,  unfortunately,  like  Pakistan,  like  some  other 
countries.  They support  these  dictators,  and these  dictators  use all  the  channels  to  stop 
people  talking,  thinking,  sharing,  opinions,  protesting  etc.  It’s  just  getting  really  awful 
(Interviewee 9). 
The interviewee blames the government for the constraints on freedom of speech. When looking at 
what the previous interviewees have said, it can be concluded that the way the government restricts 
freedom of speech, is by actively use the article in the Penal Code, and the Anti-Terror Law to put  
people on trial accusing them for insulting Turkishness or for being terrorists. In a Human Rights 
perspective those articles actively put constraints on freedom of speech. Interviewee 9 says that 
“people like dictators in this country”. Even though it might sound a bit harsh to say that they are 
dictators,  AKP do have  a  lot  of  power in  Turkey, especially  since  they have  a  one-party rule. 
Another concern this  interviewee has, is that  people support this government. When people are 
supporting the government, they in a way also support their way of ruling.  
This interviewee is a professor which also writes columns. I asked if the interviewee tried to write  
something to counter-act hate speech when writing columns. 
In a country where you don’t have a proper democratic culture, the danger is to shift very 
quickly from anti-hate  speech legislation to anti-free speech practice.  This is the biggest 
danger. Still  a long long way to go, but there are some positive turns which didn’t  exist 
before (Interviewee 5). 
This interviewee says exactly what can be the danger with having hate speech legislation. It can be 
used for anti-free speech practice. When looking at the previous examples of what journalists have 
been convicted for, it seems like even now, without having anti-hate speech legislation, people are 
being convicted for different forms of hate speech, which others would consider as just exercising 
the right of freedom of speech.  One example is article 216 which bans “inflaming hatred and 
hostility among peoples”, which in practice have been used for hindering freedom of speech. 
Fazil  Say was mentioned as an example by three different interviewees. These examples shows 
what kind of consequences you might end up with if you write what you want, using freedom of 
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speech. If you challenge the majority religion, Islam, you can be taken for “Islamophobia”. You can 
also end up in trouble if you criticize the government, and the Prime minister. Interviewee 9 claims 
that there has never been freedom of speech in Turkey, and that it’s actually getting worse day by 
day. The interviewee thinks that the reason behind it is become it’s a one party rule in the country 
today. If you write about the conflict in South-East Turkey and if you criticize the governments' way 
of handling this situation, you might end up in trouble. This is less likely to happen if you write  
about them in a negative way and call them terrorists. 
One interviewee says that laws which are meant for protecting people, are being misused, so instead 
these laws put people on trial. Another interviewee talks about the danger to shift from anti-hate 
speech to anti-free speech practice. The other interviewees mention different examples of people 
who have been prosecuted for their writings. This shows that already today there is a certain anti-
free speech practice in Turkey. 
5.6 Hate crime legislation and Islamophobia 
Freedom of speech/government-chapter shows that there the Penal code and the Anti-Terror Law 
are used to prosecute journalists who write about the Kurdish issue or the army. On the other hand, 
there is no legislation of hate speech and hate crime in the context of minorities. This Hate crime 
legislation and Islamophobia-chapter focuses on the governments’ suggestion of having hate crime 
legislation in the context of Islamophobia. 
Interviewee 3 tells me that last year a campaign for legislation for hate crimes was launched, with 
the effort of many NGOs. They were demanding heavier punishments for hate crimes, but there was 
no response from the government while this campaign was going on. Then the interviewee says that 
a couple of months ago there was a film about Muslims, and I ask if the interviewee was thinking of 
“The innocence of Muslims”. 
Yeah. After that film the prime minister for the first time in his life said: “hate crime is a 
very serious thing. Our government will work on hate crimes. Islamophobia is one of the 
biggest  crimes of  humanity.  Suddenly  the Prime minister  stole  the idea  of civil  society. 
When he was mentioning hate crimes, he only used Islamohobia. So now the people who 
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were working for this  campaign,  are not sure if  this  legislation is  made, it  can be used 
against freedom of expression. In his mind, and in the governments mind, the only hate 
crime is Islamophobia. It can lead to serious freedom of expression problems. There is one 
example apart from this legislation, you know Fazil Say? The very famous musician. He re-
twittered something about Islam, I don’t  remember the tweet at the moment, but he was 
criticizing and humiliating in some terms Islam, but it was just a speech. Now he is being 
trialed for  humiliating Islam, so it’s  a very big danger related to  freedom of expression 
(Interviewee 3). 
Other interviewees have also talked about the hate crime legislation in the context of Islamophobia. 
This interviewee says that the government didn't listen to the civil society when they wanted hate 
crime  legislation  in  the  context  of  minorities.  It  was  only  after  the  movie  “The innocence  of 
Muslims” that the prime minister launched the idea of hate crime legislation, but only to be used in 
the  context  of  Islamophobia.  If  there  will  be  a  legislation  directly  about  Islamophobia,  the 
legislation can be used for hindering freedom of speech even more. Even without this type of hate  
crime legislation, people have been convicted for humiliating Islam, as was the case with Fasil Say. 
I ask the interviewee if you can be accused for insulting Turkishness (article 301), or for supporting 
Kurds if you through an article criticize how news have been covered in South-East Turkey about 
Kurds. The interviewee comes with different aspects which are connected with some of the other 
topics I have mentioned before. 
Hate speech is becoming very problematic in these days in Turkey, because the government 
is trying to make a law about hate speech within the context of Islamophobia, not within the 
context of ethnic minorities, or religious minorities, or disable people, etc. They are really 
interested in Islamophobia. It is stupid, because Turkey is a Muslim country. 90% of the 
people are Muslims and, in a Muslim country there wouldn’t be Islamophobia, because the 
majority  of  the  people are  Muslims.  They’re  trying to  distort  the perception  about  hate 
speech, about the definition of hate speech. It’s quite dangerous, because if you’re trying to 
create a law against Islamophobia in a Muslim country, no one says: Hey, being a Muslim is 
not a good thing, you cannot say that: religion is bad for people. You can be a victim of hate  
speech, because they say that: Hey, you are writing against religion, so you are 
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Islamophobic. Many people are being trialed because of this. One example is the Turkish 
pianist Fazil Say. He was in a court house, being sued because he was saying that religion is 
bull shit or something. There is a caricaturist, my friend, Bahadir Baruter, who is a very 
famous caricaturist. He wrote something in one of his caricatures, saying that: there is no 
God, religion is  bull  shit,  or  something like that.  He’s  in trouble because of  this.  They 
perceive  this  as  Islamophobia.  It’s  not  Islamophobia,  this  is  his  personal  opinion about 
religion and God (Interviewee 9). 
This  interviewee shares the same concerns  as interviewee 2 about  hate  crime legislation in the 
context of Islamophobia can be used to hinder freedom of speech. 
I just tell the interviewee the topic of the research question.
What is needed first and foremost, is a clear, legal framework. Of course it’s not always easy 
to have such a framework, because you can easily, end up in a liberty-side legislation. While 
trying to embed or put breaks to the hate speech, you may end up to put breaks on the free 
speech. This is the risk, and there are some activist groups which I advise time to time, who 
are in touch with the government and the legislator to have a decent piece of legislation on 
that, but we haven’t so far seen anything coming. Quite to the contrary the Prime minister 
has made his intention clear to punish the hate speech against Islam in an Islamic country,  
which is quite weird, and this is where we are (Interviewee 5). 
This interviewee addresses the importance of having a clear legal framework in order to put breaks 
to the hate speech. The interviewee also addresses the issue of implementation of such a framework,  
and that it can be used as another law for preventing free-speech. This is connected to chapter 5.5 
about Freedom of speech/government, where it is illustrated that laws meant for protecting people 
instead are used to prosecute them. 
All  the three  interviewees find it  strange that the government  would rather adopt  a hate  crime 
legislation in the context of Islamophobia rather in the context of minorities, since more than 90 % 
are Muslims. They fear that it would in principle be used for further prevent freedom of speech. 
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 5.7 Self-censorship 
Self-censorship is a practice done in journalism in order not to print anything that would cause 
troubles for the newspapers and for those working in the newspapers. Self-censorship is related to 
media ownership and their investments in other sectors, the clientalist relationship between media 
and the government, and the governmental regulation of the press. 
I talked with this interviewee about media groups. The interviewee mentioned Dogan, Dogus and 
Chalik. The interviewee further mentions that these three media groups have many newspapers, 
radio-channels,  TV-channels and magazines.  I then ask the interviewee if there might not be so 
many  different  perspectives  in  the  newspapers  since  three  media  groups  owns  that  many 
newspapers. 
Yes, you might not get so many different views. There are some columnists who write what 
they want, but looking at the last two years most of them are unemployed right now, because 
they got fired. This makes people do more auto-censorship. Now people know that if they 
write such things, something will happen to them (Interviewee 2). 
This interviewee tells you what might happen if you write about those cases that you want to write  
about. You might end up losing your job. This fear of losing your job, can make journalists to do 
auto-censorship, which means that you censor yourself first, to prevent getting into trouble. Auto-
censorship is also called self-censorship, which is the term mostly used in this master thesis. In 
2008 when Hürriyet had the case of  ‘411 hands rose to chaos,’ the government responded with 
giving  the  Dogan  group  a  disproportionally  heavy  fine  for  tax  fraud.  The  Dogan  group  had 
problems with financing the fine, and had to sell two of its major papers, Milliyet and Vatan, to the 
Karacan  family  in  partnership  with  the  Demirören  Group.  These  two  families  ended  up  in  a 
disagreement, and meanwhile journalists working in these newspapers were having trouble getting 
paid. Dogan employees have reported practicing self-censorship to avoid further trouble with the 
law (see 2.4.1). This is one example of which consequences it can have for journalists when they 
write about something which for instance the government doesn't approve of. For many journalists 
it's more important getting paid than writing about what you would like to write about, which result 
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in self-censorship. 
I asked the interviewee about the role of the media.
The mainstream media is quite profit oriented right now. There is no intention to tell the 
truth  to  the  people,  especially  news  media  I’m  talking  about.  That’s  why  all  the 
organizations  and news rooms are  changed in  terms of  this  profit  orientation.  They are 
careless about public needs and public rights to know. They don’t give a shit about it, so 
that’s  why  all  the  media  companies  have  high  parallelism  with  the  government,  high 
parallelism with  the  political  parties.  Their  role  perception  is  that  the  media  is  not  the 
mediator between the public and the state, but that the media serves for the state. They are 
afraid of the prime minister, and they don’t want to write something which is going to make 
our prime minister crazy or mad, so they are very balanced in terms of using censorship and 
self-censorship. They know what to write and what not to (Interviewee 9). 
Interviewee 3 said in the chapter of Freedom of speech/Government that a journalist lost his job 
because he wrote something about the prime minister. If you're afraid of losing your job if you write 
something which might be perceived as affending, people use self-censorship also in this context. In 
the case of Erbil Tusalp, which was convicted to pay 5,000 TL in compensation for having attacked 
Prime  Minister  Tayyip  Erdogans’ personal  rights,  the  ECTHR  rulings  decided  that  the  prime 
minister should be able to handle when journalists write critical about the prime minister.  
The media doesn't want to become enemy of the government and the prime minister, because they 
have a lot of power also in the media landscape. According to the interviewee, the media is very 
profit oriented, and doesn't have the focus of public needs and public rights to know, and one of of 
the reason is because they have high parallelism with the state. 
To conclude these two interviewees talked about reasons for doing self-censorship,  such as not 
losing your job. Another aspect they talked about is that the media is quite profit oriented, so they 
don't care about publics’ needs, but rather about what the governments’ needs. 
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5.8 Codes of conducts and implementation 
An issue with all kinds of laws, rules and guidelines, is how it is implemented. There can be many 
guidelines on paper, but if these guidelines are not implemented, they don't have any effect. 
I ask if the interviewee, which former has worked as a journalist and now is working in a non-
governmental organization, works towards journalists and cooperates with them when it comes to 
the issue of hate speech. 
There’s a platform about hate speech, they [the activist] are trying to put it in the legislation, 
and we are also a part of that platform. We are trying to remove hate speech from all the 
media outlets, but it’s nearly impossible. Just to sell the newspaper they do stuff like that. 
Most of the newspapers willingly make people targets. The problem with the law in Turkey, 
actually the problem of the law in most countries, is that you may change the law, but you 
can never make sure that it’s implemented (Interviewee 2).  
The interviewee talks about a platform where organizations are gathered in order to put hate speech 
in the legislation.  This is probably connected to the campaign launched by The Association for 
Social change (Sosyal Degisim Dernegi). They launched a campaign for the adoption of Turkey’s 
first anti-hate speech law (see 2.4.7). The interviewee further raises the problem of implementation. 
If  you're  not  implementing  a  law,  it's  just  a  dormant  law.  Even though you have  put  political  
pressure on the government and they adopt a law about hate speech for instance, the law also needs 
to properly implemented, otherwise it's not of any help. This has happened with the legal reforms in 
Turkey. Several times the legal reforms have been overshadowed by the Constitutional Court. They 
have ignored changes when the parliament has adopted progressive legal reforms in accordance 
with the ECHR standards. One example is when the Constitutional Court invalidated Article 26 of 
the Press Law in May 2011, which imposes time limits on prosecutors for launching criminal cases. 
Once this decision enters into force in July 2012, prosecutors will no longer be bound to certain  
time restraints if they want to file a case about a publication in a periodical (see 2.3.2). This shows 
that it's not enough just to implement new laws, you also need a court system that will accept these 
new laws. 
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I ask if the interviewee wants to add something before the interview is finished. 
Your thesis topic is a very crucial one for journalists all over the world. It’s good to discuss  
this topic, but just discussion is not enough. You also need the implementation to change 
things. When we are talking about the ethical codes, these ethical codes should be alive and 
open. We don’t have time to discuss in depth about the ethical codes. We have to deal with 
the laws, regulations, bosses, and so on. They are all related with each other. The journalists  
have to struggle against  these laws and regulations,  but we also have to  work on these 
ethical codes and especially hate speech (Interviewee 7). 
Interviewee 7 talks about that ethical codes should be alive and open. The interviewee also says that 
they don’t have time to talk about these ethical codes. The journalists spend a lot of time in just  
adjusting to laws and regulations. In the book of Iggers (Good news, bad news: Journalism Ethics  
and the Public Interest, 1998) there are several theories of why journalists can have difficulties 
articulating their responsibilities. James Carey of Columbia University offers some explanations. In 
his essay “Journalists Just Leave”, he observed that nearly all other professional groups that attend 
conferences about ethics, start ethics study groups, organizations, journals, or engage in other forms 
of ethical discourse, except for the journalists. Carey’s explanations are that journalists don't know 
how to talk about journalism ethics, and that journalists fear that to have a public discussion about  
their professional ethics is the first step down the road to increased regulation. Since journalism is a 
far  more  public  activity  than  medicine  for  instance,  journalists  feel  more  exposed  and  more 
defensive  about  their  practices.  Journalists  are  not  independent  practitioners  serving  individual 
clients, but rather hired working for large organizations (see 2.4.3). It seems like since the media is  
so highly regulated that journalists spend more time in doing self-censorship than thinking about 
ethical guidelines.  
I ask if the interviewee thinks that campaigns started on an international level, such as the campaign 
launched by the Council of Europe called “speak out against discrimination”, would be effective in 
Turkey, and how journalists would perceive a campaign like this. 
Let's say I’m a journalist, and I use a lot of hate speech. I come to one of your workshops, 
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you’re training me, so now I’m a trained journalist. I go to work, I write a piece, and show it  
to my editor. Since my editor has been working there for five or six years, he or she is  
accustom to the media outlet I’m working in, and he or she will say “okay, fine, but people 
won’t read it. Change it and add some other stuff. So it goes back to me. So I wrote it, and 
then I send it back and take into consideration the code of conduct I have to be in line with. 
There’s a ping pong here, between me and my editor.  Then my editor gives up, takes the 
piece, rewrites it himself or herself, and then sends it out to the bigger chief. It's not just  
about the correspondence with the journalist and the editor. It’s also about the editor and the 
bigger people in the newspaper. That’s the problem (Interviewee 2). 
According to how the interviewee answers me, it's not just to attend a course and learn how to  
“speak out against discrimination”. Perhaps you start writing articles about this topic, but the article 
might end up being censored anyway. What you write have to be approved by the editor, and if the 
editor doesn't want to have this article in the newspaper you work for, you haven't come any further. 
This is connected to the media structure in Turkey, and that the media have interests in other sectors 
and in politics. 
I ask the interviewee, which works with a code of conduct for a media group, how this code of 
conduct is going to be implemented. 
There will be cases when people will interpret these guidelines differently. There will be 
cases where they will be in doubt about what to do. The most important, crucial thing is: 
who is going to decide when there is a conflict? Who is going to say: okay you are right, you 
are wrong. Who is going to say: let’s do this this way. In most cases, this duty is given to the 
managers themselves. Which is not a good idea, because then the managers start controlling 
their own work. What we did, is, to create a post, which might be called an Ombudsman, 
although we don’t call it an Ombudsman, which will be someone from the outside trying to 
mitigate between the various parts. Even his mitigation might be not enough. Ultimately it 
will be the boards of directors who solve the issue, but I don’t think that most of the issues 
will go that far. This is something we have to see, because obviously these things can look 
very nice on paper, but it’s important to see how it will work out (Interviewee 8). 
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In this case the interviewee talked about the implementation of an ethical guideline at the workplace 
of the interviewee. What the interviewee mentions as one way of making sure that there is a good 
implementation of the ethical guideline, is by having a sort of an Ombudsman, someone from the 
outside, to mitigate between various parts. Also this interviewee mentions that it's important to see 
how things will work out in practice, and that it doesn't help if it only looks nice on paper. Having  
an  Ombudsman  in  a  newspaper,  would  probably  solve  the  example  interviewee  2  came  with 
between the editor and the journalist. The Ombudsman could discuss the issue with these two parts, 
and perhaps comes with solutions. This will also help avoiding self-censorship which the editor or 
manager, as interviewee 8 puts it, would probably have done. 
I ask if the TV-channel the interviewee works for is more open minded and less nationalistic since 
it's an international TV-channel. 
The Association of Turkish journalists has for many years ago published a code of conduct.
This is an internally developed concept, we have this already. The problem comes with the 
implementation. We have to create more and more bodies in order to protect these values. 
Maybe what we lack,  is  bodies that have power, credibility  and respect  to protect these 
values. There you have a problem. The matter is self-regulating organizations, like press 
councils, various bodies of the media itself. They are very important in making these texts 
into the real life. If you leave the application of these principles to individuals, they are in a 
very weak position. You have to build walls around them, to protect them. And these walls  
are these kind of independent bodies, that have credibility and respectability. There we have 
problems. Practically I don't think we have these bodies (Interviewee 8). 
The interviewee says that ethical guidelines would be very weak if it were just up to the journalists 
to  follow them,  and that  what  they  need is  bodies  like  press  councils  to  protect  these  ethical  
guidelines. These councils are very week in Turkey today. They have tried earlier in history to have 
self-regulation and functioning press councils and press honor board, but it didn’t work out very 
well since they didn't have sanction options. A part of the problem of the implementation is that you 
may have the laws, but not the bodies to protect those laws and implement them properly. Another 
issue not mentioned here, is that political divisions within and among various media and journalists’ 
associations might also prevent them from engaging in collaborative efforts to develop 
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rules of self-regulation (see 2.4.4). 
I ask if this interviewee has anything to add before we finish the interview. 
What I said about the lack of independent bodies is not very well understood in this country,  
but you have to take into account that there are several of them. We have the equivalent of 
the press council. It is there, and it has its own complained mechanism. It has its own code 
of conduct, and they accept complains from the public and give verdicts, but it has almost no 
credibility. There is another one, which was established as an alternative to the press council,  
that also lacks credibility. The national union of journalists. They are not organized in the 
newspaper or media, media is almost completely non-unionized. Therefore they also don’t 
have an impact. The association of Turkish journalists, okay it has a certain credibility, but 
that credibility is not enough to deal with the public authorities. So, a journalist that is in a 
difficult position in terms of ethical principles and editorial values, find himself or herself 
rather alone. I think that’s one big issue in this country. It’s a very big issue. Unless we find 
a solution to that, whatever laws you have, whatever guidelines you’ll issue, the situation 
will be more or less the same (Interviewee 8). 
This is an elaboration of the previous theme interviewee 8 talked about.  The interviewee says that 
the problem with ethical principles and codes of conducts, is that if the journalist really want to 
follow  such  rules,  it's  no  one  to  support  this  journalist  properly,  since  different  bodies  lack 
credibility and journalists are not unionized. 
I have just told the interviewee about this master thesis, and then the interviewee talks. 
It’s difficult to find out ethical practice and ethical codes in Turkey, because there is nothing 
like this. There is no responsibility and accountability among journalists, and the journalistic 
organizations are quite weak. Journalists are not organized and unionized. Although there is 
a journalist union in Turkey, journalists are not being a member of the union, because they 
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are afraid of being fired by the bosses. It used to be functioning well during the 1980s, this 
is when I started journalism actually, I was a member of the journalist union, and it was 
functioning well.  Because unions are  good to have when doing independent  journalism, 
because  you  can  fight  against  bosses,  their  demands  and  requests,  but  if  you  are  not 
unionized you are quite weak. You are just alone against all the pressure coming from the 
big companies, the government and media bosses. Starting from the 1980s, journalist unions 
began  to  be  quite  weak,  and  then  good  journalists  started  to  leave  the  field.  Ethical 
journalists,  you  know.  And  then  there  was  a  replacement  in  the  journalistic  field 
(Interviewee 9). 
If you’re unionized you can easier fight against bosses, but on the other hand it seems like if you’re 
unionized you can risk being fired because they don’t like that you’re unionized. At the beginning 
of the 1990s, the new media owners forced journalists to make a choice between their labor union 
memberships and their jobs. Few dare to bring a lawsuit against their former employers because 
they fear that they will not find a job in the sector afterwards (2.4.2). 
People  in  hierarchy-enhancing institutions  are  not  likely  to  be  challenged by people  who hold 
hierarchy-attenuating beliefs and attitudes because such people work in different institutions and 
jobs. Institutions ingrain functionally compatible ideologies through their own institutional culture 
and norms, and give employees practice at using such ideologies in their work (see 3.4). This is  
illustrated by interviewee 9 who says that a lot of good journalists left the field because it was 
getting more difficult writing good journalism, and those who are left are probably journalists who 
have fewer problems with writing about Kurdish people as terrorist for instance. An editor working 
for  a  broadcasting company said the following on the lack of  skilled journalists  in  the  sector: 
‘Nobody wants  to  invest  in  high quality  media  in Turkey. They make an effort  to  hire  young, 
inexperienced, presentable individuals who are unaware of and who do not care about ethical aspect 
of the media’ (see 2.4.2).
I have just told the interviewee the topic of my master thesis. 
If I say one sentence about the ethical codes and hate speech and how the Turkish journalists 
deal with it, is that they don’t. That’s my first answer. Of course there are some councils, 
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there are some unions, but first of all the journalists in Turkey, somehow are surrounded by 
the laws and regulations, and by the ownership structures, and then not being member of a 
union, trade union. During the last  years for instance, the journalists are surrounded and 
somehow are obliged to struggle for the journalists who are in prison or under trial, so this is 
the  more  crucial  thing  we  have  to  deal  with,  and  that’s  why  these  ethical  codes,  and 
concerning the hate speech, concerning the macho nature of the media in general is very 
difficult (Interviewee 7). 
This interviewee sum up several aspects other interviewees also have mentioned. This interviewee 
talks  about  the  other  challenges  that  journalists  have  to  face,  such  as  the  media  being  highly 
regulated. This in turn makes less space for discussions about ethical codes. 
One of the interviewee talks about the challenge of doing ethical journalism, because what the 
journalist writes has to be approved by the editor. If the editor doesn't approve what is being written, 
the journalist hasn’t come any further. This implies that attending a anti-discrimination course in 
journalism, wouldn't necessarily pay off, since what the journalist write has to be approved by the 
editor. The relationship between the journalists and the media owner is too weak, and for journalists 
to be able to follow a code of conduct, it has to be protected by bodies such as the Press Council and 
the Turkish journalists association. These bodies are too weak, so the journalist stands rather alone. 
Another problem is that the newspapers have started to hire young and inexperienced journalists, so 
many journalists which have focused on ethical journalism, have left the field. 
5.9 Social media 
Facebook, twitter and YouTube are examples of social media. What is special with social media 
compared to regular media, is the fact that all people who have access to Internet can express their  
opinions through social media. Even though the government can regulate and even close certain 
types of social media, it is much more difficult controlling social media than newspapers. Social 
media is not the focus in this master thesis, but it's so widespread, commonly used and serves as an 
alternative information channel, that it's natural to have it as a topic in the analysis. 
I ask if the organization the interviewee works for cooperates with journalists when producing 
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reports. 
Social  media  is  really  difficult  to  control,  the  language  they  use  there,  the  TV-shows, 
because  many people  can’t  see those  kind  of  language at  once  in  social  media.  So it’s 
widespread, it spreads very quickly and it’s even more dangerous (Interviewee 1). 
Social media is that it's less controlled than other types of media. There are no ethical principles,  
only the principles carried within each individual which uses the social media. If hate speech is  
expressed on Internet it's more dangerous than if it's expressed in newspapers, because it spreads so 
quickly, and can reach to a greater amount of people. 
I asked the interviewee how the media group decided to make their own principles for their work. 
Since a long time Dogan Publishing Group had its own code of conduct, but we felt that it  
was  not  enough  to  cover  the  television  activities.  It  was  a  bit  more  centered  on  the 
newspaper side of the business. It wasn’t enough to cover the television+ there were things 
that we wanted to add, like for instance how to deal with the social media. Which is a new 
thing, that code of conduct was written almost maybe ten years ago, so it was in that sense 
also a bit out of date (Interviewee 8).  
The fact that Dogan Publishing Group has added social media in their new code of conduct,  shows 
that social media is important to take into consideration. Since the last code of conduct was written 
maybe ten years ago, there has been a rapid growth of the use of social media the last ten years. 
I ask the interviewee if the marginal extreme nationalist newspapers also can have a huge impact 
even though not many people read those newspapers. 
Sure. Because of the social media actually (Interviewee 9). 
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This comment implies that even though a newspaper can be very marginal and not many people 
read it, it can be read by many if the content of their writings are spread through the internet. Social  
media  can  be  instrumental  in  spreading  extreme  views  that  otherwise  would  have  been 
marginalized.
I ask the interviewee about the climate in the society. I wonder if the media is a mirror of the society  
or if the society is formed by the media. 
Media is still a tool to shape the society; the governments, the parties, the interest groups are 
using media as a tool too, in order to shape the society. But now we have some possibilities 
to break it,  as Internet,  Twitter,  Facebook. So people can get the right information from 
those sources (Interviewee 4). 
Here the positive side of the social media is mentioned. If social media is used the right way, it can 
be used for correcting biased news from the government  and different  parties.  One way social 
media  challenged regular  media  in  terms  of  being an  informative news channel,  was with  the 
incident in Hakkari province at the end of 2011. 34 Kurdish civilians were bombed by military 
fighter jets in the Uludere/Roboski village. The mainstream media waited till the government issued 
a  press  statement  before  they  released  their  first  coverage.  When they had  released  their  first 
coverage, the public opinion was already informed about the incident through the Kurdish news 
sources and the social media (see 2.4.1).
I just ask the interviewees if they have anything to add before I finish the interview. 
I think the internet has played a role in it to, the social media. People have become more 
aware.  Before maybe some of  those  violations  were being done unknowingly,  even the 
readers are understanding that certain things are incorrect with the free float information, 
and social media (Interviewee 10 b). 
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The interviewees mention both the positive and the negative effects of having social media. Social 
media is more dangerous in terms of hate speech, because it spreads more quickly, and it is more 
difficult to stop. The positive effect of having social media is that they operate outside the media 
structure, and news that different newspapers are reluctant to print, can be spread through social  
media. In the case of the bombing in the Hakkari province, Kurds are able to document the bombing 
by filming and post it on Facebook or as a video on YouTube. 
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CHAPTER 6
 CONCLUSION
How do Turkish journalists deal with ethical challenges in their work with special regard to codes
of conduct and hate speech?
In  this  master  thesis  I  wanted  to  get  to  know  more  about  how  minorities  are  perceived  and 
described by journalists in Turkish newspapers, since I assume that newspapers are instrumental in 
shaping peoples'  attitude towards minorities.  I also suggest that it  is the other way around that 
newspapers reflect the already existing attitude people have towards minorities. 
I also wanted to explore to what extent journalists follow codes of conduct in their daily work, and 
if they don't, what are the reasons for not following a certain code of conduct. In the introduction 
there are different suggestions of reasons why journalists wouldn't follow a code of conduct. Maybe 
the problem is on an individual level,  that most journalists are not well  enough educated about 
codes of conduct and ethical guidelines. Or perhaps it is on an institutional level, that there is no 
room for following ethical guidelines such as a code of conduct because media only care about 
profit maximation. 
Based on the analysis chapter it seems like hate speech occur both in the context of polarization and 
in the context of nationalism. When it occurs in the context of polarization, it is because of the 
conflict between political Islam and the secularists in Turkey. Both sides have economical resources 
and power to use the newspapers for expressing their opinions about each other. These news are 
often distorted and biased, and would in extreme cases be regarded as hate speech. 
Hate speech also occurs in the context of nationalism. When it occurs in this context, it is mostly 
targeted at  minorities.  The nation building process in Turkey was at  the expense of minorities. 
Illustrating examples are the ban on the use of minority languages in schools and in courts, and the 
requirement of ‘belonging to the Turkish race’ for recruitment to military academies and 
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employment in the public sector. This national history is one factor why minorities face hate speech 
in Turkey today. This is reflected both in society and media. When minorities face hate speech, it 
often has a stereotyping character. It could be to say that a minority group is stealing, or, in the case  
of the conflict  in  South-East  Turkey, to  say that all  Kurds are  terrorist.  When it  comes to this 
conflict, newspapers are instrumental in this form of hate speech. 
Since  Turkey  lacks  hate  speech  legislation  in  the  context  of  minorities,  journalists  don't  get 
prosecuted for writing hate speech. The newspapers are more or less nationalistic, which means that 
even though not all newspapers write what would be defined as hate speech, there can be negative  
discourse about minorities in the newspapers. 
When it comes to code of conduct, it's one of three self-regulation mechanisms in journalism made 
in order for the journalists to maintain professional respect and to let the media perform the best  
service as possible to the public.  A code of conduct should be protected by press councils  and 
journalist  associations,  which  is  another  self-regulating  mechanism.  The  press  council  and  the 
Turkish Journalists association are not functioning well in Turkey, since they don't have any power 
to sanction if a journalist violates a principle in a code of conduct. 
Instead  of  having a  well-functioning self-regulation  mechanism, Turkey has  a  well-functioning 
governmental-regulated press. It is not well  functioning in the sense that journalists  themselves 
want it to be this way, but in the sense that the government succeed in functioning as a regulating 
mechanism for the press. The fact that the government regulates the press, results in a lot of self-
censorship. The government regulates the press through different media laws, and through the Penal 
Code and the Anti-Terror Law. There are articles in the Penal Code which in practice only is used 
for the purpose of prosecuting journalists, such as article 301 Insulting Turkishness. The Anti-Terror 
Law has been used when journalists write non-violent critical articles about the conflict in South-
East Turkey. Some of the goals of the principles in a code of conduct is to ensure that the journalist 
provide reliable news and avoid discrimination. A journalist  can have the intention of writing a 
reliable  and non-discriminative  article  about  this  conflict,  but  can  end up being prosecuted  for 
writing propaganda for a terrorist organization. In order not to get in trouble with the law, many 
journalists do self-censorship, which is a way of self-censoring the content of what is being written.
Another factor which results in self-censorship, is the interconnection between the media and other 
financial  sectors.  Media  owners  invest  in  different  companies,  and  if  there  is  corruption  in  a 
company the media owner for a newspaper have invested in, the journalists employed for this 
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newspaper do self-censorship in order not to get in trouble with the media owner. Then in turn the 
media owner doesn't get any problems with the given company. 
Media also has a clientalist relationship with the government. Media owners use media to get state 
contracts from the government, and in turn the media serves as the apparatus of the government. 
Since the media sector has economic interests in being on line with the government, they have a 
common mindset of protecting the interest of the government. This means that journalists also do 
self-censorship when they write about the government, because the media owner doesn't want to 
have any problems with the government  either.  Self-censorship prevents  journalists  from doing 
their  job  properly,  and  in  a  human  right  perspective  self-censorship  prevents  journalists  from 
exercising their right to freedom of speech. 
There are a lot of laws preventing journalists from exercising their right to freedom of speech, but 
there is no legislation preventing journalists from writing hate speech, which is not a human right.
Activists and organizations have tried to do something about this by launching a campaign which 
suggests that Turkey adopt hate crime legislation in the context of minorities. The government has 
not listened to the civil society. After the movie the “innocence of Muslims” they instead suggested 
hate  crime legislation in the context of Islamohobia.  This would in practice mean a hate crime 
legislation in the context of the majority, instead of a hate crime legislation in the context of the  
minority. 
If there would be hate crime legislation in the context of minorities in Turkey today, it would also  
be a question of implementation of this legislation. If the law is not implemented, the legislation has  
no effect.  There are  examples  of  reforms  that  have  been made in  Turkey which  has  not  been 
respected by the court. One illustrating example is the legal reforms implemented by the parliament 
to fulfill the ECHR standards. These reforms were overrun by the court system. This means that it's 
not enough to change the laws, there also has to be a court  system which approves of the new 
changes in the law. 
In a theoretical perspective nationalism is a legitimizing myth. These myths are consensually held 
values, attitudes, stereotypes and cultural ideologies. Racim, sexism and nationalism are three types 
of legitimizing myths. Several of the interviewees say that that people don't react when they read 
hate speech in the newspapers. It seems like the nationalistic attitude has become normal, and that 
nationalism has become a consensually held value. 
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Legitimizing  myths  are  categorized into hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing myths and hierarchy-
attenuating legitimizing myths, where nationalism is classified in the former category. Hierarchy-
enhancing  legitimizing  myths  contribute  to  moral  and  intellectual  justification  for  group-based 
oppression and inequality. In Turkey, nationalism is infused in the Penal Code and the Anti-Terror 
Law. Article 301 insulting Turkishness, is one example in this regard. The Penal Code is being used 
for  intellectual  justification  for  group-based  oppression  and  inequality.  They  justify  violating 
freedom of speech by saying that journalists are insulting Turkishness. The government becomes 
the dominant group since they have more power and resources, and they can assign negative social  
value to journalists, since the journalists can get prosecuted and in worse case end up in prison.  
Institutions  can  also  be  classified  as  either  hierarchy  enhancing  or  hierarchy  attenuating.  An 
example of a hierarchy-enhancing institution, is the criminal justice system. They are viewed as 
mechanisms of group dominance because subordinates often are over-represented in cases brought 
against them in court and in prison cells. In the case of Turkey, a lot of cases are brought against  
journalists, and also many journalists are in prison. 
The organizations which work for the government to adopt hate crime legislation in the context of 
minorities, are typical hierarchy-attenuating institutions. These institutions include human rights, 
civil  rights, civil  liberties groups, welfare organizations and religious organizations. They try to 
balance  the  consequences  of  hierarchy-enhancing  institutions,  but  still  the  hierarchy-enhancing 
institutions have disproportionally more power. In the case of Turkey the organizations try to help 
minorities in being protected by a hate speech law, but since organizations, which represent the civil 
society, don't have as much power as for instance the criminal justice system, the government can 
decide not to listen to them. 
Ideologies that counter group-based dominance are called hierarchy-attenuating legitimizing myths, 
which are political doctrines such as social democracy, socialism, and human rights. The European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) is a court which bases its decisions on the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR). This means that ECtHR is a hierarchy-attenuating institution which 
protects a hierarchy-attenuating legitimizing myth. ECtHR tries to counter the dominance of the 
criminal  system in Turkey. Also in the case of ECtHR, they lack the base of power which the  
criminal system has, and their judgments are only recommendations for Turkey. 
Institutions and people select each other in order to make the values and legitimizing myths 
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compatible. It seems like that's also the case for these interviewees. They have chosen to work for 
newspapers which have the most compatible values as themselves. One of the interviewee was a 
former journalists, but didn't manage to work as a journalist anymore because it wasn't compatible 
with the interviewees’ values. This interviewee also said that the newspaper owners choose young 
and  inexperienced  journalists,  which  didn't  care  that  much about  ethical  principles.  Then they 
choose to have people in their work which affirm the values of the newspaper, and they won't get  
confronted.
Conclusive remarks 
When the research question was formulated, I expected to find hate speech primarily targeted at 
minorities, but it turned out that hate speech also could be targeted at political enemies. Since hate  
speech can lead to  hate crime,  newspapers have  an effect  in  forming peoples’ attitude towards 
minorities. In the case of Hrant Dink, it was an ultranationalist which assassinated him, so this is  
not to say that everyone would react in an extreme ways just by what they read. Peoples attitude 
towards minorities are not just  formed by the press, but also by the nation building process of 
Turkey,  where  minorities  were  suppressed.  There  are  direct  proves  that  newspapers  reflect  the 
already existing attitude people have towards minorities, but the media is profit oriented, so they 
would print news people have the interest of reading. People in general complain very little about  
hate speech in newspapers, so there is an acceptance of what is being written. 
There is an assumption in the introduction chapter that a code of conduct is not being followed as  
much as one should hope for. The analysis has confirmed this assumption. The problem lies both on 
an individual and structural level. Many journalists don't care following a code of conduct because 
the media hire young and inexperienced people who they think would easily adjust to the value of 
the given newspaper, which could be the value of profit-maximation. Since the bodies which should 
protect a code of conduct don't have real sanction mechanisms, there is no incentive for following a 
code of conduct either. A code of conduct can also be conflicting with the Penal Code and the Anti-
Terror Law, if a journalist would write reliable and non-discriminative about the Armenian genocide 
or the South-East conflict. Journalists have been prosecuted for doing exactly that. Since the media 
have  economic  interests  in  being  in  line  both  with  the  government  and  companies  they  have 
invested in, journalists focus more at performing self-censorship than following a code of conduct.  
If journalists don't think about what they write about companies and the government, it will have 
consequences. So there is an incentive for doing self-censorship. 
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One interviewee says that the danger is to shift from anti-hate speech legislation to anti-free speech 
legislation, but I would say that to a certain degree there is already an anti-free speech legislation in  
Turkey. This was said in the context of adopting hate crime legislation to protect minorities. 
For the journalists to be able to follow a code of conduct, the self-regulating must be functioning 
much  better  than it  does  in  Turkey today.  The  working conditions  must  also  be  improved  for 
journalists,  so  that  they  have  time  to  discuss  ethics  in  depth,  and  not  to  worry  about  all  the 
governmental laws and regulations. If there was a better climate for discussing ethical in depths,  
and less worries about self-censorship, hopefully it would also create more diversity in media, and a 
better discourse about minorities in newspapers. 
Further research 
Because of the limitation of time and the aim of having a specific focus at newspapers in this master  
thesis, social media has barely been a subject except for in chapter 5.9. Even though social media is 
not in scope in this master thesis, I think it would have been interesting to look at to which extent  
social media challenges the role of the regular media. Maybe social media can be instrumental in 
changing the uneven balance between hierarchy-enhancing and hierarchy-attenuating institutions? 
In  some  cases  organizations  don't  get  their  suggestions  through  because  there  is  not  enough 
awareness among the people about the issue. Even though organizations don't have as much power 
as the criminal system in Turkey, there is also a power having a lot of people which support you. 
The social media can be a way to reach out to more people. If hate crime legislation in the context 
of minorities was an issue many people in Turkey cared about, it would be more difficult for the  
government to overlook the suggestion. A government is after all chosen by the people, so they 
have to make sure that they stay popular.  
Social media is instrumental in informing people about news when they happen, and perhaps social 
media easier perform the duty of “public rights to information”?  In the Uludere/Roboski incident,  
where 34 Kurdish civilians were bombed by military fighter reportedly mistaken as PKK militants, 
the  mainstream  media  did  not  cover  the  massacre  in  the  first  18  hours  and  waited  till  the 
government issued a press statement before they released their first coverage. Meanwhile people 
had already been informed through the Kurdish news sources and the social media. This incident 
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damaged the reliability of the regular media. 
Maybe the government must change their laws regulating the media in order for the journalist to be 
able to write more critical  journalism, since people get to know the news through social media 
anyway? That could be one way of increasing the reliability of the media. 
There are also negative effects of the quick flow of information on social media. Extreme forms of 
hate speech can reach out to much more people than it would have done without social media. One 
example is the movie “the innocence of Muslims”. It was posted on YouTube in June 2012, and 
during  some  months  it  was  known to  the  whole  Muslim  world.  It  resulted  in  many  peaceful  
demonstrations,  but also in violent  riots,  causing the life  of an American ambassador in Libya. 
Social  media  are  also  regulated  in  many countries,  but  I'm not  certain  if  they mostly regulate 
freedom of speech or hate speech. But maybe there are possibilities for social media to be self-
regulated?
I leave those reflections and questions open for discussion. 
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APPENDICES
Theme guide: 
Background questions
Concerning around: 
Experience, motivations
Type of work the person has now
Role of the media
What kind of role do you think that the media has: 
consumer role, information role etc. 
Principles
Usual  principles/ethical  guidelines  for  journalists,  in  which  way  do  you  think  they  are  being 
followed as an insider/outsider: 
Truth Telling - an addiction to factual accuracy, checking and re-checking;
the skill of anticipating the possibility of error
Independent and Fair – stories that are complete, without suppression
of significant facts; striving to avoid bias
Humanity and Solidarity – doing no direct, intentional damage to others
Challenges with implementation
Ethical challenges in newspapers: monopolization, the absence of editorial freedom, the lack of job 
security, failure to accept ethical codes, ethics vs. profit 
Your own thoughts of ethical challenges in different medias: Radio, TV, newspapers etc…
Cooperation 
In your work, how do you cooperate with:  
Newspaper  owners,  press associations,  ombudsman,  the readers  and organizations (NGOs),  TV, 
radio 
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(Angle it from your own standing) 
Campaigns developed by organizations
Any knowledge and thoughts about these efforts (or similar efforts): 
-Speak out against discrimination 
- Press Council’s code of principles
- Journalists Association of Turkey (TGC) 
-National codes, or universal codes
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The Turkish Journalists Declaration of Rights and Responsibilities: 
Preface 
Every journalist and media organization should defend the rights of journalists, observe 
professional principles and ensure that the principles defined below are followed. Those who are 
not journalists but participate in journalistic activities in media organizations under different forms 
and those who target foreign audiences in Turkey or Turkish audience abroad also come under the 
responsibilities defined here. 
The directors of media organizations, chief editors, managing editors, responsible editors and others 
are responsible for compliance with professional principles by the journalists they employ as well as 
their media product. 
Journalists’ rights constitute the basis of the public right to information and its freedom of 
expression. Professional principles, on the other hand, constitute the basis of accurate and reliable 
communication of information. 
Professional principles assume self-regulation by journalists and media organizations.Their primary 
criterion for judgment is their own conscience. 
A. Human and Citizen Rights: 
Every individual has the right to be informed and to have access to news as well as freedom of 
thought, expression and free criticism. 
Freedom of press and publication, which is the main tool of freedom of thought and expression, is 
one of the basic human rights. 
It is a general rule that these rights should be guaranteed by the constitution in a democratic state. 
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B. Definition of a Journalist: 
Any individual whose job is to gather, process, communicate news or to express opinion, ideas and 
views regularly at a daily or periodical print, video, audio, electronic or digital medium employed 
on a fulltime, contractual or copyright basis and whose main employment and means of livelihood 
consists of this job, and who is defined as such by the legislation that covers the functioning of the 
organization at which he or she is employed, is a journalist. 
All enterprises functioning in the field of press and publication are obliged to recognize the rights 
granted to journalists by law. 
C. Responsibilities of Journalists: 
The journalist uses the freedom of the press conscientiously and honestly to further the public’s 
right to be informed and to have access to accurate news. For this purpose, the journalist should 
fight all forms of censorship and self-censorship and to inform the public on this question. 
The responsibility of the journalist to the public supersedes all other responsibilities, including 
those to his employer and public authorities. 
Information, news and free thought are of a social nature that separates them from all other 
commercial commodities and services. The journalist carries all responsibility for the news and 
information he publishes. 
The limits and contents of journalists’ freedom are primarily determined by their responsibility and 
professional principles. 
D. Journalists’ Rights: 
1. Journalists have the right to free access to all sources of information and the right to observe and 
research all phenomena that affect public life or are of interest to the public. Obstacles, such as 
secrecy or classification, should be based on law in matters concerning public affairs and 
convincing reasons in private matters. 
2. Journalists must take into account the basic policy line of the media organization that should be 
included among the terms of their employment contract. 
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3. Journalists have the right to reject all sorts of suggestions, proposals, requests and instructions 
that are outside, conflict with or are not openly described in that basic policy. 
4. Journalists cannot be compelled to defend an opinion that they do not share or to perform any 
assignment that violates professional principles. 
5. Journalists, particularly those who are employed at an editorial and managerial level, should be 
informed about important decisions that affect and determine the functioning of the media 
organization; whenever it is necessary they should take part in making these decisions. 
6. Relevant to their function and responsibilities, journalists have the right to organize. They also 
have the right to sign contracts individually to safeguard their moral and material interests. The 
journalists should be paid a salary that is commensurate with their social role, skill and the amount 
of work required. Their salaries should also guarantee their economic independence. 
7. According to the principle of the protection of sources, the journalists cannot be compelled to 
reveal their sources or testify about them. This principle may be waived with the consent of the 
source. The journalist may reveal the identity of his source in cases where he has been clearly 
misled by the source. 
E. The Basic Duties and Principles of a Journalist: 
1. The public has a right to know. The journalist has to respect facts and to report accurately, 
whatever the consequences from his personal point of view. 
2. The journalist defends, at whatever cost, the freedom of gathering information, news evaluation 
and making comments and criticism. 
3. The journalist defends the universal values of humanity, peace, democracy, human rights, and 
pluralism and respects differences. Without any discrimination based on nation, race, ethnicity, 
class, gender, language or religious and philosophical belief, the journalist recognizes the rights and 
values of all nations, peoples and individuals. 
The journalist refrains from publishing material that incites enmity and hatred among 92 
individuals, nations and societies. The journalist should not target the cultural values or beliefs (or 
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lack of beliefs) of any society or of an individual. The journalist should not publish or broadcast 
material that justifies or incites violence of any kind. 4. The journalist should refrain from 
publishing and broadcasting news and information, the source of which is unknown to him. In cases 
where the source is not known, he is obliged to warn the public. 
5. The journalist cannot ignore or destroy relevant information, alter or falsify texts and documents. 
He must refrain from publishing material that is incorrect, false or misleading. 
6. The journalist cannot resort to misleading methods in order to obtain information, news, visual 
images, audio material or other documents. 
7. Even if the person in question is a public figure, unless journalists obtain permission they cannot 
violate privacy for purposes that are not directly related to the public right to information. 
8. Journalists are committed to the rule that any inaccurate information published should be 
corrected in the shortest possible time. Every journalist respects the right to respond on condition 
that it is not misused or abused. 
9. According to the rule of professional secrecy, journalists can not reveal the sources of 
information and documents entrusted to them under any circumstances unless allowed by their 
sources. 
10. Journalists should refrain from slander, insult, distortion, manipulation, rumor, gossip and 
groundless accusation. 
11. Journalists cannot seek material gains or moral advantages from publishing or withholding an 
item of information or news. Professional principles are the main guide for journalists in 
establishing and conducting relations with people or institutions and sources of information, 
including even heads of state as members of parliament, businessmen and bureaucrats. 
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12. Journalists should not combine their professional work with advertising, public relations 
activities or propaganda. Journalists cannot accept suggestions, advice or material benefits from 
sources of advertisement. 
13. Whatever the subject matter, journalists cannot use information for personal interest before it is 
fully made public. They cannot use their profession to obtain any form of personal privilege 
(outside rights given by laws and regulations). 
14. Journalists cannot resort to blackmail or any form of threat to obtain information. They should 
resist all pressure to gather information by such means. 
15. Journalists must reject all kinds of pressure and should not accept instructions regarding their 
job from anyone except the executives of the media organizations employing them. 
16. Anyone entitled to be called a journalist is committed to fully abiding by professional principles. 
While observing due respect to the laws of the country, journalists should rebuff all interference 
from the government and official institutions. Professionally, journalists should take into account 
only the judgment of the public, colleagues and verdicts of independent jurisdiction. 
17
1817. Journalists should function according to the public’s right to know and not prejudices 
regarding domestic and international policy issues shaped by those in government. Journalists 
should be guided solely by basic professional principles and concerns for a free democracy.
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TURKISH JOURNALISTS CODE OF CONDUCT 
News and Comment: 
The distinction between news and comment or editorials should be made clear to enable the public 
to discern easily the difference between them. 
Photography – Visual Images: 
Any photograph or visual image used should be clearly marked to show whether it is real or an 
enactment or simulation. The audience should be allowed to easily discern whether the image is 
accurate or a representation. 
News – Advertisement - Announcements: 
The texts and visual elements of news and editorials should be clearly separated from the texts and 
visual elements of advertisements and commercial announcements to leave no room for confusion. 
Judicial Reporting: 
During the preparatory investigation of a legal case, news and commentaries that might influence 
and weaken the legal process should not be disseminated. News during the trial should be provided 
free of any prejudice or inaccuracy. The journalist should not become a party in any legal process 
about which he is reporting. Nobody should be represented as guilty before the legal verdict is 
finalized. Nobody should be implied as guilty in news and comment unless found guilty at the end 
of the legal process. 
Minors: 
The identities and visual images of minors as defendants, witnesses or victims in criminal or sexual 
assault cases should not be published or made public. In cases where the personality and behavior 
of minors could be affected, journalists should not interview or use the visual image of a minor 
unless given prior permission by the family or an adult responsible for the minor in question. 
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Sexual Assault: 
The visual images and identities of the victims of sexual assault cases should not be published or 
made public expect in instances where there is a clear public interest in such publication. 
Identity and Special Cases: 
An action or an offence committed by an individual should not be attributed to race, nationality, 
religion, sex or sexual choice or any disease or physical or mental disorder unless there is relevance 
or evident public interest. These special character traits should never be the subject of ridicule, 
insult or prejudice. 
Health: 
Sensationalism in health issues should be avoided, Dissemination of information that would incite 
desperation or create false hope should be prevented. Rudimentary findings of medical research 
should not be presented as final and definitive. Before suggesting the use of a particular drug, an 
expert scientist should be consulted. Any journalist, who is conducting research at hospitals, should 
openly declare his identity and enter prohibited areas only with the permission of hospital 
authorities. Journalists should not take visual images or audio recordings at hospitals without the 
permission of hospital authorities, the patient or relatives responsible. 
Gifts: 
Journalists should reject personal gifts and material benefits that would create public doubt or 
prejudice over the contents of a particular news item or information and the decision to make it 
public. 
Company Interests: 
The rights, responsibilities and duties of journalists described in “The Declaration of Rights and 
Responsibilities” determine how they function in a media organization. Within this professional 
framework, the journalist should not take part in activities not relevant to the publishing policies of 
the media organization, either voluntarily or by compulsion, even if such activity may be in the 
interest of the company. 
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Self-criticism: 
Journalists and media organizations should correct their mistakes and engage in self- criticism 
beyond their legal obligation in order to respect the right of reply and correction. 
Impartiality: 
Journalists and media organizations should clearly announce their positions in cases where they are 
parties in a dispute or a contractual matter. Any media organization or commentator can disseminate 
comments in accordance with their political, economic and social affiliation. In such cases, the 
nature of the affiliation should be clearly stated and a clear distinction drawn between comment and 
news. 
Privacy: 
The basic principle is the protection of the public interest. Situations in which the privacy principle 
does not apply include: 
a. Research and publication on major corruption or criminal cases; 
b. Research and publication on activities that would have a negative effect on the public; 
c. Cases where public security or health is at stake; 
d. To prevent the public from being misled or deceived or from committing mistakes because of the 
actions or statements of the person in question. 
Even in these situations, the private information made public should be directly related to the 
subject. The extent to which the private life of the person in question affects his public activity 
should also be considered. 
Information – Documents: 
Journalists should not take documents, photographs, audio recording or visual images without the 
consent of the person concerned expect in cases where the public interest is at stake. This principle 
can only be waived in cases where there is a clear public interest and if the journalist has a firm 
conviction that the material cannot be obtained otherwise. 
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Payment in Exchange for Information: 
The journalist should not offer or give money in exchange for information, documents or visual 
images to defendants in a criminal case or to witnesses or their associates. 
Cases of Shock and Confusion: 
When there are people in distress, sorrow, danger, disaster, destruction or shock, the journalist’s 
approach should be humane and respectful of privacy. He must refrain from exploiting feelings. 
Relatives and Associates of Defendants: 
Journalists should not expose the identity of the relatives and associates of defendants or convicted 
persons unless they are directly related to, or are essential in, a correct perception of the events that 
transpired. 
Suicide Cases: 
In cases of suicide, publishing or broadcasting information in an exaggerated way that goes beyond 
normal dimensions of reporting with the purpose of influencing readers or spectators should not 
occur. Photography, pictures, visual images or film depicting such cases should not be made public. 
Economic and Financial Information (Insider Information): 
Even if the current law does not ban it, journalists should not use economic and financial 
information obtained for personal interests before making it fully public. Journalists should not 
disseminate information about securities, stocks, shares and other papers of value they or their 
relatives or associates hold, without accurately informing their superiors at the media organization 
about such ownership. Journalists should not indulge in real estate or similar transactions if these 
are the subject matters of their news and comment. 
Embargo, Preview, Off-the-Record: 
Journalists should comply with the publication date specified by the source of a piece of 
information or a document unless they have obtained such information independently. Journalists 
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have no commitment to let anyone, including the source, preview the drafts of news stories, 
interviews, commentaries or visual images of 
material they are preparing to publish or broadcast, except responsible persons at the media 
organizations employing them. Journalists should not publish or broadcast off- the-record 
information or statements. 
Competition: 
Journalists should refrain from deliberately causing professional harm to their colleagues even for 
purposes of competition. They should refrain from acts that would prevent their colleagues’ material 
from reaching the public. 
Sourcing: 
Journalists should give credit to the sources of information, including material from agencies, other 
colleagues or other publications. 
Non - journalists: 
The actual titles and professions of those who perform journalistic activities at media organizations 
should be clearly announced periodically or occasionally in order to inform the public. 
Questions of Identity: 
Whatever the expertise of a journalist, his main job is journalism. Police reporters should not act or 
disseminate information as policemen or police spokespersons. Similarly, sports reporters are not 
spokespersons for sports clubs and reporters assigned to cover a political party are not members or 
spokespersons of that party. 
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EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
Reaffirming their profound belief in those fundamental freedoms which are the foundation of 
justice and peace in the world and are best maintained on the one hand by an effective political 
democracy and on the other by a common understanding and observance of the human rights upon 
which they depend; 
Being resolved, as the governments of European countries which are like-minded and have a 
common heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law, to take the first steps for 
the collective enforcement of certain of the rights stated in the Universal Declaration, 
Have agreed as follows:
Article 10, freedom of expression, says: 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold 
opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority 
and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of 
broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject 
to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary 
in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for 
the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the 
reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or 
for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. 
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